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Abstract 
 
 This mixed-method study is focused on the values, beliefs, and attitudes of 
Jordanian elites towards liberalization, democratization and development. The study aims 
to describe elites’ political culture and centers of influence, as well as Jordan’s viability 
of achieving higher developmental levels. Survey results are presented. The study argues 
that the Jordanian regime remains congruent with elites’ political culture and other 
patterns of authority within the elite strata. However, until this “cautious liberal” political 
culture of Jordanian elites changes, a transitional movement cannot arise that would lead 
Jordan towards greater liberalism, constitutionalism and development. The study 
concludes with implications for transitional movements in other developing countries, 
particularly in the Arab region.  
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
 
A Study Problem Overview 
 This study is designed to describe the political culture of three groups of 
Jordanian elites consisting of their values, beliefs, and attitudes towards 
democratization and development in light of Jordan’s 1989 commitment to 
liberalization and reform. Since its independence in 1946, Jordanian political 
leaders, under the stewardship of the Palace, have promised to provide 
Jordanians with their political rights to elect a Parliament and to form and join 
political parties. As a result, Jordan witnessed two liberalization periods in 1952 
and 1989, yet both promises remained incomplete. In fact, most previous studies 
on Jordan’s political culture bypassed other exigencies for liberalization and 
democratization and the complexity of the transitional movement. In view of 
that, this study examines the perceptions, beliefs and values of how different 
types of elite consider different aspects of Jordanian society that leads to 
liberalization and democratization. It anticipates if elites’ political culture will 
lead them to implement serious changes in the government and the political 
system, or, if it is their political culture that restricts them from implementing 
serious changes; due to believing that changes in the political system and 
government might lead Jordan to political degeneration.  
 This chapter presents an overview of the problem, and outlines the 
purpose of the study, including research questions and contributions. In addition 
  
2 
 
it provides a summary of the analytic methods used, and the overview of a 
dissertation outline, where each chapter is briefly described. 
 
The Purpose, Research Question and Contributions of the Study 
 This study intends to describe the values, beliefs, and attitudes that 
contribute to the formation of the political culture of three groups of Jordanian 
elites: political, social, and economic, regarding democratization and 
development; and seeks to define Jordan’s centers of influence and the regime’s 
congruence relative to this political culture. The values and beliefs structure 
both, the pace of, and the possibilities for social and political change (Almond 
and Verba, 1963; Fattah, 2006; and Putnam, 1971). This description is based on 
classical and modern elite theories that focus on elites’ roles in shaping the 
values, beliefs, and attitudes of the masses, and their instrumental and influential 
abilities to mold public institutions by maintaining the flow of communications 
within the system, and enacting, interpreting, and enforcing the rules that govern 
the masses (Beatty 2003; Putnam 1973, 1976; and Welsh 1979). Moreover, the 
description of Jordanian elites’ political culture is also based on John Locke’s 
political theory of “cautious liberalism” that has discordant tendencies towards 
both liberalism and conservatism in terms of change in the political system 
(Grant, 1987, p.204). The theory of “cautious liberalism” in addition to 
Eckstein’s congruent theory and several other elite, political culture, and 
development theories have formed the theoretical foundation for this study. 
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 In addition, personal knowledge and observations by the researcher, along 
with a number of practical, intellectual, personal goals have added to this study’s 
inferences. The practical and intellectual goals of this study are compatible with 
the researcher’s motivations, personal goals, and curiosity about the lagging 
behind situations, which stem from the researcher’s desire to see the wheel 
moving towards achieving higher levels of liberalization, democratization, and 
development in Jordan and the rest of the region. 
 This study examines and compares the political culture of the three groups 
of elites consisting of influential and prominent political, social, and economic 
figures in the Jordanian society, with the intent to clarify the differences among 
elites’ values, beliefs, and attitudes in regards to liberalization, democratization, 
and development. This study posits two key research questions and two 
hypotheses: 
Q1: What is the political culture that consists of Jordanian elites’ values, 
 beliefs, and attitudes towards the processes of liberalization, 
 democratization and political, social, and economic developments in the 
 Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan? 
Q2:  Are there significant differences among the values, beliefs, and attitudes of 
 the three groups of Jordanian elites? 
H1:  There are significant differences among the values, beliefs, and attitudes 
 of the three groups of Jordanian elites towards political, social, and 
 economic development.  
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Q3:   What are the values and beliefs of Jordanian elites concerning the center of 
 power in Jordan? 
Q4:    Is Jordan’s current political regime congruent with the values, beliefs, and 
 attitudes of Jordan’s elites?  
H2:    The regime is congruent with elite political culture. 
 Jordan is located in a turbulent region; see the map of Jordan and 
geographical location in Appendix A. Its security and stability is important to 
the United States and other international policymakers, and remains critical to 
the rest of the Arab region as its theoretical orientation is relevant to the 
conspicuous problems of the rapidly and constantly changing nature of Middle 
Eastern politics (Jureidini and Mclaurin, 1984). This case study departs from the 
typical approach taken by most studies on Jordan. It focuses on the values, 
beliefs and attitudes of Jordanian elites and guides their political behavior, 
providing a basis to explicate the political culture of Jordan and attempts to 
apply the insights of social psychology in the study of comparative politics. The 
study’s findings are comparable with other political cultures that share common 
grounds with Jordan’s political culture, and fill the academic gap in this field of 
study on Jordanian elites.  
 Arab elites that are influenced by its authors’ biased inclinations.  Further, the 
data gathering for this study is focused on materials that are more representative of the 
values, beliefs, and attitudes of Jordanian elites. This study was conducted by running 
face-to-face interviews with randomly selected elites. By putting emphases on the 
academic purpose of this study and on the confidentiality of the identities of its 
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respondents, the researcher could minimize skepticism, raise the level of participation, 
and gather more data from the responses that were abundant and useful for the study. 
 Simultaneously, the absence of media affiliation steered the gathered data from 
any censorship that might impact its validity.  
 
A Brief Summary of Analytic Methods 
 The data for this study was collected in Amman, the capital of the 
Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan, by meeting face-to-face with political, social, 
and economic elites administering a survey. The survey included both closed- 
and open-ended questions which generated quantitative and qualitative data 
respectively. The survey questions explored the values, beliefs and attitudes of 
Jordanian elites that were important in shaping the political culture of Jordan, 
and influences the country’s capacity to make changes in their government and 
political system. The respondents included current and previous incumbents of 
randomly selected 100 government and prominent social and economic figures.  
 The data collection took place over a period of nine months with the 
assistance of Jordan University’s Center for Strategic Studies (CSS). 
Throughout the data collection phase careful attention was paid to the sensitive 
nature of the topic.  
 The data analysis of this study is mostly descriptive. In order to compare 
responses among the three groups of elites, namely political, social and 
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economic elites, a one-way analysis of variance and Chi-square were conducted. 
Qualitative data were coded and subjected to thematic analysis.  
 Lastly, the used techniques of close and persistent observation enabled the 
interviewer during the face-to-face interviews to improve both the validity and reliability 
of the gathered data.  Kirk and Miller (1986) assert that “qualitative research is a 
particular tradition in social science that fundamentally depends on watching people in 
their own territory and interacting with them in their own language, on their own 
terms…qualitative research has been seen to be naturalistic, ethnographic, and 
participatory” (p. 9). Accordingly, being knowledgeable of Jordan’s history and ethnic 
conditions, along with understanding elites’ religious backgrounds and Arabic language 
have contributed to collecting valid and reliable data on elites’ values, beliefs and 
attitudes as will be explained in chapter 3.  
 
Dissertation Overview 
 This dissertation is organized in five chapters. Chapter 1 has presented the 
introduction, statement of the problem, research questions, and the significance 
of the study. Following this introduction is Chapter 2, which provides a 
theoretical foundation presented in three bodies of literature relevant to this 
study: the first theoretical framework includes theories on classical and modern 
elite theories; the political, social, and economic Jordanian elites; and elites’ 
political culture. The second body of literature is solidified with theories on 
authoritarianism, monarchy, and the Jordanian political system and regime 
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verses theories of transition towards liberalization, democratization, and 
political, social, and economic developments. The third body of literature 
explains the theories of congruence and cautious liberalism applied to Jordanian 
elites’ political culture. The theoretical framework in the literature review 
provides a foundational understanding for the discussion of this dissertation by 
supporting the researcher’s argument and outcomes in describing the political 
culture of Jordanian elites.  
 Chapter 3 describes the methods. It provides explanations on the study 
population, and the identification of elites in terms of positions, incumbents and 
group classifications. It elucidates all the preparatory steps followed by the 
researcher with a detailed narrative on the sample selection, survey design, 
survey administration, and the procedures of the face-to-face interviews. The 
chapter unfolds the contents of the survey questionnaire that includes a mixture 
of open- and closed-ended questions. Collecting multiple types of data provided 
a more comprehensive understanding for the political culture of those who may 
impact the process of democratization and development in Jordan under its 
authoritarian monarchical political system. As a result, the randomly selected 
participants of the political, social, and economic elites were willing to 
participate in the face-to-face interviews and to provide responses and 
elaborations on the subjects of the entire questionnaire.  
 Chapter 4 summarizes the results of the study, portraying the outcomes of 
quantitative and qualitative data analysis. The presentation of the data is 
organized in conjunction with the two hypotheses of the study. The results are 
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inferred in terms of their acceptance or rejection to each hypothesis with 
emphases on the seven significant questions out of the thirty-five survey 
questions.    
 Chapter 5 presents the discussion and conclusion of the results. It 
discusses the implications of the statistical analysis by highlighting the patterns 
of the cautious liberal political culture and the results that indicate significant 
differences between elite groups. The conclusion of this study describes the 
political culture of Jordanian elites and their cautious liberal nature that reflects 
on decisions relevant to change in Jordan’s authoritarian monarchy and the 
achievement of liberalization, democratization, and development.  
 In sum, this study contributes to a deeper understanding of the political 
culture of Jordanian elites, along with other key factors of the Hashemites’ 
authoritarian regime that influence the trajectory of Jordan’s democratization 
and development movement. Such understanding is crucial in determining the 
success of the prospective transition from an authoritative monarchy to a 
constitutional monarchy.  
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Chapter 2: Literature Review 
 
The major themes of this study will emerge repeatedly in this review, 
focusing on the theoretical foundations of values, beliefs, and attitudes that 
constitute elites’ political culture towards liberalization, democratization, and 
development; along with the ensued changes in the authoritarian monarchical 
political system in the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan. This review provides the 
reader with three bodies of literature. First, it presents theoretical perspectives 
that focus on classical and modern elite theories; the political, social, and 
economic elites in the Middle East and Jordan; and elites’ political culture. 
Subsequently, the second body of literature presents theoretical perspectives of 
authoritarianism, monarchy, political regimes and the centers of influence verses 
theories of transition towards liberalization, democratization, and political, 
social, and economic developments. The third body of literature explains the 
theories of congruence and cautious liberalism by focusing on their application 
to Jordanian elites’ political culture, which may or may not shape the regime’s 
political behavior pertaining to change and transitioning towards liberalization, 
democratization, and development.  
 Although historical, geographical, and demographic data and incidents are 
not directly factored into the analysis, these incidents will set this chapter’s 
stage. This background information warrants an attempt to understand specific 
but important characteristics of Jordanian elites’ political culture towards any 
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changes in their political system; further in-sequence data will be included in 
Appendix B. 
 
An Overview of Jordan: Geographical Location 
  The Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan is strategically located in the Middle 
East; bound by Syria to the north, Iraq to the northeast, Saudi Arabia to the east 
and south, the Red Sea to the south, and the West Bank in the Palestinian 
National Authority and Israel to the west. Jordan covers a diversity of 
landscapes over an area of 89,213 square kilometers, with a desert region that 
spans over approximately 75% of that area. The lowest point on earth lies at the 
Dead Sea, in Jordan, at 408 meters below sea level, verses 1854 meters above 
sea level, which is the peak of Jabal Umm El Dami. Amman is Jordan’s capital 
and it is located in the northwest; Al-Zarqa and Irbid are two major northern 
cities; while Karak and Aqaba are two major southern cities.  
 
Population, Religions, and Ideological Makeup: Jordanian Elite 
Socialization 
 According to UNDP and World Bank 2013 reports, Jordan currently has a 
population of approximately 6.5 million people, where nearly 3 million reside in 
the capital, Amman. More than 70% of the population is under 30 years of age, 
which 22% of those are between the ages of 15 and 24 (See Appendix B, Figure 
2.1).   
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 The main reason behind the high rate of population growth was ascribed to 
the influxes of Palestinian refugees since 1948 (Department of Statistics, 2008). 
According to the United Nations Relief and Works Agency (UNRWA) for 
Palestinian refugees, about 224,000 people were admitted to UNRWA refugee 
camps in the East Bank immediately after the June 1967 war. In 1986, UNRWA 
cited 826,128 registered refugees in the East Bank, where roughly 205,000 of 
which were in refugee camps. The estimate of Palestinians living in Jordan has 
ranged from 60 to 70 percent of the total population, but the exact numbers are 
unknown, particularly since official government statistics do not distinguish 
between the nomadic tribal members who lived east of the Jordan River and the 
West Bank urbanized groups that crossed the Jordan River to settle on the East 
Bank (UNRWA/United Nations).  
 The Transjordan area has been continuously inhabited with archaeological 
evidence suggesting sedentary settlements on both the East and West Banks of 
the Jordan River. The inhabitants on both sides of the river were extensively 
divergent, but the dominant form of social organization in Transjordan was that 
of the tribe. Early in the seventh century a fundamental change occurred in the 
predominantly Arab inhabited region. This change has influenced Jordan and its 
neighbors to this day bringing the arrival of Islam, a newly developed religion 
with strong roots in Christianity and Judaism. As a consequence, the inhabitants 
of Transjordan have embraced the Islamic religion particularly on the East Bank 
of the river which remained heavily nomadic or semi-nomadic. Hitherto, the 
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West Bank remained multi-religious and dominated by an urban culture 
(Jureidini & Mclaurin, 1984, p. 9).  
 The demographic components and location of Jordan has been inviting to 
national ideologies and movements (Salibi, 1993). Arab nationalism, for 
instance, was one of the most powerful ideologies of the sixties and seventies; 
however, it was considered one of the most radical threatening movements to 
the Jordanian monarchical regime. 
 Today’s Jordanian population has a dominant Muslim majority, with a 
Christian minority of only 6% (Mufti, 1999). The non-Arab population in Jordan 
comprises of 5% of the population, most being: Circassians, Chechens, 
Armenians, Turkmen, and Gypsies, and all of which have maintained their 
separate ethnic identities. The loyalty of both the Circassians and Chechens to 
the Hashemites has guaranteed them fixed seats in the Parliament and important 
incumbencies in the government. Most importantly are the Eastern Jordanian 
prominent tribal leaders whose content and persuasion are important to the King 
himself. The prominent tribal members represent big and powerful tribe. 
Therefore, in order to keep these tribal figures and their tribal members gratified 
and loyal to the regime, the King bestows them various privileges and financial 
compensations. These figures were referred to, by several theorists and 
respondents who participated in this study, as the “Old Guards,” who constitute 
the center of influence and the internal elite strata that remain fundamental to the 
stability of the regime (Al-Khalidi, 2011, Jureidini & Mclaurin, 1984, Malik, 
1999, Robins, 2004). 
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A Historical Overview 
 Retrospectively, Sharif Hussein bin Ali Al Hashemi was a Caliph living in 
the province of Hijaz. In 1916, he proclaimed the independence of the 
significant Hijaz province, ascribed to the two holy cities of Mecca and Medina 
(Robins, 2004; Snow, 1972). Sharif Hussein was a grand Sharif, guardian of 
Mecca, and the ruler of the Hijaz. As a Hashemite he was styled Sharif; ‘Sharif’ 
means noble and signifies descent from the Prophet. The Hashemites family is 
the noblest in Islam, because they are affiliated with Al Hashem clan that 
descends from Prophet Muhammad’s tribe ‘Al Quraish.’ Until this day, this 
religious affiliation with Prophet Mohammad’s descent has been the Hashemites 
source of legitimacy to their reign and extends their active pursuit of regime 
longevity in the face of all challenges to their throne (Gubster, 1983).  
 Later, in the aftermath of WWI, Transjordan and the rest of the Arab 
region were affected by two complicated British promises that were difficult to 
reconcile. The first was made to the Jewish people as a result of Hayim 
Weizmann’s efforts in 1898. Weizmann pushed the British foreign secretary 
Arthur Balfour to send a letter to the leader of the British Jewish community 
Walter Rothschild, or Baron Rothschild, stating that the British government 
views in favor to a national home for the Jewish people to be established in 
Palestine, and will use all their endeavors to facilitate the achievement of this 
promise. According to the Jewish Virtual Library (2014), Weizmann was an 
active Zionist leader, the President of the Zionist organization, and statesman 
who convinced the United States government to recognize the newly established 
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state of Israel. In 1949, Weizmann became the first President of the state of 
Israel. The second promise was made to Sharif Hussein promising him the 
creation of a new independent Arab Kingdom in the Transjordan desert (Shlaim, 
1995, p. 22).  
 Indeed, the creation of the state of Israel in Palestine after the 1948 war 
has affected Jordan more than any other neighboring country due to its 
geographic location. Enormous Palestinian migrations took the eastern route, 
because of its smooth topographic land and close distance, making it easier on 
immigrants traveling by foot. Just by crossing the Jordan River from the West 
Bank in Palestine, influxes of Palestinian immigrants ended up and settled on 
the East Bank in Jordan. Jordan kept receiving a flooding amount of Palestinian 
immigrants due to several war conditions. Since then, large numbers of 
Palestinians have resided in Jordan, which affected the demographics of the 
Jordanian society to date (Shlaim, 1995, p. 20).   
 Consequently, the new state of Jordan emerged on the region’s map after 
the British separated Transjordan from the mandate of Palestine. This separation 
was between the fertile lands and water resources of the West and the expansive 
barren lands in the East. Hence, it affected both states politically, 
demographically, and economically. The coastal area that is located west of the 
Jordanian River is known as Palestine, and together, the western and eastern 
lands were placed in a single mandate under the authority of the United 
Kingdom. Since its early history, Palestine was rural and its society was 
agrarian. Contrast to the Bedouins on the East Bank, the inhabitants on the West 
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Bank settled there and valued land ownership, and this separation shaped the 
legacy of the Hashemites, as well as the political culture of the Jordanian society 
(Jureidini and McLaurin 1984, p. 9).  
 As a result to these political incidents, later in history, the regime used this 
split between the same families and tribal members to plant a social faction seed. 
In order to pursue particular political interests, the regime accentuated 
discrimination between East and West Bankers. For example, as it was 
previously mentioned in this study, Jordan’s military forces remained exclusive 
and restricted to the members of Eastern Bedouin tribes (Robins, 2004). 
According to Jureidini and McLaurin (1984), anthropologically and politically, 
the West Bankers are those who settled west of the Jordan River, while the East 
Bankers are the nomadic and semi-nomadic tribes that dominated the east side 
of the River. The distinction between nomadic and cultivating societies has 
remained applicable to the civilizations of the East and West Banks, with the 
exception of some tribal nomadic elements on the West Bank, and towns on the 
East Bank. Thus, many tribes have east and west branches as in the case of Salt 
and Karak on the east of the River, and Jerusalem and Nablus on the west. 
Although the numbers of West Bankers compose the larger part of the 
population in Jordan and exceed the numbers of East Bankers, neither 
component of the Jordanian society regard Jordan as Palestine (p. 11).  
 Since their early days, the East Bankers’ interactions went south to the 
Arabian Desert, but the West Bankers’ interactions went to the west and north 
responding to their urban and multi-religious character that was accentuated 
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with the presence of a large Christian minority (Gubster, 1983; Jureidini & 
Mclaurin, 1984). Some scholars emphasize and address this difference as a 
social cleavage that undermines the country’s national legitimacy and unity; 
Mufti, for instance, considers it a division in Jordan’s population. He further 
states that this division was violently manifested in Jordan’s 1970 civil war, and 
it still undermines the national unity, which is identified by Rustow (1970) as a 
requisite for successful political liberalization (p. 101). 
 
Elite Theory: The Center of Influence among Jordanian Elites  
 The classical theorists, Gaetano Mosca (1896) and Vilfrado Pareto (1916) 
stated that the purpose of elite studies is to examine the structure of power in 
communities, in order to know if power is in the hands of a cohesive minority 
and to respond to the question of the nature of power in a society. Accordingly, 
both classic and modern scholars define this minority group as the “elite,” and 
they have acknowledged its members’ possession for power and other notable 
traits (Parry, 1970, p. 34).  
 Mosca classified the elites in a society in terms of their exercise of 
political power, or their engagement in the struggle for political leadership such 
as the members of the government and of high administration, military leaders, 
members of politically influential families of an aristocracy or royal house, 
influential members of the intelligentsia, and leaders of powerful economic 
enterprises. Moreover, Mosca defined this group as a distinguished group that 
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appears in every society behind the formal holder of power, and it possesses 
certain traits, exerts decisive political influence, and serves as a recruiting 
ground for the members of the government. This group is the elite, or, as labeled 
since ancient Greek times the oligarchy, or the aristocratic group in the society. 
Mosca, though, did not think of elites as a group that is raised high above the 
society, but they are connected with this classification through much larger 
strata of sub-elite that supplies the elite ruling class with new recruits 
(Bottomore, 1993; p. 5-7).  
 Consequently, the elites are defined in several ways, such as the ruling 
class, upper class, governing elite, or dominant stratum. In every society there 
are two strata: the superior upper one is the elite, while the inferior stratum is the 
masses, or the non-elite. Pareto stated that the governing elite possess enough 
wealth, power, and influence to lead the masses in collective actions (Bottomore 
1993; Parry, 1970, 2005; Putnam, 1971).    
 In this respect, Pareto highlighted the appearance of two classes of people 
in all societies and under all political systems: a class that rules and a class that 
is ruled. The first is always the less numerous, performs all political functions, 
mobilizes power, and enjoys the advantages that power brings; whereas the 
second is directed and controlled by the first. The ruled are the masses, and the 
rulers are the “governing elites” (Parry, 1970; Lenczowski, 1975). 
 Hence, the dominant upper class in Jordan consists of the East and West 
Bank elites. Their wealth, power, and high governmental, social, and economic 
positions make them influential and the most prominent figures in the Jordanian 
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society. The influence and prominence of East Bank elites, for instance, 
originate in the big tribes to which they belong. Through the years Jordan’s big 
tribes have preserved power and affluence of resources; thus Jordan’s big tribes 
have remained influential (Thomas, 2003, p. 543).  
 Accordingly, this study seeks to identify the specific group of Jordanian 
elites that are the center of influence in Jordan. Pareto’s concept of “the 
circulation of elites,” provides a theoretical foundation in responding to this 
research question (RQ3) concerning the center of power in Jordan. The two 
main aspects to Pareto’s concept are: 1.) the replacement of individuals within 
the elite; and 2.) the replacement of one elite by another. These dynamic aspects 
generally take place in elites’ strata due to mortality, attrition, and 
replenishment.  
 The process of individual replacement is exclusive, while in other cases, is 
an open process that allows less privileged individuals an opportunity to join the 
ranks of the most influential figures in the society. By the same token, 
Lenczowski (1975) asserts that behind the formal holders of power in the state, 
there is an enduring group with certain distinguishable traits that exerts decisive 
political influence. Moreover, this group serves as a recruiting ground for 
members of the government, and may have an informal, loose structure while 
enjoying economic and social power, and an inherited status in society (p. 3). In 
the Jordanian case, this explains the existence of the most influential “Old 
Guards” group of elites behind the formal holders of power in the Jordanian 
government, and their impact over the institution of Palace and the entirety of 
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the Monarch. The “Old Guards” are the East Bankers that the institution of 
Army is constituted of with its soldiers and high rank officers. As Robin (2004) 
asserted, Jordan’s military forces remained exclusive and restricted to the 
members of Eastern Bedouin tribes. Further, Brynen (1998) explained that the 
members of these Bedouin tribes are the regime constituents of East Bankers. 
The regime grants East Bank elites financial and other rewards and privileges. In 
return, these dividends protect, sustain, and guarantee the tribes’ support to the 
regime, strengthen its circle of patronage, and enhance its legitimacy.   
 Ben-Dor (1984) conducted a comparative study on political elites in the 
Middle East, underlining the importance of sub-elites who belong to the military 
forces of few Middle Eastern countries. In the prelude of his study, Ben-Dor 
cited a well-known Egyptian elite who still belongs to the Egyptian 
intelligentsia, Mohammed Hassanein Haykal (1962) and whose socialization, 
ideology, and attitudes have not changed up until our recent time. In the 
aftermath of the military coup d'état and the Egyptian revolution of 1952, 
Haykal stated: “Under the conditions that are typical of the class struggle in the 
underdeveloped countries, and bearing in mind the feeling of the general public 
that the leaders in power represent only interests which by their very nature are 
opposed to those of the masses, the popular revolutionary movement has no 
choice but to base itself on the army in order to pave the way for the revolution.”  
 Ben-Dor explains that when disintegration occurs in Middle Eastern 
societies, it is typically due to a breakdown of the established patterns of 
convergence, rather than class struggle, as he considers Middle Eastern societies 
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to be based on convergence, and not on integration. He further emphasizes on 
the religious impact on individuals in Middle Eastern societies, and their 
conviction in ‘obedience’ whether spiritually, to God and the Prophet, or on a 
societal or cultural aspect, where the ‘inferior’ role obeys any ‘superior.’ 
Therefore, the obedience for political leaderships is stemmed from this culture. 
Accordingly, Ben-Dor argues against the notion of the military recruitment in 
the Middle East to be based on class or social background, but claims a strong 
association between the military and middle class in a society. Thus, the upper 
class domination over society gets penetrated by the middle class intervention 
through military revolutionary movements that can be described as endeavors 
against reactionary rules. An example provided to further exemplify this point, 
is the military recruitment sytem based on minorities in several Arab societies, 
particularly in Syria in the case of the ‘Alawis’ (p. 6-8). This system is relatively 
applied to the Jordanian case, as the regime exclusively recruits soldiers to join 
the institution of Army from East Bank tribes. Therefore, when these soldiers 
are promoted to high rank officer positions, they undergo a process of 
“civilianization” and are further granted higher incumbencies by the King. Ben-
Dor explains that the civilianization process increases the professionalization of 
the army and raises the proportion of civilian bureaucrats and technocrats in the 
formal organs of the elite (p. 21). 
  Further, Ben-Dor explains that linking the military with the middle class 
can transform society to more modern patterns, and asserts that the role of the 
military can be understood through its interactions with upper and middle 
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classes in the society.  When the upper class dominates the middle class, society, 
and the regime, the military intervention is considered revolutionary, whereas its 
intervention to stop mass domination is considered reactionary. However, 
Middle East elite theorists emphasized that the high echelons of bureaucracy 
remains substantial to the regimes of the Middle Eastern countries; where 
without their cooperation and expertise, the top elites find themselves incapable 
to exercise their power (Ben-Dor, 1984; Lenczowski 1980; Zartman, 1980).   
 For instance, the Jordanian military intervention of 1970 that eradicated the mass 
domination and led to a civil war was coupled with severe austerity measures as a result 
to East Bank elites’ attitudes. Individuals that belong to the Hashemite family have 
started their reign by establishing a regime that is protected by the institution of Army 
exclusive to East Bankers in order to protect their monarchical legitimacy and the 
regime-based state. The endurance of this situation is based on the reciprocal relationship 
between the Hashemites, and the sub-elite strata, where the Hashemites receive emphasis 
on their status, and in return the sub-elites receive benefits, including financial dividends, 
and other privileges, such as joining the bureaucratic apparatus of the state, and 
occupying the highest incumbencies in Jordan’s administrative institutions.  
 Zartman’s approach in describing elites of Middle Eastern countries stems from 
describing elites on the bases of their recruitment and promotion; elite socialization, 
including formation, personalities, ideologies, and political culture; and elite decisions, 
behaviors, and organizations. In his theory, he focused on who elites are, how they 
acquire power, and what they do. The phenomenon of elite circulation generates from 
recurrent interactions between the incumbent elites and the relevant situations that 
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generate new elites. Elite circulation, according to Zartman relates to the "who" and the 
"what" over time. Thus, there is no immediate prediction concerning who will be next in 
power, or when a change will occur, but there is a likelihood of outlining who may be 
next in power if specified conditions, assumptions, or consequences would suggest 
particular types of people to hold power in certain circumstances. Zartman’s theory 
provides an ideal type of elite circulation (p. 92-8). This model explains King Hussein’s 
strategy of recruiting and promoting certain influential figures among the West Bankers 
to join the Jordanian elite strata, forming the center of influence among Jordanian elites.  
 Further, realizing the differences and similarities among elite structures in 
different Middle Eastern countries triggered Stone, (as cited in Zartman, 1980), to 
conduct a comparative study and test the influence of the following four independent 
variables: a.) recent history of elite circulation; b.) the current form of political structure; 
c.) the social background and preparation; and d.) elites’ attitudes, personalities, and 
motivations. Stone used a typology to test the relationship between the four variables, 
where variables ‘a’ and ‘b’ represent studies that focus on political structures which elites 
operate under, and variables ‘c’ and ‘d’ represent elites’ socialization, political culture, 
and personal characteristics, by examining the relationships between ‘a’ and ‘c’ and ‘b’ 
and ‘d’ variables.  
 However, the viability of his study remains limited particularly that it depended 
on existing data. Stone suggested other methods than the comparative analyses to study 
elites in the Middle East such as the longitudinal analyses that involves following a 
process of change over an extended period of time or a combination design but also these 
methods had their limitations, which confirmed the scarcity of the conducted studies on 
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elites in the Middle East. Moreover, there is a particular scarcity in single elite case 
studies, which confirms that there has been a gap in the Middle Eastern elite literature.  
 Robins (2004) claims that the King selects the educated tribal members from the 
big and influential tribes to occupy high governmental posts. On one hand, this selection 
provides the regime with loyal and supportive influential tribal members, and on the 
other, it is a royal offer that remains contingent to the loyalty of the incumbent to the 
Monarch and his regime. Based on this equation, East Bank elites have always found 
their refuge in tribalism, and so has the regime, particularly the “Old Guards” who mostly 
form the center of influence. These elites do not follow the perceived description of the 
classical elites defined by Mosca and Pareto, but are more fitting to Lenczowski’s (1975) 
description, as a new type of elite who has political influence, power and predominance 
that may be attributed to their manipulative skills, and in some nondemocratic cases, the 
use or threat of force. However the ultimate skill of these elites is organizational; for 
instance, an attorney, judge, or law professor can be appointed as a minister of justice, 
and this appointment under authoritarian regimes is considered “natural.” As Lenczowski 
notes, this appointment conforms to the common-sense expectation, that the head of the 
department of justice “be a man with legal training and experience” (p. 5). 
 According to the CSS (1999), the old innate belief by East Jordanians 
reckons tribalism and tribal affiliation as the source of pride, solidarity, and 
power. Presently, the most important positions in the Jordanian government and 
society are still occupied by East Jordanian prominent figures, whose clans can 
be traced back in history of the Transjordanian tribes. Most of the well-known 
family names in Jordan are ramifications of the most salient Jordanian tribes, 
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which are Bani-Hassan, Bani-Sakher, Le’abaidat, Al-Gharaibeh, Bani-Hamida, 
and Howaitat (see Appendix B, Map 2.1; Origins of East Bank Elites and the 
distribution of Jordanian tribes). Some East Jordanians go by the same surname 
of the original tribal name, such as Le’abaidat and Al-Gharaibeh, but many 
others go by a family name that is a branch from the original one. As an 
example, Bani-Hassan is known to be the biggest tribe in the Transjordanian 
area, whose members alone are 30% of Jordanians. The name of the current 
Prime Minister of Jordan, Abdulla Ensour, originates from Al-Nsoor clan, which 
is one of the ramifications of Bani-Hassan. Also, the tribe of Bani-Sakher is 
another example where its members are still famous, powerful, and wealthy. 
However, Bani-Sakher is not a large tribe due to its involvement in frequent 
wars in the past, causing a significant loss of members. Yet, today’s most 
famous surnames root back from Bani-Sakher, such as Al-Lozi and Al-Fayez 
clans, who occupied the most prominent positions in the Jordanian government, 
such as the two Prime Ministers Ahmad Al-Lozi and Faisal Al-Fayez, also 
Nasser Al-Lozi, the Chief of “Al Diwan Al-Malaki” or the Royal Court.  
 Additionally, the prominence of the West Bank elites is due to their power 
and wealth that they established in Palestine. According to Smith (1986), in the 
1930s Palestine had reached a level of prosperity that made it one of the most 
advanced countries in the Middle East. The new oil refinery at Haifa and the 
center of British communications during World War II rendered Palestine more 
urbanized than before. As a result, the Palestinians became involved in 
construction and in trade; particularly, the agricultural exports of citrus fruits, 
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grain, and other crops. Also, they were employed in the railroads, huge military 
construction projects, and government departments along with their Jewish 
counterparts. In addition, the war brought Palestinians into the world market. 
Several Palestinian entrepreneurs invested in government bonds, shares, 
commodity stocks, and other forms of the 1930s financial papers, which enabled 
many Palestinians to recover some of their wealth after their dispersion in 1948. 
The sum of Palestinians’ investments was estimated by over £39 million sterling 
pounds. Out of these amounts, £10 million sterling pounds were transferred to 
Jordan alone, where the majority of exiles had taken refuge and at least £1.5 
million was brought into the country in the form of banknotes prior to the 
abolition of the Palestinian currency (p. 22). 
 Smith asserts that only a few Palestinians with available wealth in exile 
were able to partially recoup their losses and, unlike the peasantry, to avoid the 
confinement of life in the camps. For example, The Tuqan family of Nablus 
used their funds in Jordan to expand their agricultural operations on the East 
Bank and to start related industries with Board of Directors that included some 
of the wealthiest merchants of Nablus, such as the Vegetable Oil Company of 
Jordan. Also, Yusif Baidas, a former bank clerk and foreign exchange dealer in 
Mandatory Palestine, used funds obtained from the release of accounts in 
Barclays and started a multi-million dollar business in money exchange, which 
started in Beirut and expanded throughout the Arab world, Europe, and Africa. 
The Shoman family of Jerusalem, as another example, was able to transfer the 
headquarters of the Arab Bank from Jerusalem to Amman and expanded its 
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programs to become one of the largest banks in the Middle East today. Due to 
the development of new forms of corporate enterprise in Palestine during the 
1940s, other merchants and traders found it possible to transfer their businesses 
abroad. The Arabian Insurance Company, for example, along with Middle East 
Airlines, both reopened in Lebanon after 1948; by the end of the 1950s their 
shareholders included some of the wealthiest Palestinians in the Arab world (p. 
23-24).  
 Consequently, the wealthy Palestinian entrepreneurs who have become 
holders of the Jordanian nationality are the original Palestinian bourgeoisie class 
that formed the stratum of West Bank Jordanian elites. Similar to the stratum of 
East Bank Jordanian elites, who occupy prominent positions in the government 
and the army institution, West Bank Jordanian elites are the prominent 
entrepreneurs, whose wealth, high educational levels, and noticeable liberal 
exposure have enabled them to form the economic elite stratum. Their 
prominent positions triggered the King to offer some of the West Bankers high 
positions in the Jordanian government. In fact, Jordan’s stability has been 
dependent on the King’s ability to martial and exploit the tribal loyalty. All 
groups and ethnicities have their own elite prominent members who are close 
and loyal to both the regime and the Monarch (Mufti, 1999, p. 105).  
 Generally, Pareto is concerned with the governing elites, because they 
have power while the masses have none. The governing elites as Pareto defines 
them are influential politicians, who can impact political decision-making, 
directly or indirectly through their leadership positions in any of the industrial, 
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labor, military or other fields. Also, Pareto emphasizes the capability of 
opposition leaders in influencing the political situations in a society (Parry, 
1970; p. 34). Further, there are two kinds of elites, according to Pareto: the 
astute or cunning, referred to as ‘the foxes,’ and the courageous leaders, 
particularly military leaders, referred to as ‘the lions.’ According to Faulks 
(2000), throughout the state’s history, the different stages and times determined 
which type of elite should govern. 
 Mosca sees the organizational skill as the key to elite rule, while Pareto is 
more militant concerning the suitable psychological and personal attributes for 
governing. The political elite’s mental strength protects them from being 
overthrown. Most elite theorists based their theories on these two ideas. The first 
idea emphasizes that power lies in positions of authority in key political and 
economic institutions; while the second emphasizes the importance of some 
psychological traits. The psychological, personal attributes, and intelligence of 
elites set them apart; their intellectual superiority enable them to become the 
highest accomplishers in any field and lead the masses (Parry, 2005; p. 36). 
 Throughout Jordan’s history, the regime’s figures that belong to a tribal 
power base and are entrenched in state bureaucracy, the institution of the 
military, and the intelligence agency are its most powerful elites. These elites are 
East Bankers known as the “Old Guards,” whose power and influence enables 
them to impact decision-making and state policies. With their power they can 
constrain every reform attempt, including the King’s timid steps towards 
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liberalization and to end riots and turmoil; as they consider reforms a threat to 
their political privileges and economic benefits (Al-khalidi, 2011). 
   
Elites’ Political Culture: Values, Beliefs, & Attitudes 
  According to Beatty (2003): “It is [elites] who at once shape the values, 
beliefs, and attitudes…who set standards…mold public institutions…formulate 
demands and maintain the flow of communications within the system, and who 
enact, interpret, and enforce the rules that govern us.” Therefore, elites are 
considered vitally interested in the theory and practice of shaping and changing 
other people’s values, beliefs, and attitudes (p. 4).  
 According to Putnam (1971) the relationship between elites’ attitudes and 
the different situations can be understood if plugged in an equation. He explains 
it is a push-pull relation: the stronger the attitudinal press, the less the need for 
situational stimuli, and vice versa. Thus, Putnam (1971) argued that elites’ 
attitudes could be examined through investigating their opinions on current 
political topics to understand the significance of their views, and what they 
favor, in order to assess their attitudinal press in different situations (p. 651-2). 
Putnam (1976) argued that understanding elite behavior requires an 
understanding to how their opinions specifically fit in the broader pattern of 
beliefs.  
 Thus, understanding elites’ attitudes requires understanding and defining 
their values and beliefs. Values are the beliefs that guide the behavior of an 
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individual and their decision-making process that are expressed through words 
or actions. The value occurs in the heart, while the belief initiates in the mind. 
Basic values may move to the subconscious level of the individual’s mind, and 
only when these values are translated into decisions do they become challenged 
by others, and their importance is recognized. A value is what the individual 
considers important to oneself; a belief is the way the individual thinks things 
are or should be; and an attitude is what the individual thinks and feels, which 
leads to a behavior. So, values and beliefs provide guidance and direction for 
one’s attitudes and behavior.  
 Notwithstanding, the enclosed definitions of values and beliefs in previous 
value studies by different behavioral sociologists muddled the definition of 
‘values’ with the definitions of ‘beliefs’ and ‘attitudes.’ Hutcheon (1972) 
highlights the changing prominence of values from Durkheim and other 
sociologists until 1959, and reveals a number of disturbing tendencies in their 
studies, one of which, considering values as a non-empirical study, but having 
fundamental religious roots. Also, during the 1960s several sociologists had a 
tendency to assume that society is antecedent to the individual and they 
emphasized an imbalance in value theory based on the assumption that values 
are independent variables. Moreover, other sociologists had the tendency to 
stress on conformity and minimization of the role of reason and the selective 
perception in human action, such in the over-socialized view of man and the 
over-integrated view of society (p. 174). Another tendency discussed the 
confusion in the value concept that made some define it as norms, cultural 
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ideals, assessments of action, beliefs, objects, value orientations, behavior 
probabilities, and as generalized attitudes (p. 177). Yet Rokeach (1960) reflected 
a different approach in defining values and beliefs. His cognitive and 
experimental approach was a convergence of several theoretical orientations that 
emphasized structure rather than content. As a result, Rokeach defined values as 
the most important components of the belief system (p. 447). 
 Scheibe (1970) provided a distinction between behavior, values, and 
beliefs, gestating behavior as ‘what the person does,’ and values and beliefs as 
‘what the person wants to do’ according to what they believe is true (p. 21). 
Scheibe operationalized these concepts and noted that when the question asks 
about ‘what the person did or will do,’ it is an attitude question. When it asks 
about ‘what is good,’ it is a value question. But, when it asks about ‘what is 
true,’ it becomes a belief question (p. 41).  
 Almond and Verba (1963), describe civic culture as the Anglo-American 
tradition, and refer to it as a gift to the world. They state that “every political 
system is embedded in a particular pattern of orientations to political 
action…the political culture.” Thus, political culture can be defined as “…the 
specifically political orientations; the attitudes towards the political system and 
its various parts; and attitudes towards the role of the self in the system” as it 
underpins all systems of governance (Almond, 1956, p. 3). In later work, Verba 
(1966) defines the political culture as “the subjective orientation to politics” or 
the “system of empirical beliefs, expressive symbols, and values that define the 
situation in which political action takes place" (p. 513).    
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 The stability of the political system, according to Almond and Verba is 
contingent to its supportive value and belief system. In 1963, the authors ran a 
study on five different countries and their political systems. They considered 
Britain the best example of a stable civic culture based on their conducted study 
on one-thousand British individuals. They deduced from the responses of the 
interviewees that there is a high magnitude of cultural homogeneity, consensus, 
and respect among the British people for their government institutions. The 
results of the study indicated how the individuals’ shared values towards their 
parliamentary rules and government decisions. The social trust between the 
individuals and their political institutions is an important association that is 
required for the success of civil society. In other words, this association is 
between individuals’ behaviors and the state’s behavior. Nevertheless, the 
aforementioned policies of the regime in Jordan that, for the most part, resulted 
in containing just one sect of the society and passing over the larger sect would 
impact the level of democracy in Jordan and the stability of its political system, 
which renders this theory unfeasible to be applied on the Jordanian case. 
 Putnam (1971) defines the set of politically relevant values, beliefs and 
habits of political leaders as the political culture. Understanding elites’ political 
culture requires skills in interpreting their ideologies, in characterizing 
operational codes, and in defining the spirit and calculations that lie behind 
high-risk political behavior (p. 651). The political leaders’ attitudes are a 
function of the environmental situations in which they find themselves, where 
they bring their psychological predispositions to these situations. Putnam 
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considers the political culture approach illuminating and informative as it 
provides information about the nature of people in general, if evil or good; the 
society if harmonious or conflictual; what politics is all about; the importance of 
the social and political differences; and about how these differences should be 
dealt with. Besides, he considers the political culture approach useful in 
providing answers to various questions about politics, political issues, and 
political problems, as well as it is adequate for presenting solutions to these 
problems (p. 652).  
 
Political System: Democracy, Governance, and Development in Jordan 
 The monarchical authoritarian regime of the Hashemite Kingdom of 
Jordan. In a study on Jordan’s monarchy, Lucas (2004) suggests that since its 
establishment, the Jordanian monarchical system has taken the lead in molding 
the country’s national identity that suits its regime. The monarchical regime of 
Jordan has built a new state around itself rather than reconstructing an already 
existing state. In his study, Lucas mentions two common types of Middle 
Eastern monarchies: dynastic and linchpin; Jordan’s monarchy is a linchpin 
monarchy. Contrary to the dynastic monarchy, the members of the ruling family 
of the linchpin monarchical system do not participate in the political institution 
of the monarchy or fill positions in the state bureaucracy except rarely. 
However, the King in Jordan does not rule alone, but forms a coalition and stays 
at its center. Hence, pluralism is allowed at a certain degree within the regime 
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coalition. Even opposition is legalized, which maintains the country’s political 
and social stability, because quiescence and political stability are vital for the 
endurance of the monarchical regime (p. 106).  
 Moreover, Jordan and its neighboring countries offer ample opportunities 
for the study on authoritarianism through their powerful national security 
apparatus. Jordan’s national security apparatus, or the “Mukhabarat,” has 
enjoyed fairly wide usage since the establishment of the state, and controls all of 
its activities (Hudson, 2001, p. 801). Similarly, Lucas asserts that linchpin 
monarchies encourage social pluralism and mobilize it along vertical lines to 
participate in the governing of the state, as long as all the activities are 
controlled by the national security apparatus, or the “Mukhabarat” (p. 108-9). 
This type of linchpin monarchy and social pluralism is seen in the rule of the 
Hashemites. During the era of King Hussein, Jordan’s most popular King, 
several scholars wrote about the Hashemites’ popularity. King Hussein was 
extremely capable through his personal relations with key power figures 
internally and within the region and beyond, to establish an unchallenged 
institution of monarchy. His charisma and wisdom in making policy had 
augmented the recognition of the Hashemite monarchical rule among 
Jordanians, many Arabs in the region, and the world (Shlaim, 2007; Snow, 
1972; and, Kechihian, 2008).  
 Lucas (2004) describes Jordan as a regime-led state ruled by a monarch on 
the basis of kinship and hierarchy, as he sees a blurry line between the regime 
and the state of Jordan. “Regimes” are defined by Keohane and Nye (as cited in 
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Krasner, 1983) as “sets of governing arrangements that include networks of 
rules, norms, and procedures that regularize behavior and control its effect” (p. 
2). Susan Strange (as cited in Krasner, 1983) defines regimes as, “the 
government of a society by an individual, dynasty, party or group that wields 
effective power over the rest of society.” Strange contends that the concept of 
the “regime” is usually tied with authoritarianism, and believes that the “regime 
is biased towards authoritarian political structures” (p. 344).    
 Authoritarian political systems, according to Juan Linz (as cited in Linz, 
2000, p. 159) have four characteristics: (1) limited not responsible political 
pluralism, which constrains political institutions; (2) a basis for legitimacy for 
accepting the regime as a necessary evil; (3) neither extensive nor intensive 
political mobilization, such in the use of the ventilation method that allow the 
masses to vent only during controlled demonstrations; (4) a formally ill-defined 
executive power that is often shifting. These four characteristics describe a 
political system that rules by using a mixture of austerity and forbearance 
strategies. A further elaborated study by Robert Bianchi (1986) describes the 
Middle Eastern political systems as hybrid, eclectic, and alterable political 
structures. 
 According to Bianchi’s study, the authoritarian regimes of Middle Eastern 
countries have promoted corporatist associations as instruments of social control 
while avoiding high levels of repression and simultaneously perceiving interest 
group politics as inadequate attempts to replicate the classic democratic Anglo-
American models. Bianchi based his theoretical perspective on the two 
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coexisting paradigms of Philippe C. Schmitter of corporatism and pluralism in 
the ‘Third World.’  Bianchi argued that within the same political system, the two 
concepts of corporatism and pluralism coexist and do not collide. Austerity and 
stringency coexist with forbearance and clemency, but in changing proportions 
and the two strategies interact in various ways.  
 The previous Latin American political structures are corporatist, robust, 
and stringent regimes. Schmitter (1982) defines them as systems of interest 
representation with units organized into limited numbers of singular, 
compulsory, non-competitive, hierarchically-ordered, and functionally 
differentiated categories; recognized and created by the state; and granted a 
deliberate representational monopoly within their respective categories in 
exchange for observing certain controls on their selection of leaders and 
articulation of demands and supports. Conversely, he defines the pluralist 
political structure as a constituent unit of pluralism, organized into unspecific 
numbers of multiple, voluntary, competitive, non-hierarchical, and self 
determined categories. The units of the pluralist political structure are not 
controlled or created by the state and do not exercise monopoly of 
representational activity (Bianchi, 1986, p. 507).  
 Accordingly, under the heterogeneous nature of political systems, a 
mixture of corporatist and pluralist interest of representation play key and 
enduring roles. Yet, neither paradigm is considered permanent, especially in the 
systems of ongoing tensions and competition between pluralist and corporatist 
that promote periodic and cyclical fluctuations in the predominant mode of 
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representation. This theory is found pertinent to the authoritarian regime in 
Jordan as it imposes inconsistent austerity measures, while concurrently 
allowing some pluralism. Thus, the political system of Jordan is known for its 
hybrid political structure that does not entirely impose rigid authoritarian 
policies, or totally eliminate pluralism. As put by Bianchi, it is a political system 
that has “opted for strategies of corporatization that are far more tentative, 
partial, and inconsistent” (p. 509).  
 Pettygrove (2006) describes the regime in Jordan as patriarchic with 
traditional leadership. Hudson (1977) also argues that the patriarchic traditional 
ideology is adopted by the regime to inculcate an ideological legitimacy that 
counteracts anti-royalist doctrines. Hudson warns that authoritarian regimes’ 
legitimacy crisis can only be avoided by implementing reforms and enhancing 
the transition movements to achieve liberal democracy. This warning was taken 
seriously in Jordan when King Hussein overcame the crisis of 1989 riots by his 
liberalization attempt (p. 209).  
 
Political Development: Political Liberalization and Democratization  
 There are a number of issues that are important in Jordan and the entire Arab 
region, all of which deal with the delayed development. In 2006, the Center for Strategic 
Studies (CSS), at the University of Jordan undertook a survey of public opinion in 
various Jordanian governorates. The study was conducted in cooperation with the Arab 
Democracy Barometer that was established in 2005 by scholars and research centers in 
  
37 
 
the United States and several Arab countries under the leadership of University of 
Michigan and Princeton University.  
 The project aims to create a database of opinions held in the Arab world 
concerning politics, society, religion, and culture. Additionally, this project measures a 
number of specific issues organized under five sections; views of democracy, focus on 
citizenship, the place of religion in public and private life, views of public institutions and 
confidence in their efficiency, and international and Arab affairs. This study will refer to 
some of these results in Chapter 4.  
Most popular and academic discussions use the two terms of political 
liberalization and political democratization interchangeably, while they are in 
fact different. Political liberalization, as defined by Brynen, Korany, and Noble 
(1998), “involves the expansion of the public space through the recognition and 
protection of civil and political liberties,” such as the ability of citizens to 
engage in free political discourse and to freely organize in the pursuit of 
common interests. Political democratization is the expansion of political 
participation, such as providing citizens with a degree of real and meaningful 
collective control over public policy (p. 3).  
  In its modern history, Jordan witnessed two liberalization movements in 
1959 and 1989. The constitution of 1952 was an attempt to set forth the essential 
elements of a constitutional liberal democracy in Jordan. It stated the right of 
citizens to set up and join political parties and during that time, Jordan had 
active parties and held parliamentary elections that led to a coalition government 
formed by the whole of the country’s political spectrum. Yet, in 1959, King 
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Hussein instructed his government to impose severe authoritarian measures on 
political parties, restrict civil activities, and empower the investigation apparatus 
that surrounds and protects the regime, which interrupted the liberalization era 
by restrictive legislations that banned political participation for thirty years, 
(Majed, 2005, p. 15).  
 Similarly, in 1989, after thirty years of government’s austerity measures, 
wide riots erupted in Jordan. These incidents triggered the King to adopt the 
second liberalization and socioeconomic development movements in order to 
keep the country under control. Kamrava (1998) and Mufti (1999) described 
Jordan’s liberalization movement of 1989 as one of the most significant 
experiments in political liberalization in the Arab world despite the ultimate 
power of its unelected king and appointed officials. King Hussein’s 
liberalization strategies entailed several governments to become engaged in 
initiating and implementing reformation policies at all levels, which made 
Jordan more liberalized and developed than any other Arab country in the region 
Mufti (1999). 
 As a result to the 1989 liberalization movement and its political reforms, 
and for the first time since 1967, a parliamentary election was held, martial law 
was rescinded, political parties were re-legalized, censorship was abolished, new 
press legislation was introduced, and a ‘new National Charter committing the 
country to political pluralism and democracy was adopted. The parliamentary 
election of that year was the fairest and freest election in Jordan’s history. It 
allowed the only opposition party, the Islamic Action Front (IAF) to participate 
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in the elections. However, the results were unexpected to many liberals in the 
country. Out of 80 parliamentary seats, 33 were won by Islamist candidates, 22 
of which were for the IAF, and 12 were won by liberal leftists. As a response to 
these results, the King appointed Tahir Al-Masri as a premier, who is known to 
be a liberal leftist. Al-Masri formed a committee from the most prominent 
intelligentsia members to put together the National Charter (Brynen, 1998, p. 
75-79).  
 The King’s decision of 1990 to appoint a Royal Commission in order to 
draw up the National Charter was significant in two respects: first it represents a 
consensus statement between the King and the parliamentarians, tribal notables, 
urban elites, East and West Bankers, conservatives, liberals, leftists, and 
Islamists on the political rules of the game under liberalization. Second, it is 
more elaborative and explicit in endorsing democratic politics than the 
constitution. The National Charter declares that the system of government in the 
Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan is parliamentary, monarchic, and hereditary and 
it calls for strengthening the democratic process on the supremacy of law and 
political pluralism bases. The Charter begins with a historical introduction 
followed by eight chapters of substantial details that lead to political, social, and 
economic developments in Jordan. The first chapter is a detailed rationale on the 
democratic choice followed by a detailed chapter on political pluralism and rule 
of law system. The rest of the chapters deal with particulars on national security; 
economy; the social aspect including culture, education, and science; 
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information technology; Jordanian-Palestinian relations; and Arab, Islamic, and 
international relations (The Jordanian National Charter, 1990).  
 According to Al-madhoun (2010), the Charter has been the subject of 
national consensus and acquired a unique status subordinate to the constitution, 
but no mechanisms or procedures were formulated to implement it. Since the 
issuance of the National Charter it became the model for national reconciliation 
and it has been present in the political and intellectual meetings, discussions, and 
writings of the Jordanian intelligentsia. Among those benefits are the 
reconciliation among Jordanians, the termination of martial law, and the 
restoration of constitutional rights for political participation through elections 
and political party affiliations, which are all substantial issues for Jordan’s 
stability and development. Drafting the National Charter has benefited all 
Jordanians although its implementation proceedings and mechanisms remained 
absent (p. 3-7).  
 The National Charter attempt was frustrated by some ruling elites. The 
government and the regime enforced a series of preemptive measures and 
defense mechanisms designed to help the ruling elites maintain their privileges 
by thwarting this liberalization and democratization movement, which, had it 
been approved, would have moved Jordan many steps forward in its transition 
towards liberalization, democratization, and development (Brynen, 1998).  
 Wiktorowicz (1999) claims that Jordan’s liberalization attempts remained 
stalled, due to the regime’s manipulation and exercise of power through legal 
codes and political repression, a situation that benefits the incumbent elites by 
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perpetuating their political control. In his study of the limitations of democracy 
in Jordan, Wiktorowicz refers the floundering towards liberal democracy to the 
lingering authoritarianism. He describes what has been going on in Jordan since 
1989 as just a “façade of democracy” with only symbols, such as political 
parties, elections, and civil society organizations. These symbols have become 
common; yet, they did not lead Jordan to liberal democracy (p. 607).  
  Hitherto, it has been possible to have some of the elements of political 
liberalization without having political democratization. As explained by Brynen 
et al., allowing some liberalization relaxes the political repression without 
expanding political participation, which assimilates the earlier theory of the 
mixed political system of interest representation by Bianchi. Also, this 
accommodates Linz’s ventilation method used by authoritarian regimes to 
prolong their rule, and therefore proves that even a modest amount of 
liberalization under the control of the state guarantees, protects, and preserves 
the status quo for both the political system and political elites. Yet, as Brynen et 
al. confirm, political freedom remains essential for enabling citizens to 
participate effectively and choose a political alternative. Expanding political 
participation by elections under repression, highly distortional systems of 
electoral representation, or electoral fraud does not provide citizens with 
effective say in political decision-making.  
 Cheema (2005) argues that the political systems are not marked liberal and 
democratic for only holding fair and free elections. If democracy is defined in 
terms of elections, then it is possible to have an “illiberal democracy,” but the 
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democratic political system enforces rule of law, separation of powers, and 
protection of its citizens’ basic rights. Jordan’s liberalization movement of the 
1990 slowed down and its efforts to achieve democratic governance fell in a 
state of stagnation. There is a need for serious implementation of reforms that 
guarantees the success of liberalization and democratic governance. The process 
of achieving democratic governance entails the coordination of “complex 
mechanisms, processes, relationships, and institutions through which citizens 
and groups articulate their interests, exercise their rights and obligations, and 
mediate their differences by allocating and managing all resources to respond to 
collective problems” (p. 5). By good governance Jordan will be able to eliminate 
corruption by imposing a rule of law system that enforces transparency, 
accountability, and other democratic principles. 
 Cheema asserts that democratization responds to a universal human 
yearning for freedom and life with dignity, undiminished by our cultural 
diversity and ethnic differences. Jordan needs a serious implementation of 
reforms managed by democratic governance. He also goes on to explain that the 
democratization process in developing countries does not slow down because 
democracy is inapplicable due to their political cultures, but because 
authoritarianism interrupts the progress of their liberalization and 
democratization movement.  
 Moreover, according to Jreisat (as cited in Jabbra, 1989), public 
administration in Jordan is crucial for the implementation of reform and 
development policies. However, confrontational issues, such as tribalism, 
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remain challenging for the achievement of administrative development. The 
tribal loyalties have been more powerful than loyalties to the state, as well as 
centralism, clerkism, nepotism, incompetence, and corruption (p. 99). These 
challenges are frustrating to the implementation of administrative reforms that 
most elites confirmed have not been effectively managed. 
 
Social Development and Civic Engagement  
 Civil society, according to Wiktorowicz (2000), is an essential component 
of democratization. It is viewed “as a mechanism of collective empowerment 
that enhances the ability of citizens to protect their interests and rights from 
arbitrary or capricious state power.” The expansion of civil society requires 
several transitions to democracy, but under authoritarian rule the activities of 
non-governmental organizations (NGOs) remain under state control. In Jordan, 
all NGOs, such as women’s organizations, journalists’ associations, professional 
associations, and cultural societies are continuously challenged by the state. 
Keeping their activities under state control avoids the destabilization of the 
regime by limiting civic engagement and social empowerment. Jordan witnessed 
an expansion in the number of civil society organizations after 1989. However, 
the opportunity for creating new civil society organizations remained limited. As 
described by Wiktorowicz, once these organizations were created, they became 
embedded in a web of bureaucratic practices and legal codes that allow the state 
to monitor and regulate their collective activities. This strategy rendered civil 
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society organizations in Jordan as an instrument of state social control rather 
than a mechanism of collective empowerment (p. 43).  
 According to Al-Attiyat (2005) and Pettygrove (2006), increasing women’s 
participation and empowerment is significant to the social development and 
modernization in Jordan. Pettygrove believes that civil society organizations dedicated to 
women’s issues have blossomed. Relatively, the participation of women has been 
empowered through several efforts, for example, the gender equality protection clause 
within the Jordanian constitution, which has led to many legislative advances in regards 
to women’s rights, and women’s suffrage. Further, while the percentage of university-
educated women is as high as it is for men, the government yet organizes campaigns and 
training programs to raise women’s rights awareness, empower women in business and 
politics, and encourage women’s participation in all sectors of the workforce (p. 4).   
 However, in spite of these advances women’s civil society organizations inhibit 
their decision-making roles, which hampers their abilities to achieve empowerment. In 
addition, family and religious social structures, including gender roles in Jordan, 
remained resistant to change. These social structure and social value systems serve as 
obstacles to women’s political empowerment, along with the Islamic value system that is 
manipulated in its interpretations to intentionally hinder women’s participation at all 
levels; political, social and economic (p. 22-5).  
 Moreover, Kamrava (1998) describes the authoritarian nature of the 
Jordanian regime as restrictive, because it frustrates all reform implementations 
by constraining the meaningful political participation and development of an 
effective civil society. This restrictive nature is also emphasized by Wiktorowicz 
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(1999) who elaborates on the regime’s use of political repression in order to 
channel any mobilization or political participation within its formal and state-
delineated institutions. The repressive barriers of the state still exist since the 
social movements, and political activists and actors prefer to mobilize through 
the grassroots voluntary organizations. 
 Currently, the activities of all types of NGOs are restricted and monitored 
by the government, including the ones that are concerned with human rights, 
democracy, the sentiment value of Jerusalem, and Islam as cultural activities. 
For instance, the government politicizes the cultural and religious activities of 
most NGOs in Jordan and has created clashes over the definition of their 
activities. The politicization of cultural and religious activities is intended by the 
regime to prevent, limit, or forbid any mobilization outside the formal channels. 
The government issued two laws to govern civil society and their activities; Law 
33 was issued in 1966: “to provide social services without any intention of 
financial gains or other personal gains, including political gains.” The second is 
the political party law: Law 32 of 1992 that stipulates: “The use of the premises, 
instrumentalities, and assets of associations, charitable organizations and clubs 
for the benefit of any partisan organization, shall be prohibited” (Wiktorowicz, 
1999, p. 610). In Law 33, for instance, there is no explicit requirement that says 
all volunteers and administrative board members must be approved by the 
“Mukhabarat” or the security department and the public security of the interior, 
though all types of public activities in Jordan must first be cleared by the 
security apparatus and other state agencies (Wiktorowicz, 2000, p. 50). By the 
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same token, Bayat (2002) argues that Jordanian NGOs are established to remain 
charity-driven organizations and to fulfill basic needs, which does not lead to 
social development.  
 Brynen (1998) states that prior to 1989, the professional associations in 
Amman represented the main vehicle for political discussions, but other civil 
institutions in Jordan showed little independence or politicization, such as the 
press that followed the exact direction of the government, chamber of 
commerce, university campuses, and trade unions. All these institutions and 
associations were thoroughly under the government’s control. After 1989, the 
number of civil society associations and organizations has grown tremendously, 
although the process of modernizing these organizations was deficient. Thus, the 
institutionalization process did not progress to match the growth in the number 
of NGOs. Brynen illustrates this problem by explaining how the government 
owns the media, even after the royal decree of 1997 that modified the press law, 
but later resumed their control and continued to limit freedom of expression. 
Also, most organized groups have remained passive and incapable of impacting 
the broad political agenda. This failure in modernizing and liberalizing civil 
society institutions was referred to a myriad of reasons. In addition to the 
government’s limitations, bureaucratic complexities, and the “Mukhabarat,” 
there were other reasons behind the passivity of civic engagement, such as tribal 
and clan connections that lessened the importance of the formal associational 
groups, the excessive involvement of royal members, former and current cabinet 
ministers in the social organizations, and the activation of the parliament and 
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political parties. This expanded the formal mechanisms of political participation 
and caused some associational groups to drop their memberships or active 
participation, and to lose the political reason for their existence. The dilemma 
caused a conflict between the government and some opposition groups including 
leftist minorities and the IAF who endorsed the call for boycotting the 1997 
parliamentary elections. Additionally, the legalization of political parties did not 
rotate power or create political elites. Ironically, the party that significantly 
gained support of the southern region was “Al A’ahd” party, meaning the 
Jordanian Pledge party. It is still headed by a strong East Jordanian advocate of 
the regime. “Al A’ahd” party has entered a coalition with eight other political 
parties to strengthen their support to the regime. Thus, the political party 
institution in Jordan did not meet the consideration of a fundamental mechanism 
for political participation, nor did it ensure political pluralism (Brynen, 1998, p. 
84-89).  
 
Tribalism vs. Jordanian Nationalism  
  Tribalism can be a double-edged sword. It promotes loyalty, unity, and 
cohesiveness among tribal members who share kinship relations; while 
simultaneously, it spreads prejudice and favoritism because it discriminates 
against others who do not have similar kinship affiliations. According to the 
Blackwell Dictionary of Political Science, tribalism can be defined in two ways: 
“the anthropological meaning of the term refers to the type of society which 
preceded the primitive state where groups of pastoralists linked by kinship, 
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formed regular organizations in which chieftainship would later develop and 
these might be called clans or tribes. The term is also used to describe a sort of 
political system in which nepotism and clientilism predominate. Hereditary 
political families are prominent, programmatic and ideological conflict is still 
not intense. Policies tend to be implemented by trading favors” (p. 326).  
 In fact, the dichotomy and fluctuation in the concept of tribalism has 
caused Jordan more confusion on local and national levels regarding how the 
state system should work through its institutions. Jordan is not a highly 
tribalized country according to a recent tribalism study conducted by USAID 
(2010) that evaluates the relationship between traditional and modern 
institutions in Middle Eastern countries.  
 According to Oudat and Alshboul (2010) the relationship between the 
state and the traditional institution of tribalism, or the ‘asha’eriyah’ in Jordan is 
very special due to the security strategy that harnesses the traditional institution 
of tribalism to work as a defense mechanism for the regime. Retrospectively, the 
tribes have been the foundation on which the Jordanian government is grounded, 
as they form the fundamental part of the Jordanian army and the security 
apparatus that keeps the regime protected without relating the ‘tribe’ or the 
‘ashirah’ to the importance of the nation state (p. 70). On the contrary, the 
regime defends the tribal honor and the institution of the monarchy as one entity, 
rather than defending the concept of the nation-state, which created an alliance 
between the regime, tribes, and the institution of monarchy that is represented in 
the slogan of “Jordan First” that enables the state system of political authority to 
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make use of the traditional political authority by promoting tribal loyalties 
towards the monarch and his regime. Hence, the regime has gained control over 
the tribes through its reliance on their support and loyalty that was promoted 
towards the monarch, not the state. Yet, this alliance has produced incompatible 
and ill-assorted situations relevant to the issue of loyalty that has never included 
the Jordanian nation (p. 77, 83-85).  
  Additionally, the authors highlight very important points; firstly, they 
warn from the consequences of the regime’s strategy of “Jordan First” and the 
recruitment of the traditional institution of tribalism, as they do not consider this 
strategy patriotic. The authors assume that the negative impact of tribalism on 
Jordanian nationalism and development will backfire; specifically in the strategy 
of “Jordan First.”  
 Secondly, they emphasize that the regime’s defense strategy has not 
brought Jordan any stability. It is anticipated that this strategy will encourage 
more opposition and trigger radical movements, widen the gap between the 
regime and the society, and weaken the traditional power of tribalism 
characterized by solidarity, social cohesion, power, and pride, among others. 
Accordingly, the regime’s presumption of “Jordan First” defense strategy has 
been failing; it has neither empowered the traditional institution of tribalism, nor 
provided the regime with protection.  
 Thirdly, contrary to the regime’s presumption, this strategy is becoming an 
instrument of modernization, as the new generations are beginning to define 
themselves according to their personal achievements rather than being defined 
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by a tribal affiliation. Thus, according to Oudat and Alshboul (2010) this 
strategy is the new beginning for political liberalization in Jordan. 
 
Economic Liberalization and the State of Rentierism 
 According to Knowels (2005) the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan is one of 
the most vulnerable countries to the external political, economic, and security 
events. The country has been rocked by the effects of the regional instability and 
its numerous events including the ongoing Israeli/Palestinian conflict, the wave 
of the radical revolutions during the 1950s-1960s, the civil Lebanese war of 
1974, various Gulf wars, the invasion of Kuwait, and the invasions of 
Afghanistan and Iraq. More recently, though Knowels’ study reflects up to 2005, 
it is yet relevant to the ongoing war in Syria. The regional crises diminished 
Jordan’s subsidies from the oil producing countries and placed further pressures 
on the economy as the country received hundreds of thousands of refugee 
influxes from each of its neighboring countries.  
 The government in Jordan struggles to meet the requirements and high 
demand of commodities and services, due to its scarce resources, and 
particularly since Jordan is classified as a rentier state. Rentier theory has been 
used since the 1970s to attempt to explain the political economy of Middle 
Eastern countries (Knowles, 2001). The rentier or semi-rentier states are 
dependent states on exogenous sources, since these states derive revenues from 
external resources rather than depending on domestic production or taxation 
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(Greenwood, 2003). Jordan is characterized by aspects of rentierism since its 
establishment in 1921. 
 Brynen (1992) blames rentierism for social and political factions in 
Jordan; it has deeply divided the population in Jordan and played a key role in 
weakening the national integration by primarily directing state resources at East 
Jordanian elites. As a semi-rentier country Jordan has an average GNP, and 
lower-middle income levels with great disparity between its “haves” and “have-
nots.”  The state revenues in Jordan depend on the international market, not on 
domestic production. Its available financial resources support the country’s 
authoritarian regime, which renders the legitimacy of the government less 
important.  
 In a later analysis by Brynen, Korany, and Noble (1998), they criticize the 
allocations and distributions of the financial resources by the government. They 
assert that the regime uses these resources to support the coercive apparatus of 
the state and to sustain massive social welfare programs that fuel powerful 
neopatrimonial networks based on family, the tribe, and proximity to the ruling 
elite. Also, under such circumstances coercion becomes less important for the 
regime when political legitimacy can be “purchased” through economic rewards. 
The rentier social contract is one in which the state provides goods and services 
to society such as subsidies on basic commodities without imposing economic 
burdens, while society provides state officials with a degree of autonomy in 
decision-making and policy. Legitimacy rests upon the ability to enhance quality 
of life rather than democratic principles (p. 15).   
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 According to political economy scholars, Jordan was one of the world’s 
fastest-growing economies, as a result to the 1973 Arab-Israeli War. The 
increase of oil prices, increased remittances, and oil-producing Arab countries’ 
assistance contributed to Jordan’s economy and GDP growth of the 1970s. This 
economic rise continued through 1984 with low unemployment and poverty 
rates, and high per capita GNP and GDP levels to rise. However, Jordan did not 
maintain this economic growth, and the increment in revenues was mainly used 
by the regime to enhance its position among its patronage and East Bank 
constituents. Thus, the economy began to fall, especially with the aftermath of 
the economic crisis that befell the country in the 1990s; see Appendix B, Table 
2.1 Jordan GNI per capita/PPP from 1989 to 2012 in.  
 Lipset’s theory (1959) classifies the following most important 
prerequisites for achieving development and political democracy: the steady 
increases in Gross National Product (GNP) per capita; the legitimacy of the 
government and its ability to strengthen its citizens’ beliefs in the 
appropriateness of their existing political institutions for the society; the 
effectiveness and efficiency of the political system to maintain political stability 
that enhances the economic development and sustains democracy; 
industrialization; urbanization; and citizens’ high educational levels. The 
positive linear relationship between the levels of socioeconomic development 
and democratic development leads to a steady increase in the overall wealth of a 
society. Fulfilling these prerequisites enabled the Western democratic societies 
to achieve political and economic developments (p. 75).  
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 In order to achieve political stability and maintain an average level of 
socioeconomic development in Jordan, the regime found refuge in the 
International Monetary Fund’s (IMF) and World Bank’s stabilization methods. 
The international organizations’ economic reform plans are designed to 
overcome economic deterioration manifested in low growth, high inflation rates, 
foreign exchange shortages, and budget deficits.  
 However, the economic reform is not a one-shot deal, but should be 
viewed as a stage-by-stage process (Barkey, 1992). It starts with a stabilization 
stage and continues in a structural adjustment stage. In the stabilization stage the 
imbalance gets remedied, such as balance of payments, budget deficits and high 
inflation rates, by devaluating the currency and increasing the prices of imported 
goods and domestic products that contain foreign inputs. Meanwhile, the second 
stage is more complicated as it requires an institutionalization process. In fact, 
most Middle Eastern countries fear the stabilization measures because they can 
harm the tenure of their regimes. This fear makes these countries delay the 
stabilization stage, which sets back the whole process of economic reform (p. 3). 
 The principle sources of Jordan’s hard currency earnings are based on 
several different resources and industries: its mineral resources, such as 
phosphate, potash, and fertilizers; the tourism sector and other services that 
include healthcare, pharmaceutical, and the cosmetic sector; and finally, 
overseas remittances, and foreign aid. Nevertheless, the foremost obstacles of 
Jordan’s economy are its regional instability, water scarcity, and complete 
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reliance on oil imports for energy (See Appendix B for more information on 
Jordan’s largest export sectors and Human Development Index).  
 As a result, the Jordanian government has taken wide steps towards rapid 
privatization. Privatization is the process of “converting state-run industries and 
firms into private ones” (Stiglitz, 2003, p. 54); particularly that Jordan attracts 
investments on a large scale. It has six special economic zones: Aqaba, Mafraq, 
Ma'an, Ajloun, the Dead Sea, and Irbid.  
 Jordan’s success in privatizing state-owned enterprises (SOE) is discussed 
in the World’s Bank report (2012), and used as an example for other 
governments in developing countries to overcome their citizens’ fears of 
privatizing stemming from many scopes: employees’ expectations to lose 
benefits; consumers’ worries about price increases; and voters mistrust in 
government officials. During the period from 1998 to 2008, the government of 
Jordan has successfully privatized fourteen fully SOEs in the following 
industries: telecommunications, electricity, air transport, mining and other 
sectors. According to the World Bank, privatization strengthened Jordan’s fiscal 
position and supported its macroeconomic stability by generating $2.3 billion in 
sales proceeds, supporting the reducing debts from 100% of GDP in 2000 to 
89% in 2004 and 60% in 2008.  
  Although Jordan is mostly an arid desert land with limited water 
resources, and depends on external sources for the majority of its energy 
requirements, the World Bank has recently classified Jordan as an “upper middle 
income country.” Jordan’s annual GDP growth between 2010 and 2011, 
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according to UNDP (2013) report was 3.1% and the GDP per capita is 0.9%. 
The IMF expects an economic growth to accelerate and expand by 3.5% and 
reach 4.5% in 2017. The UNDP per capita Gross National Income (GNI) rate is 
$4,380. According to IMF, Jordan’s GDP per capita/Purchasing Power Parity 
(PPP) for 2012 is estimated by 5,977 (See Appendix B, Figure 2.3 for GNP 
growth rate, and Figure 2.4, for Jordan’s Economic Liberalization and Freedom 
Index, 2013). 
 
Congruence Theory  
 The relationship between the authority patterns of Jordanian elites with the 
Monarch on one hand, and the citizens of Jordan on the other, are relevant to 
Eckstein’s congruence theory (1998). The core of the congruence theory 
consists of two hypotheses. The first finds pertinence to Jordan’s political 
system and pertains to the congruence between the authority patterns of the 
political system and the authority patterns of other units of society. The viability 
and well performance of the political system is measured on the basis of this 
congruence; high performance requires high congruence. Thus, it is the 
capability of the political system to be in agreement and broadly correspond to 
different social organizations, agencies, and units. Predominantly, the units of 
the society are such institutions and organizations that include political parties, 
unions, businesses, professional societies, community and voluntary 
associations, schools and universities, film production teams, sport team 
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leagues, religious worshiping associations, hospitals, social clubs, and families; 
these are the social units where the elites of the society are drawn from. The 
social units are subunits that directly affect and differ from the state in their 
scale and complexity, and require governance. Thus, governments perform well 
if their authority patterns are congruent with the authority patterns of other 
social units (p. 5).  
 The second hypothesis of the congruence theory is not separate from the 
first, but an extension of it. It suggests that in addition to the congruence 
condition, high performance will be satisfied if the political system is capable to 
make a balance among its disparities. This requires the ability to have mixed-
authority relations. The effective transition towards democracy and the stability 
of the political system requires balanced interactions and relationships among all 
conflicting and consensual parties, or active and passive ones. This conductive 
environment, according to the theory, enhances the stability of the political 
system; while the authoritative or totalitarian authority patterns hamper the 
transition towards democracy and the stability of the political system (p. 10- 12). 
 According to Eckstein, the high performance of governments also pertains 
to how well a polity can do in preserving the following conditions and criteria: 
its durability over time; keeping a civil order and avoiding the existence of 
violence and coercive channels in the society; legitimacy of the regime and how 
much its members consider it worthy to them; and the government’s decisional 
efficacy in carrying out policies in response to political demands and challenges 
(p. 13). 
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 The application of the first hypothesis of congruence theory to Jordanian 
elites, who are drawn from different social units within the society, indicates that 
congruence is always apparent between the authority patterns of the regime and 
the authority patterns of particular social units, but not all social units. The 
Jordanian authority pattern of Eastern elites for instance, remains responsive to 
only a minority of constituencies, particularly with the unrepresentative party 
system that does not allow devolution of power or recruitment of elites. This 
creates disparities within the Jordanian society, as this congruence is only 
representative to the minority of elites. As far as the second hypothesis of the 
congruence theory in terms of the ability of the political system to establish a 
balanced relationship with its disparities in the society, and in order to establish 
a consensual environment among all parties, the Jordanian political system has 
lately proven its ability to do so. After the eruption of the Arab Spring, the 
change in the regional political milieu planted the seed for some change in the 
Jordanian political system, in terms of responding to reforms. Relatively, the 
King acknowledged the demand for political reform, and yielded to the wish of 
certain Parliament members to select the Prime Minister. Therefore, the 
Jordanian political system proved that it can create a consensual environment 
and avoid coercion and disagreements. 
 However, the performance of the government and political system will be 
measured in terms of its ability to maintain civil order, legitimacy, and its 
efficacy in carrying out policies in response to political demands and challenges. 
But, the Jordanian political system lacks for governmental durability, and has 
  
58 
 
used coercive and astute measures to keep civil order and enforce balance in the 
society, which impacts the transitional movement towards liberalization and 
democratization that has been slow and remained as a “form” rather than a 
“norm.” These enduring conditions are constraining the progress of liberal 
democracy in Jordan. 
 
Cautious Liberalism 
    John Locke’s political theory does not guarantee an inevitable progress 
of human communities, as he deems the political order precarious. Locke’s 
political theory is joined with a constant anxiety about a possibility of political 
degeneration caused by change. John Locke’s political theory has two 
tendencies that are not very harmonious. On one hand Locke seems reluctant to 
change and inclined towards preserving the political order, due to believing that 
change might be for the worse; this tendency expresses conservatism. On the 
other hand however, Locke rejects tyranny and abuse and regards them as a state 
of war. In this rejection Locke expresses radicalism, as he urges that citizens 
should stay watchful and ready to act in order to oppose abuse before it is too 
late. Therefore, Locke tends to encourage what he calls “cautious liberalism,” to 
avoid changes in the political system and government, which he believes might 
lead to political degeneration. 
 Rooted from the value of liberalism, John Locke theorized that in order to 
establish a legitimate rule, every society must approve consent among its 
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members on the bases of freedom and equality. A citizen’s entitlement to be free 
and equal enables them to come to consensus, and maintain legitimacy, avoiding 
any infringement on their rights. Further, a legitimate political authority must 
have separated powers, certain institutional arrangements that enable the polity 
to elect an assembly, and must replace traditionalism with constitutionalism in 
order to ensure the continuation of stability. Locke’s liberal theory obeys 
legitimate authority, while allowing resistance against illegitimate power and 
tyranny. Therefore, power must be exercised within reason as a means for a 
legitimate end, and only then will the public good be served (Grant, 1987, p. 
204).  
 Applying Locke’s “cautious liberalism” theory to the analysis of the 
collected data on Jordanian elites’ political culture will indicate whether 
Jordanian elites’ values, beliefs, and attitudes are ambivalent towards 
liberalization, democratization, and development. This study will provide a 
description on elites’ values, beliefs, and attitudes towards change and the 
implementation in reforms in Jordan’s political, social, and economic orders as 
depicted in their responses to the survey questions of this study. Further, the 
analysis of their responses allows me to describe them as “cautious liberals” in 
terms of this theory, as they provide signs of acceptance for liberalization, 
democratization, and development, but simultaneously illustrate timid attitudes 
towards accepting change in their political order, fearing potential instability. 
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Chapter 3: Methods 
 
 The core of the literature review suggests that what actually matters is 
what Jordanian elites appreciate, believe in, and want to act towards. 
Accordingly, this chapter explains the methods that were used in describing 
elites’ political culture that consists of their values, beliefs, and attitudes. It 
examines the three types of values, beliefs, and attitudes questions of the survey 
questionnaire that were designed to respond to the study’s four research 
questions and their two hypotheses.   
 Four research questions and two hypotheses were developed to describe 
the political culture of Jordanian elites that consists of their values, beliefs, and 
attitudes towards liberalization, democratization, and development; measure 
significant differences between the means of the three groups of elites; illustrate 
the values, beliefs and attitudes of Jordanian elites concerning the center of 
power in Jordan; and explain if Jordan’s current political regime congruent with 
the values, beliefs, and attitudes of Jordanian elites. The two hypotheses were 
tested in terms of significant differences between the means of the three groups 
of elites as well as the congruence between the regime and elites’ political 
culture. The following are the four research questions and their two hypotheses: 
Q1: What is the political culture that consists of Jordanian elites’ values, 
 beliefs, and attitudes towards the processes of liberalization, 
 democratization and political, social, and economic developments in the 
 Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan? 
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 Q2:  Are there significant differences among the values, beliefs, and  
             attitudes of the three groups of Jordanian elites? 
 H1:  There are significant differences among the values, beliefs, and  
              attitudes of the three groups of Jordanian elites towards political,  
  social, and economic development.  
 Q3:   What are the values and beliefs of Jordanian elites concerning the  
          center of power in Jordan? 
 Q4:    Is Jordan’s current political regime congruent with the values,  
            beliefs, and attitudes of Jordanian elites?  
 H2:   The regime is congruent with Jordanian elites’ political culture. 
 
 The following sections in this chapter illustrate and describe the data 
collection and analysis methods used in this research. The main data collection 
method for this study was a face-to-face survey, administered to three different 
groups of Jordanian elites. This data was collected during 2008, during the time 
I received the Sasakawa Young Leaders Fellowship Fund (SYLFF) scholarship 
and stayed in Jordan for one academic year. This chapter describes the 
following:  
 Study population 
 Sample selection procedure 
 Survey administration procedures 
 Survey questionnaire  
 Data analyses approaches for both quantitative and qualitative data 
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Study Population 
 The target population of this study is the elites in Jordan. As noted in the 
previous chapter, according to elite theorists, (Berry, 1989; Parry, 2005; Putnam, 
1976; Tachau 1975) elites are a small minority that plays an exceptionally 
influential part in political, social, and economic affairs. The target population of 
this study is therefore, the most influential minority in the Jordanian society. The 
political elites include the highest governmental officers and policymakers, who 
currently occupy, or have occupied in the past, the highest rank positions in the 
government and public sector. The elites also include business owners and 
corporate CEOs from the Jordanian private sector; considered as economic 
elites. An assortment of intelligentsia members of thinkers, writers, and 
professors, as well as members of the prominent tribal groups are also covered 
within the study and considered as social elites. Traditionally, the King granted 
several social and economic elites high rank positions in the government, due to 
their prominent social and economic statuses. Therefore, frequently many 
political elites are also social or economic elites. 
In this study the three groups of elites are identified based on the following 
titles and positions: 
1.) The political elite group, consisted of those who held high governmental 
positions such as, former and present Prime Ministers and Ministers, former and 
present Parliament representatives from both the lower and upper houses, 
political party leaders, and the under secretaries, trustees, administrative 
executives, and general managers of ministries and public agencies. 
  
63 
 
2.)  The social elite group consisted of secretary generals of unions and 
syndicates, leaders of nonprofit organizations, and members of the intelligentsia, 
such as university professors and writers.  
3.) The economic elite group included the private sector business owners, 
who are CEOs and chairs of companies that contain large numbers of 
shareholders.  
 
Sample Selection 
 The study sample was selected with the help of the Center for Strategic 
Studies (CSS) at the University of Jordan. The CSS is a well-known research 
center highly recognized among University of Jordan’s professors that have 
been providing the government bodies and organizations in the public and 
private sectors with high-impact social, economic and political studies on the 
local, regional, and foreign policies in Jordan. Since Jordan’s democratization 
process was initiated in 1989, the CSS has been expanding its scope of activities 
to include planning and research in several other relevant fields. Their research 
areas include political pluralism, gender studies, and democratic governance. In 
addition, the CSS works in cooperation with other research centers in the region 
to present a variety of political, economic, socio-economic and environmental 
analyses. Projects by CSS are accompanied by extensive efforts to develop and 
launch an Arab academic and research network (http://www.jcss.org).  
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 This center (CSS) was regarded as a reliable information source for 
researchers and decision-makers by Sasakawa Young Leaders Fellowship Fund 
(Sylff) organizers, who grant researchers scholarships to conduct data collection. 
The University of Jordan (UOJ) is a Sylff institution; thus, when I arrived to 
Amman, Jordan, I contacted the Sylff representative professor at UOJ, who 
introduced me to the CSS researchers. The center is located on campus and 
provides researchers and students with academic training, access to its library, 
and allows them to participate in workshops and activities.  
 Through CSS, I obtained a list of Jordanian elites’ names that were used as 
a sampling frame for selecting the sample for this study, containing six-hundred-
sixty-eight (668) names. This list contained names of prominent political, social, 
and economic figures in the Jordanian society. However, the social and 
economic prominent figures can be granted political positions by the King. For 
instance, many tribal influential figures serve as Prime Ministers and Ministers 
if chosen by the King to fill these positions. These social and economic figures 
would in most cases identify themselves as political rather than social or 
economic elites. This offers an explanation as to why the number of political 
elites is doubled and why the proportions of the three groups of elites in the 
sample are:  65:23:12 (political: social: economic). 
 Moreover, the appointment of Prime Ministers by the King is usually confined to 
a pool of a few prominent influential tribal figures, where in some cases some Prime 
Ministers have served in more than three governments. Similarly, the political elite 
stratum includes certain prominent figures that filled a variety of positions and are still 
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part of the government, including elites with more than one affiliation according to the 
three elite categories, yet identify and introduce themselves as political verses social or 
economic. The sample of this study is affected by all these reasons. In addition, according 
to CSS researchers, the sample is representative, as the disproportions in the sample are a 
reflection of the disproportions in the population.   
 A systematic random sampling method was used to select one hundred 
(100) study participants. A table of random numbers was used to locate the 
initial sampling point. The following describes steps taken during the sampling 
procedure. 
 The total numbers of the list of names (668) were divided by the sample 
size (100). The derived number 668/100=6.68 (approximately 7) provided the 
justification for the researcher to select every 7
th
 person from the randomly 
identified starting point. 
 The number 3 was selected, picked randomly between 1 and 10, in order 
to locate the initial sampling point. The selection process began by highlighting 
every third name as the starting point for the count, and every seventh name 
down the list was then highlighted for selection until achieving a list of one-
hundred-ten (110) names. 
 The extra ten names were selected and reserved for replacement purposes 
in case someone declined to participate in this study, or asked to be removed 
from the list of participants before or after the interview. Only one elite asked to 
be removed, and was replaced by one from those ten names. 
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 Using the contact information in the verified list of office addresses and 
phone numbers provided by CSS, I contacted each one of the hundred (100) 
people identified through the sampling procedure described above, by phone. 
The phone contact was made mainly to solicit their participation in the face-to-
face survey. After the elite who asked to be removed was replaced, all the 
contacted elites agreed to participate in the study.  
 
Survey Administration and Interview Procedures 
 Initial phone contacts. Initial contacts with the study participants were 
made by phone to solicit their participation to the face-to-face survey. Prior to 
the phone contact, CSS staff members trained me to follow a certain protocol 
necessary for dealing with and talking to Jordanian elites. For instance, the 
Jordanian elites have certain designated titles endowed by the King. According 
to Jordanian protocol, it would be considered inappropriate to address the elites, 
who were designated by “His Majesty,” without acknowledging their 
designation.  
 The main purpose of the phone contact was to describe the research and to 
introduce the researcher, develop a rapport with the study participants, solicit 
their participation to the face-to-face survey, and make appointments for 
conducting the interviews. Efforts were made to establish friendly and trustful 
relationships with the participants during the phone contact. The phone 
conversations began with a summary of the purpose of the study. In the 
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conversations, I emphasized the academic nature of the study, assured 
confidentiality of the identity of the participants, and informed them of Portland 
State University’s Informed Consent.  
 Elites were extremely concerned about their confidentiality, which was taken 
seriously due to their political environment. According to the blogs of Premium Data 
Processing & Survey Research (http://www.sentenium.com/), confidentiality means only 
the researcher, who is conducting the survey, knows the respondents who are taking the 
survey, without any disclosure of that information. The notion of confidentiality and 
anonymity was raised and discussed with all interviewees prior to their participation in 
the interviews. Confidential research cannot be conducted; researchers have a duty to 
report on the findings of their research and they cannot do so if the data they collect is 
confidential. The researcher’s duty is to report on the findings of the research; this duty 
cannot be fulfilled without revealing the collected data. Therefore, I ensured the 
interviewees to try my best to protect their identities through various processes designed 
to keep their identifiable information anonymous.  So, all the potential participants, who 
were contacted by phone accepted to participate in this study, but their acceptance was 
conditional on guaranteeing them that their responses will not be linked to their names 
and identities. 
 During this phone contact, I discussed some key aspects of the Jordanian 
elites’ power through their positions. We touched on the abilities of Jordanian 
elites through their influential positions in the public, private, and nonprofit 
sectors, and their role as intelligentsia. The confidentiality of identities was the 
most common concern emphasized by most elites. I assured them that this 
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concern would be taken very seriously with complete understanding to their 
political environment and to the pressures coming from their authoritarian 
monarchical regime. Many elites were concerned about this study’s association 
with any local or international media. I emphasized that although I had 
knowledge of the surveyed participants, the identities of the respondents, and 
any associated names within the information shared with me was in complete 
confidence. The participants were also noted that they would receive a copy of 
the “Informed Consent” in the Arabic language before beginning their 
interviews. 
 In addition, the participants were informed that this research was 
supported by a grant from Sasakawa Young Leaders Fellowship Fund (Sylff) for 
the students pursuing graduate studies. It was clarified that Sylff is not 
responsible for the content of this research. I also noted that CSS is providing 
assistance to this research with the identification of the study participants. At the 
end of the phone conversation, all potential participants accepted to participate 
in this study, under the condition that I guarantee the confidentiality of their 
names and identities.  
 The initial phone contact provided the study participants a chance to ask 
questions about me and other concerns they have about the study. This step 
turned out to be an important part of the data collection that had a psychological 
impact on elites. It allowed those who occupy the senior positions to stay in 
control of the interview situation and gave them the opportunity to ask questions 
  
69 
 
to maintain this sense of control. It also removed any concerns about the 
research prior to the face-to-face survey/interviews. 
  
 Written and oral wording of survey questions. Initially, the survey 
questions were sketched in English with emphasis on their linkage to the 
objectives of the study. However, after consulting with question-crafters from 
the CSS, the questions were translated into standard Arabic. The design and 
wording of the questions followed the standardized survey questionnaire of 
Converse and Presser (1986) that stresses the effectiveness of keeping most 
questions short and choosing simple, clear, and precise vocabulary. According 
to Converse (1984), the wording was free of ambiguity and unnecessary 
adjectives and adverbs. Efforts were exerted while wording the questions in 
order not to choose any vocabulary that leads to assumptions. The consultation 
with the CSS question-crafters was important for the face-to-face questions 
during the interviews, in order to avoid the chatty, over-familiar language, and 
maintain professionalism and accuracy. In addition, consulting with the CSS 
question-crafters was essential for the appropriateness of the language that was 
used to address prominent political, social, and economic interviewees in the 
Jordanian government and society.  
  
 Face-to-face survey administration and interview. The face-to-face 
format was a suitable data collection approach for this study as it allowed me to 
elicit information from a group of former and present prominent elites. 
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Questioning elites in a face-to-face setting led to collecting more accurate 
information and improved the quality of the obtained data. Whenever 
respondents’ comments sounded elusive, irrelevant, or contradictory, I was able 
to ask follow-up questions to clarify the information. There were several reasons 
behind the elusiveness or irrelevance in elites’ comments; first, as I learned from 
the local researchers at CSS, there is a tendency in the Jordanian media of 
falsifying any statistics on lagging behind situations on the social or economic 
levels in Jordan. In fact, the media proclamations reflect the official position of 
the government, a position that is complemented by the lack of accountability 
and transparency. Therefore, giving responses that contradict with this official 
stand can cause agitation, which drives some elites to evade from giving 
straightforward responses.  
 Second, Under the Jordanian monarchical system, there is a certain 
protocol for addressing ministers, under secretaries, chairs, and other high 
governmental officers. Each elite might have an additional title, which in formal 
settings he/she are addressed with. The additional titles are usually granted by 
“His Majesty” the King. For example, the Prime Minister is always addressed by 
“Ma’aleek” or “Your Highness,” but sometimes the King might address a 
minister by “Ma’aleek” which makes it politically incorrect to address that 
particular minister without the prefix which he/she was granted by the King. The 
Jordanian under secretary is usually addressed by “Otooftak” or “Your 
Kindness,” a chair must be addressed by “Sa’adtak” or “Your Honor,” and a 
high governmental officer sometimes must be addressed by “Siyadtak” or 
  
71 
 
“Your Excellency” before his/her name. The CSS question-crafters were 
consulted about the importance of including the additional titles in the orally 
repeated questions, such as “why, Sa’adtak, do you believe…?” or “how, 
Siyadtak, do you consider...?” According to CSS question-crafters these titles 
are important to be used while addressing most elites and might impact their 
reluctance verses willingness to answering the questions. Therefore, the 
additional titles were studied and added to all the face-to-face interviews, as well 
as while communicating with them over the phone. Learning titles was an 
essential step that took place prior to contacting any of the elites, as mistakes in 
addressing Jordanian elites could negatively affect the process of data gathering. 
 When respondents made elusive or irrelevant comments on questions 
pertaining corruption, or levels of poverty or unemployment, I repeated the 
question and challenged the succeeding answer by including statistics or other 
published facts within the question, which indicated my knowledge supported 
by evidential facts regarding the issue. This technique was useful to solicit 
answers that were more factual and direct. Thus, the face-to-face setting made it 
possible to use this approach and to collect more accurate responses and avoided 
a process of collecting politicized, terse, or generic media-based information and 
data. Finally, the face-to-face interviewing method minimized the “I do not 
know” and the “No response” answers.  
 Mail survey was not used for this study in order to avoid the discretion of 
the secretaries and office managers, who might forget, delay, or ignore the 
surveys. It was also not used in order to minimize the possibility of rejection to 
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participate by projected participants, due to any misinterpretation or 
misunderstanding to the purpose of this survey. The uncertainty of the local 
postal system, according to its reputation among locals residing in the city of 
Amman, was another reason for not using the mail survey approach.  
 During the survey, strict attention was paid to the fact that this study was 
being conducted under an authoritarian monarchical system, and its participants 
were elements of the monarchical system. As VIPs of a monarchical system, the 
Jordanian elites had high expectations for receiving a favored treatment, which 
was expected in advance. Therefore, I learned the local protocols and formalities 
that met these elite’s expectations to be treated with special care and courtesy.  
 At the beginning of the face-to-face survey session, all interviewees were 
handed a copy of the Informed Consent Form translated into Arabic (see 
Appendix C for an English copy of the Informed Consent Form). I reemphasized 
the information already shared over the phone prior to our meeting, and insisted 
on the academic purpose of this study. The procedures required for data 
collection by Portland State University were also communicated. In addition, in 
order to minimize any hesitations that might occur, the confidentiality factor was 
further stressed. Through this agreement, due to the sensitivity of the 
interviewees’ positions and potential jeopardy of what their answers may lead 
to, the request for their signed endorsements was discarded, as many of elites’ 
feedback expressed the question of how truly anonymous their identities would 
remain. 
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 Subsequently, each interviewee was handed a printed hard copy of the 
Arabic Informed Consent Form for their reference, and the survey questionnaire, 
so he/she could read and follow each question during the interview process. All 
interviewees saw the survey questions for the first time at the face-to-face 
interview session.  
 High response Rates. As mentioned in the Literature Review, the reasons behind 
the high responding rates to this study can be explained by the participation of Jordanians 
in other studies, such as their participation in the Arab Barometer study, which was 
conducted in Jordan in 2006 and had a poll that included a sample of 1200 residences and 
had a high response rate of 95.4%, as only 55 households refused to take part. Likewise, 
this study has a high participation and responding percentages among its selected elites. 
The high responding rates are a precursor for the researchers in the field to overcome the 
previous research limitations. The ability to gather an abundance of data and to defeat 
different research limitations is an optimistic indication that heralds a new era for the 
researchers, who are concerned with filling the gap in the literature and for those who are 
interested in understating the centers of influence and elites in the Middle East.    
 Mishler (1986) defines the interview as a pattern of interaction in which 
the role relationship of interviewer and respondent is highly specialized; it has 
specific characteristics that is affected by the purpose and character of the 
interview (p. 8). In accordance with this definition, the authoritarian 
monarchical political culture and environment of Jordan had a vivid impact on 
the character of these interviews; hence, the researcher’s familiarity with the 
political culture and environment of the country and the interviewees was 
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substantial for achieving the purpose of these face-to-face interactions. For 
instance, during the interviews it was important to sense the sensitivity of certain 
political issues and to pay special attention to respondents’ actions and reactions 
to certain subjects. The communication during the interviews was consistent 
with these actions and reactions, which kept the flow of collecting clear and 
valid responses with less skepticism and few hesitations.  
 Despite the regime’s recent endeavors of allowing some freedom of 
opinion, several elites remained reluctant or hesitant to answer a number of 
questions that asked about the King’s absolute powers, authoritarianism, or 
corruption, either because they did not believe that the regime was serious in its 
endeavors of implementing change, or because they were loyal to the regime. By 
the same token, lack of knowledge about certain questions’ subjects, or the used 
terminologies, being unaccustomed to speaking up, or remaining skeptical about 
confidentiality were among the reasons that were taken under consideration, 
because they caused reluctance and hesitation to give direct responses.  
 I directed several follow-up questions to the respondents who showed 
negative reactions to any of the questions. I used several different approaches in 
a feedback form, such as repeating, restructuring, explaining, or delineating the 
original question. In fact, the face-to-face settings made it possible to use these 
approaches, as it allowed me to both hear and see the verbal and non-verbal 
responses and reactions. Thus, the setting enabled me to interfere whenever 
respondents portrayed negative reactions and to use different approaches that 
suited the different situations. As a result, I gathered an abundance of candid 
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information and more accurate data since the respondents had adjusted it during 
the interviews. 
 For example, some questions were rephrased to include explanations or 
delineations about the question’s subject or to explain the terminology. In some 
cases responses or comments were repeated, suggesting to the respondents that I 
had not understood what they meant, which triggered them to clarify their 
response and provided me with a more accurate one. Occasionally, there were 
some awkward situations when respondents would say or make irrelevant 
comments on questions, and where certain patterns of techniques were 
employed in response. For instance, my reactions to these situations were 
hypersensitive, as some elites, whose political environments were influenced by 
their positions in the society and/or the government, had to be treated carefully 
by using an indirect rephrasing of the question. The indirect rephrasing of the 
question was a successful technique, as it avoided any embarrassment to these 
respondents. Yet, whenever the questions needed to be rephrased, effort was 
made to maintain the intent and integrity of the original questions.  
 Other situations were treated differently, for example, if the respondent 
used nonverbal body language or gestures to answer a question instead of 
making a verbal response, I recorded the response accordingly. Also, in some 
cases the respondents answered sarcastically with either a “yes” or “no,” while 
they have nodded their heads to mean the opposite, the responses were recorded 
to reflect the true intentions of the respondents.  
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 Additionally, when the respondents showed hesitation due to a question 
regarding the King’s absolute powers, authoritarianism, or some newly enforced 
laws to eliminate corruption, it was noted that they were still skeptical and 
doubtful about confidentiality. I dealt with these cases by reassuring them that 
their confidentiality will be preserved; however in most cases, rephrasing the 
question was still necessary to solicit an answer. In this case, the question was 
reworded orally by framing it more broadly after reading it from the survey. 
Generally, verbally rephrasing the written question allowed the opportunity to 
ask the same question indirectly, by providing specific scenarios and examples, 
which gave the interviewee the confidence in answering the question, implying 
the same answer to the directly stated written question. Once an answer was 
provided from the indirect rephrased situational approach, I reverted back to the 
direct survey question and indicated parallelism in the question and answer 
discussed, which at this point, the respondent confirms. 
 In addition, personal family relations have played an important role in 
facilitating the gathering of data. The success behind the initial phone calls with 
potential participants and their acceptance to participate in the face-to-face 
interviews was in part due to the researcher’s family name and relations. As a 
Middle Eastern country, Jordan has a culture that values the concept of family 
honor. For instance, expectations such as having low participation levels among 
elites and collecting brief, “no,” or “I do not know” responses were overridden. 
Elites’ perceptions of the quality, worthiness, and respectability of the researcher 
and the data gathering process relative to this study were further affected by this 
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factor. Particularly, the researcher’s family relation with Dr. Rima Khalaf- 
Hunaidi, the Executive Secretary for United Nations Economic and Social 
Commission for Western Asia (ESCWA); listed in the Financial Times among 
the top fifty people who shaped the decade. She held several high-ranking 
ministerial positions in Jordan, including the Minister of Industry and Trade 
(1993–1995); the Minister of Planning (1995–1998); Deputy of Prime Minister 
and Minister of Planning (1999–2000); Assistant Secretary-General and Director 
of the Regional Bureau for Arab States (RBAS) at the United Nations 
Development Program (UNDP) from 2000 to 2006; and she has also served as 
the Chairperson of the Advisory Board of the United Nations Democracy Fund 
(2006–2007). These prominent positions held by Dr. Khalaf-Hunaidi directly 
strengthened the researcher’s position and had a positive impact on the data 
gathering process.    
 
Survey Questionnaire 
 A survey questionnaire with thirty-five questions, including both closed-
ended and open ended-questions, was developed for this study (see Appendix C 
for the survey questionnaire). The questions in this survey questionnaire were 
designed to assess respondents’ political environment, and to collect data that 
would address the aforementioned two research questions of this study.     
 The survey questions were designed to collect data about the respondents’ 
perception of the political system, culture, and environment of Jordanian elites. 
This set of questions provided me with a set of standardized and structured 
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quantitative data. On the other hand, the open-ended, free-response questions led 
to an abundance of qualitative data. The open-ended questions triggered the 
respondents to give more information and elaborate on the questions in their 
own words. In addition, the open-ended questions gave me an opportunity to ask 
follow-up questions for clarification and elaboration.  
 In designing this survey questions the political environment of the 
respondents was taken into consideration. By following up a closed-ended 
question with an open-ended question, allowed the respondents to elaborate and 
explain their answers when the question touched on the sensitive issues in the 
Jordanian politics. Appendix C is the English version of the survey form.  
 The survey questions were constructed to assess 1.) values, 2.) beliefs, and 
3.) attitudes. In order to differentiate between the three types of questions of the 
survey, the definitions of values, beliefs, and attitudes according to Sheibe’s 
(1970) theory were considered. As previously mentioned in the literature review, 
each of the three has different attributes, which affected how each question was 
differentiated from the other. For example, when the question asks about “what 
is good,” it is a value question; as how “good” something is, or how “good” a 
matter is to a person is a means of value to them specifically. When the question 
asks about “what is true,” it is a belief question. The belief system is based on 
how much truth a person thinks there is in what he/she believes in. Finally, when 
the question asks about how the person views, thinks about, or did/will do 
towards a specific matter, it is an attitude question. Accordingly, the questions 
of the survey were classified and labeled.  
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 Based on Sheibe’s theory, the three types of survey questions were labeled 
and are displayed in the three following tables (Table 3.1, Table 3.2 and Table 
3.3). The first table of the closed-ended/values questions is preceded with more 
explanations on how these questions were labeled. 
 Closed-ended ‘value’ questions. Values are identified as empirical 
elements in human behavior that arise out of human experience, invoked in 
social interaction to evaluate the behavioral goals or modes of action; thus 
became mainly defined as social norms, or as attitudes anchored in groups of 
norms and assumed to be central to the cognitive organization of the individual 
and to serve as a basis for the formation of beliefs, opinions, and attitudes 
(Hutcheon 1972, Rokeach 1970, 1973).  
 In reference to all these theories, question (103), as a ranking question, 
was designed to investigate the importance of certain values to respondents; the 
question of identifying oneself with an ideological affiliation indicated how 
much this person values the characteristics of this ideological affiliation and 
thought of it as ‘good.’ Question (108), asked about the effectiveness or the 
goodness of a particular law; and question (112) asked about the suitability of 
one out of four political systems, indicating which system is the most valuable 
or suitable according to the respondents. Question (115.a) rates the support of 
women’s participation across the three fields of development. Question (117) 
defines elites’ reason for lobbying, indicating how much they value lobbying. 
Question (121) results express how elites value the campaigning culture during 
parliamentary elections, particularly regarding campaign mottos, and vision and 
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mission statements. Finally, question (129) inquires about elites’ affiliations 
with nonprofit organizations, and if the activities of nonprofits were considered 
as a value to them, or not. The measurement of values in this survey follows the 
ranking and rating model of Alwin,and Krosnick (1985). See (Table 3.1) below 
for the closed-ended value questions: 
 
Table 3.1 Closed-ended ‘Value’ Questions 
Q# Q. Type     Q. Structure 
103 Value  How would you rank the following values in terms of their   
    importance to the reformation and the current development policies? 
(1 = Extremely unimportant; 2 = Unimportant; 3 = Somehow important; 
4 = Important; 5 = Extremely Important) 
105 Value  Describe yourself ideologically: 
1. Liberal 
2. Independent 
3. Conservative 
108 Value  How do rate the effectiveness of the ‘declaration of liability’ law to  
   ensure accountability and transparency? 
1. Extremely ineffective 
2. Ineffective  
3. Moderately effective  
4. Effective 
5. I don’t know 
6. No Response 
112 Value  The following are models for political systems of some countries  
   in the Middle East. Pick the most suitable for Jordan and rate its   
   suitability on the below scale from 1-6:  
(1 = Not suitable; 2 = Somewhat suitable; 3 = Suitable; 4 = Very 
suitable; 5 = don’t know; 6 = No response): 
1. Parliamentary system that allows the nationalist, Islamic, and  
left and right wing parties to compete in transparent and  
impartial parliamentary elections 
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2. Parliamentary system that allows only the Islamic parties to 
compete in parliamentary elections 
3. Authoritarian system controlled and ruled by an ultimate  
power and authority without consent or consideration for 
opposing views 
4. A system ruled by Islamic Shari’ah without any type of  
elections or political parties 
 
115.a Value  Rate your support or opposition to women’s participation in the  
    political, social, and economic development:   
(1 = Strongly oppose; 2 = Somewhat oppose; 3 = Moderately support; 4 
= Strongly support; 5 = don’t know; 6 = No response)   
 
117 Value  What were your reasons for lobbying? 
1. To implement important changes      
2. To pursue my democratic values 
3. To support pluralism 
4. To participate in policymaking  
5. All the above 
 
121 Value  How do you describe the mottos, mission and vision statements of  
   political parties and the parliamentary election campaigns in Jordan? 
1. Appealing and engaging to most Jordanians 
2. Appealing and engaging to some Jordanians 
3. Neither appealing nor engaging  
4. Used as campaign propaganda 
5. I don’t know 
6. No response 
 
129 Value  Do/did you have an affiliation with any of the following nonprofit  
   or civic organizations? 
  
 
 Closed-ended ‘belief’ questions. Scheibe (1970) defined the belief 
system by a set of functional disposition, nature, or character; beliefs are the 
implicit expectations concerning what leads to what (p. 39). Accordingly, 
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political beliefs reset the culturally defined goals for political processes; 
therefore they play a major role in determining the operation of the political 
process. This group of questions was categorized as belief questions, as they 
asked about “what was true.” See the closed-ended belief questions in the below 
table (Table 3.2): 
Table  3.2 Closed-ended ‘Belief’ Questions 
Q# Q. Type     Q. Structure 
101      Belief Do you think you currently have or have had any impact on policy-
 making in Jordan? 
  (0 = No; 1 = Yes) 
 
102      Belief As a policy maker, or as someone who has/had an impact on  
 policymaking, to what extent do you believe that your political goals 
 are/were achieved?  
1. Not at all 
2. To a little extent 
3. To a moderate extent 
4. To a large extent 
5. Don’t know 
6. No response 
 
 
104     Belief  How would you rate the current administration’s performance on  
 implementing the following reforms? 
 
  (1 = Very poor; 2 = Poor; 3 = Standard; 4 = Good;  
  5 = Very good; 6 = Excellent) 
 
 
110      Belief Institutionalization is a required stage in administrative development.  
 Do you think the institutionalization process in Jordan has been  
 successful? 
  
  (0 = No; 1 = Yes) 
 
118      Belief “Pluralism” is the participation of all political forces in governance.  
 Does pluralism exist under Jordan’s authoritative monarchical  
 political structure? 
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  (0 = No; 1 = Yes) 
 
125      Belief  Is it true that parliament members stay connected with their constituencies  
 after the elections? 
  (0 = No; 1 = Yes)  
  
126      Belief In what way do you think tribalism impacts the political and social 
 developments in Jordan? 
 
1. Positive  
2. Negative 
3. Positive at times and negative at others  
4. Don’t know 
5. No response  
 
128      Belief ‘The values, beliefs, and attitudes of Jordanian elites are influenced by  
 their tribal affiliations;’ how much do you agree with this statement? 
 
1. Strongly disagree 
2. Disagree  
3. Agree  
4. Strongly agree  
5. I don’t know 
6. No response 
 
130      Belief The government interferes in the affairs of nonprofit organizations. 
 
1. Never (Go to Q. 132) 
2. Always 
3. Sometimes 
4. Don’t know (Go to Q. 132) 
5. No response (Go to Q. 132)  
 
132      Belief Do you think economic and political developments should go together or  
 should one of them take precedence in order for the other to be achieved? 
 
1. The economic development should take precedence  
2. The political development and civil liberties should 
take precedence  
3. Both developments should occur simultaneously  
4. Neither, both are imposed by external powers 
5. Don’t know 
6. No response 
 
134.a      Belief Do you believe the Prime Minister should be elected from the Parliament  
 majority? 
  
  (0 = No; 1 = Yes) 
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 Closed-ended ‘attitude’ questions. An attitude, according to Rokeach 
(1970), is relatively an enduring organization of beliefs around an object or 
situation predisposing one to respond in some preferential manner (p. 112). So, 
it is a person's feeling towards an object or event, accompanied with an 
evaluation of this object or event. The components of an attitude, according to 
several researchers are emotional, cognitive, and behavioral, which makes 
individuals react differently towards any situation. According to Allport (as 
cited in Rockeach, 1970), different people react differently to the same situation 
(p. 112). Also, elites’ attitudes, according to Putnam (1971), can be examined 
through investigating their opinions on current political topics to know how they 
view matters, what they favor, and how they think about certain issues in order 
to assess their attitudinal press in different situations (p. 651-2). 
 In other words, ‘attitude’ is usually assessed by defining its direction and 
measuring the intensity of the direction. For example, if the direction is on the 
positive side, that would respond to the ‘what’ factor in Putnam’s theory; 
however, that is not a full assessment since we can still assess the ‘how’ factor; 
or how much positivity or negativity the attitude has by defining the intensity of 
the direction. This is how attitudes were measured in the analysis of this study; 
by their directions and intensities. The following table, (Table 3.3) displays all 
the closed-ended ‘attitude’ questions from the survey questionnaire:  
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Table 3.3  Closed-ended ‘Attitude’ Questions 
Q# Q. Type     Q. Structure 
 
106      Attitude On a scale of 1-6, how do you favor the implementation of the  
 following reforms by the Jordanian government? 
 
  (1 = Very unfavorable; 2 = Unfavorable; 3 = Neutral;  
  4 = Favorable; 5 = don’t know; 6 = No response) 
 
107     Attitude  In Jordan the relationship between the public and private sectors and  
 civil society in the delivery of public services is lagging behind. 
 
1. Strongly disapprove  
2. Uncertain 
3. Strongly approve  
 
116      Attitude Have/had you ever practiced formal or informal lobbying to influence  
 members of Parliament? 
 
  (0 = No; 1 = Yes) 
 
119      Attitude Are you affiliated with a political party? 
 
  (0 = No; 1 = Yes) 
 
124      Attitude The one-person, one-vote law empowered tribalism at the expense of  
 the partisan structure of the parliament and weakened political party and  
 Parliament institutions. Please indicate your level of agreement: 
 
1. Strongly disagree 
2. Disagree 
3. Agree  
4. Strongly agree 
5. Don’t know 
6. No response 
 
 
  
 Open-ended ‘value’ questions. Questions (109) and (120) are the only 
two open-ended value questions. Question (109) is designed to gather free 
information on elites’ values concerning the administrative development reform. 
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It asks them to mention the three most important administrative reforms that 
enhance efficiency, effectiveness and productivity in all their organizations.  
 In question (120), the respondents are indirectly asked about their political 
party affiliations. This indirect design is suitable for this type of questioning, due 
to the negative heritage of political party affiliation in Jordan. Therefore, the 
focus of the question is on the most dedicated political party leadership, rather 
than focusing on respondents’ personal affiliations. 
 The indirect design is more encouraging and it triggers respondents in 
some situations to provide more information. The coding and analysis of the 
open-ended questions follows the model of Boyatzis (1998) of thematic analysis 
and the development of codes. The below table, (Table 3.4) displays the two 
open-ended value questions in the survey: 
 
Table 3.4 Open-ended ‘Values’ Questions 
Q# Q. Type     Q. Structure 
109 Value  Can you mention the three most important administrative reforms 
   that would lead to higher efficiency and productivity levels? 
 
120 Value  Which political party, do you think, has most dedicated leadership? 
 
 Open-ended ‘belief’ questions. By responding to the two open-ended 
questions (113) and (114), the respondents explained in their own words how 
the political system, which they had chosen in a previous question, enhances the 
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 democratization and development processes. So, the two questions examined 
elites’ beliefs in their chosen political system by asking them how this suitable 
political system would solve Jordan’s political problems that impede democracy 
and political and administrative developments. At the same time, how they think 
this suitable political system would eradicate poverty and lower the 
unemployment rate.  
 By the same token, questions (115.b), (122), (127), (133), (134.b) were 
designed to gather more data on preceding closed-ended questions. A lot of data 
was gathered from these open-ended questions on several issues, such as 
women’s political, social, and economic participation, political party activities, 
tribalism impact, and the economic and political developments. The open-ended 
design of these questions gave the respondents good opportunities to explain and 
elaborate on their structured responses from all those questions. Following some 
of the closed-ended questions with open-ended ones suited the political 
environment of the respondents and led to collecting more in depth information. 
The below table, (Table 3.5) displays all the open-ended belief questions of the 
survey questionnaire: 
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Table 3.5 Open-ended ‘Belief’ Questions 
Q# Q. Type     Q. Structure 
113       Belief  Can you mention how your choice of political system would   
   enhance democratic governance and accelerate the political and   
   administrative developments in  Jordan? 
 
114       Belief  Can you mention how your choice of political system would   
   enhance the country’s economic development, improve living  
    standards in the suburbs, and find solutions for the high   
   unemployment  and poverty levels? 
 
115.b   Belief  If you support women’s participation in any of the three fields,   
   why do you think women in Jordan are lagging behind? 
 
122      Belief  What are the reasons behind the weakness of political parties  
   in Jordan? 
 
127      Belief  Why? 
 
133      Belief  Why do you think this is a better development plan for Jordan? 
 
134.b   Belief  Why, or why not? 
 
  
 Open-ended ‘attitude’ questions. Questions (111), (123), (131), (135) 
were preceded by closed-ended questions that asked about the 
institutionalization process in Jordan, political party laws, and civil engagement 
and NGOs’ activities. As open-ended questions they resulted in gathering more 
detailed data on the attitudes of the respondents. The free responses on the above 
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issues enriched this data gathering with more information. Open-ended attitude 
questions would help the analyses, because the collected responses would be 
supplemental for identifying the problems and suggesting solutions. 
 To wrap up, the final survey question was designed to collect free 
responses and information about elites’ views on how they see the practice of 
democracy in Jordan. Hence, it is considered an attitude question, as it 
investigated elites’ opinions on a current political topic, which is the 
democratization process. This question contributed in figuring out how 
Jordanian elites view their democratization process, whether they favor it or not, 
and how they think about it. In its design, this question aims to assess elites’ 
attitudes during this transitional period by triggering them with a definition for 
real democracy and asking them about the democratization process in their 
country. As shown in the below table, the question underlines the main 
characteristics of democracy, which are still hindered by the regime, such as the 
empowerment of citizens; practicing all freedoms and citizens’ rights; having a 
rule of law system; and the occurrence of regular, competitive, transparent, and 
fair elections. 
 With their own words, the respondents answered this question by giving 
free responses on how they viewed democracy. They discussed their feelings 
and thoughts, and how those feelings were directed. Designing this question as a 
final open-ended question posed as a wakeup call for most respondents, 
providing them with an opportunity to have more realistic attitudes; particularly 
those who remained skeptic. 
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 In their own words, the respondents defined the directions and the 
intensities of their attitudes towards the subject of this question, which bundles 
up all the other issues that the survey questions inquired about earlier. So, this 
final question made respondents aware of the void they might have previously 
created when responding unrealistically to some questions. Finally, this question 
highlighted the gap between reality and the rhetoric of government officials, 
which would be emphasized in the discussion section of this study. The 
following table, (Table 3.6) displays all the open-ended attitude questions: 
 
Table 3.6 Open-ended ‘Attitude’ Questions 
Q# Q. Type     Q. Structure 
111      Attitude If not, what should the government do in order to achieve  
 administrative development 
 through the process of institutionalization? 
 
 
123      Attitude Name three elements that would activate the party system and  
 empower political parties. 
 
 
131      Attitude Tell me about the government’s interference in the affairs of  
   nonprofit organizations? 
 
 
135      Attitude Democracy is not merely a motto; it is a way of life that serves and  
   empowers citizens under a rule of law system. It assures freedoms, 
    protects citizenship rights, and guarantees the occurrence of regular,   
   competitive, transparent, and fair elections while practicing the two  
   freedoms of choice and press. According to the above definition of  
   democracy, how do you view the practice of democracy in Jordan? 
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Data Analysis Procedure 
 The collected data from the Jordanian elites through the face-to-face 
interviews were analyzed to address the two main research questions of this 
study. There were two types of analyses that were conducted in this study: 
quantitative and qualitative. The responses of the closed-ended questions were 
subject to a series of statistical analysis, while the responses of the open-ended 
question were subject to a qualitative thematic analysis. 
 
 Statistical analysis. All responses for the closed-ended questions were 
entered into SPSS version 19. After examining the descriptive statistics, a series 
of One-way ANOVA analysis were conducted to ascertain the differences in the 
values, beliefs, and attitudes among the three groups of Jordanian elites. Prior to 
the statistical analysis, the raw data was subject to a series of data cleaning and 
organizing processes. 
 
 Qualitative thematic analysis. Responses to the open-ended questions 
that were designed to gather elaborated information on the values, beliefs, and 
attitudes of Jordanian elites were analyzed using thematic analysis approach. 
Qualitative data analysis followed the following steps: segmenting, coding, 
thematic categorization, sorting, and identifying themes. 
 The first step, of segmenting data, according to Johnson and Christensen 
(2008), involves dividing the data into meaningful analytical units. First, by 
reading the gathered data carefully, such as the respondents’ answers, notes, and 
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comments; and second, by searching for specifics and meanings that lead to 
defining different meaningful units. The process of segmenting is important for 
data analysis because it facilitates the process of defining similarities, 
differences, and relationships among the gathered words, sentences, and 
paragraphs (p. 534). By applying the segmentation of data to all responses from 
open-ended questions, the raw data was filtered, segmented, and organized into 
themes. Some survey questions, for instance, are answered by three steps, such 
as [What are the reasons behind the weakness of political parties in Jordan? 1..., 
2…, 3…]; or, [State three elements that would activate the party system and 
empower political parties]. These questions gathered an abundance of 
information, and in order to be analyzed, they needed to be filtered by 
segmenting and organizing them into meaningful units. The filtering of data 
minimized repetitions, redundancy, and wordiness, and segmenting added 
articulation by creating divisions and subdivisions to the gathered data. Finally, 
the organization stage included arranging and systemizing the data to prepare it 
for the coding process. 
 The second process of qualitative data analysis involves coding. 
According to Johnson and Christensen, it is the process of marking segments of 
data with symbols, descriptive words, or category names; “codes are tags or 
labels for assigning units of meaning to the descriptive or inferential information 
compiled during a study,” (p. 534). For instance, the analytical meaningful units 
that shared descriptive words or category names were compiled and labeled 
together. Therefore, the segmented data resulted in several categories of 
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connotations, which were classified as the meaningful units, and each of these 
units were coded by certain descriptions or themes. The coding process for this 
study was originally done in Arabic language since both data gathering and note 
taking were done in the country’s formal language. After these steps were 
accomplished a codebook was then established. 
 The codebook captured the whole range of the meaning of the numerical 
code assigned to the open-ended responses. Also, the codebook served as an aid 
for locating data. Since all the responses were gathered and written in the Arabic 
language, the coding was also done in the Arabic language.  
 During this thematic categorization process, the data is compiled and 
grouped in terms of meanings and gets labeled in themes. All the themes that 
stem from the same original theme have one core theme. So, each core theme 
has more than one subordinate theme. The core theme in the thematic 
categorization is the source theme, or (Theme 1); while (Theme 2), and (Theme 
3) are the subordinate themes that spring or emanate from the core. First, the 
researcher reviewed all responses and identified key themes. These initial main 
themes were used as a starting point to code the open-ended responses (Theme 
1). As the researcher analyzed the data, sub-themes under the larger categories 
of Theme 1 had emerged. These subordinate themes were captured as Theme 2. 
When there were further subcategories under Theme 2, these themes were 
captured as Theme 3. Overall, the three levels of themes emerged, and were 
used to code the qualitative data.  
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 Once all the data coded by themes were entered into Microsoft Excel, it 
was sorted by themes. Sorting the data allowed the researcher to assess the 
frequency of each theme appearing in the open-ended responses. The table 
below is an example from the Excel spreadsheet. These responses were given by 
one of the respondents on this survey’s open-ended questions. The table displays 
how the data was compiled and grouped into three levels of themes (Table 3.7): 
Table 3.7 Example from the Survey: Thematic Categorization: Core &   
  Subordinate Themes 
No. Question Category Theme Level 1 Theme Level 2 Theme Level 3 
109 
Administrative 
Development 
Improving 
Individuals' 
Performance 
Training   
109 
Administrative 
Development 
Applying the 
Codes & Conducts 
of the Hiring 
System  
Merit System KSAs  
109 
Administrative 
Development 
Improving 
Individuals' 
Performance 
Incentives & 
Motivational Rewards 
  
111 
 
Administrative 
development 
 
Implementing 
Reforms 
 
Amending Statutes 
 
Compliance 
With the 
Constitution 
 
111 
 
Political/ Admin. 
Development 
 
Enforcement of 
Democratic Values 
 
Equality 
 
 
113 
 
Political 
Development 
 
The 1st political 
system is 
extremely suitable 
 
Holding Officials 
Accountable 
 
 
114 Econ. Dev. & Liberal Economic 
Privatization  
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 Liberalization 
 
System 
 
 
114 
 
Econ. Dev. & 
Liberalization 
 
Significance Of  
Work  Value 
 
  
115.b 
 
Social Development 
 
Obsolete Customs  
& Traditions 
 
  
122 
Political 
Development 
Authoritarianism 
Centralized 
Monarchical Political 
System 
Powerful Old 
Guards & 
Security 
Apparatus 
 
123 
 
 
Political 
Development 
 
Top Authority 
Institutional 
Empowerment 
 
Reinstatement of 
Institutional Freedom 
 
Implementing 
Change 
 
127 
 
Social Development 
 
Negative Impact 
on Political 
Development 
 
Impedes Fair 
Elections 
   
127 Social Development 
Negative Impact 
on  Rule of Law 
Weakens the Legal 
System   
131 
 
Social Development 
 
Great Interference  
Security Reasons 
 
Ensuring Security 
 
  
133 
Econ/Political 
Development 
Both 
Developments 
Simultaneously  
Protective against 
Globalization 
  
134.b  
Political 
Development 
The Prime Minister 
Should Be 
Appointed 
   
135 
Political, Soc., & 
Econ. Development 
Decreasing the 
Authoritarian 
Power 
Eliminating Security 
Apparatus Discretion 
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Chapter 4: Results 
 
 A one-way ANOVA design, cross tabulation, Chi-square, and thematic analysis 
were all conducted to evaluate the values, beliefs, and attitudes of Jordanian elites 
towards liberalization, democratization, and development. The result of the analysis will 
provide information for the researcher to answer the four research questions and respond 
to their two hypotheses. The results provide analyses of data in four areas: description of 
elites’ values, beliefs, and attitudes; variations among the three groups of elites’ political 
culture; center of influence; and the regime’s congruence with elites’ political culture. 
Two hypotheses were developed and will be reported in this section. Qualitative data will 
also be included in this chapter followed by a discussion of the results.  
Statistical and Thematic Analysis 
 This chapter presents findings from both analyses of open- and closed-ended 
questions that asked the respondents about the three domains of political, social, and 
economic developments. Quantitative and qualitative data analysis will be coupled 
together according to subject relevance, in order to answer the four research questions 
related to describing elites’ political culture; variations among the three groups’ values, 
beliefs, and attitudes; the evaluation of elites’ political culture concerning the center of 
power in Jordan; and the congruence level between the regime and the values, beliefs, 
and attitudes of Jordanian elites. In addition, two hypotheses were developed. These 
hypotheses analyzed the data in the areas of differences among the three groups’ political 
culture and the regime’s congruence with elites’ political culture.   
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The two hypotheses are:  
  (H1: There are significant differences among the values, beliefs, and  
              attitudes of the three groups of Jordanian elites towards political, social, 
                         and economic development).                               
 
 
  (H2:  The regime is congruent with elites’ political culture).  
 
 
 The results of political development questions will be organized under the 
following topics: the type of political system and democratic governance; rights and 
freedoms; public sector reform; and political participation including: lobbying, political 
parties, and elections. Similarly, the main topics of social development consisting of 
women empowerment; tribalism; civic engagement; and economic liberalization will be 
the main topic of economic development.  
 Each one of these topics will represent more than one question from the survey, 
thus the reporting of results will be combined under the main abovementioned topics. The 
results of quantitative and qualitative data are reported in the following section. All 
survey questions are in Appendix C, Survey Questionnaire. Tables and figures are 
displayed in serial numbers in Appendix D.  
 
Political Development 
 
 Elites’ Political Culture towards Jordan’s Political System  
 Elites’ values in question (112) are assessed by using a 4-point scale (1= not 
suitable to 4=very suitable) of the suitability of the subsequent political systems for 
Jordan: 1) pluralistic parliamentary democratic; 2) parliamentary Islamic; 3) authoritarian 
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system ruled by an ultimate power; and 4) religious non-democratic ruled by Shari’ah 
law. See Appendix D, Figures 1 and 2. 
 According to the cross tabulation results, 72% of all elites deem the pluralistic 
parliamentary political system “very suitable” for Jordan. A total of 5% deem it “not 
suitable.” However, 0% of all elites deem the authoritative monarchical political system, 
which represents the current political system in Jordan as “very suitable,” while a total of 
96% of them deem it “not suitable;” see Appendix D, Table 5 for the N (%) cross 
tabulation for the suitability of all four political systems, and Figures 1 and 2.  
 Most elites valued the suitability of the pluralistic parliamentary democratic 
political system, and did not value the other political systems, including the authoritative 
that is ruled by an ultimate power. By running one-way ANOVA tests, there are no 
significant differences between elites, indicating the following results, excluding the 
parliamentary Islamic that could not run the model: the pluralistic parliamentary system, 
F (2, 97) = .224, p=ns; the authoritarian ruled by an ultimate power, F (2, 97) = .549, 
p=ns; and the religious non-parliamentary, F (2, 97) = .265, p= ns. For more details on 
ANOVA, means, and standard deviations see Appendix D, Tables 1, 2, 3, and 4. 
 Thus, H1 is not supported, indicating no significant difference between the three 
groups of elites in the average means of their values, in terms of suitability of the four 
political systems. The current authoritarian monarchical political system is the opposite 
what the majority of elites value. This implication suggests that there is a lack of 
congruence between the regime and the values of its elites. The regime is not congruent 
with elites’ political culture; therefore, the results do not support H2.  
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 As designated by the responses of the open-ended question (113), the majority of 
elites appreciate the pluralistic parliamentary democratic political system for its ability to 
present solutions for the problem of corruption in Jordan. Thus, the results assert that 
most elites value the pluralistic democratic political system as the most suitable for 
Jordan. See Appendix C for the Survey Questionnaire.  
 The enforcement of rule of law under the authoritative monarchical political 
system is rated in question (104.2) on a 6-point scale (1= very poor to 6= excellent). A 
concrete rule of law enforcement is fundamental for development, however the majority 
of elites believe that there is a “standard” rule of law enforcement by the Jordanian 
government is only a one. 
 The one-way ANOVA test indicated the following result: F (2, 97) = 1.94, p =ns. 
There is no significant difference between elites. Thus, H1 is not supported. For more 
details see Appendix D, Figure 3 and Tables 6 to 8.   
 Most elites believed that the government’s lack of seriousness in implementing 
reform policies remains the main reason behind Jordan’s tardiness in the supremacy of 
rule of law.  They criticized the consecutive Jordanian governments for their tardiness in 
implementing this reform, while ignoring the fact that they themselves are part of the 
current or any of the previous governments. The result indicates that there is congruence 
between the regime and elites’ beliefs Thus, the result supports H2.  
 Democratic governance and the cooperation and coordination among the public, 
private, and nonprofit sectors were tested in questions (106.3), (106.4), and (107). The 
responses of the first two questions show elites’ passive attitudes towards the 
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coordination and collaboration among the three sectors; 57% of their attitudes are 
“neutral” towards the government’s reform policies that ensure cooperation between the 
public and private sectors, and 50% of their attitudes are “unfavorable” towards their 
government’s implementation of reforms that ensure cooperation between public and 
nonprofit sectors. Similarly, 58% remained “uncertain” while 39% “strongly approved” 
of the question statement that “the relationship between the public and private sectors and 
civil society in the delivery of public services is lagging behind.” Accordingly, the results 
of all three questions expressed traditional attitudes, conventional beliefs, and confirmed 
elites’ cautious liberalism. See Appendix D, Figures 4 through 6 for more details.   
 The results do not support H1, as the two one-way ANOVA results indicate no 
significant difference between elites’ attitudes: public/private: F (2, 97) =.089, p=ns; 
public/nonprofit: F (2, 97) =.962, p=ns; and Chi-square result for coordination among the 
three sectors: χ2 (4, N=100) =2.44, p=.654. For more details see Appendix D, Tables 9 to 
14. 
 The majority of elites’ responses on the three democratic governance questions 
were “unfavorable,” “neutral,” or “uncertain.” The higher percentages of unfavorable and 
nonaligned attitudes towards the government’s reform policies to achieve democratic 
governance indicate that most elites agreed that democratic governance in Jordan is 
lagging behind. The results of these three questions are congruent with the regime, which 
supports H2. 
 Moreover, elites’ beliefs in pluralism were assessed from their responses to the 
dichotomous question (118). A majority by 73.7% of elites believed that pluralism is 
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absent in Jordan, versus 26.3% believed the opposite. Chi-square results do not indicate 
significance, χ2 (2, N=99) =2.33, p=.312, thus do not support H1. For more details, see 
Appendix D, Figure 8 and Tables 18 and 19.  
 Most elites admitted that there is an absence of real pluralism in Jordan, which 
indicates the regime’s congruence with elites’ beliefs; thus, the results support H2.     
 The dichotomous question (134.a) and the open-ended question (134.b) 
investigate elites’ beliefs in electing the Prime Minister of Jordan, who is traditionally 
appointed by the King, as one of His prerogatives. The question also triggers responses 
touching on the absence of a Parliamentary majority in the Parliament structure. Elites’ 
beliefs in this change were assessed, and the results of (134.a) were 51% “no” and 49% 
“yes” for the election of the Prime Minister. The majority of elites do not yet believe in 
making this change; see Appendix D, Figure 7 and Table 15 and 16.  
 H1 is not supported as Chi-square, as the results do not show significance,  
χ2 (2, N=100) =1.77, p=.414.   
 The majority of elites did not believe in the significance of this reform to the 
transitional movement. These unprogressive beliefs indicate that the majority of elites are 
approving of their regimes’ policies. Accordingly, the regime is congruent with elites’ 
political culture. Therefore, the results support H2. 
  Likewise, elites’ elaborations on electing versus appointing the Prime Minister 
underlined their beliefs that “democracy in Jordan has not matured yet” or “not ready” for 
implementing such changes to its political system. The most frequent three themes in 
responding to the open-ended question (134.b) do not exemplify progressive beliefs. For 
more details on thematic analysis see Appendix D, Table 17. 
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 Finally for this section, elites’ attitudes towards the seriousness of the 
democratization process in Jordan are assessed in the open-ended question (135). For 
details on the thematic analysis see Appendix D, Tables 20 and 21. The most frequent 
themes are displayed below: 
 
Table 4.1 Qualitative Analysis of the Jordanian Democratization Process 
   Deficiencies: Percentages of Elites’ Attitudes  
Core Themes     Political Elites         Social Elites            Economic Elites     
         (N=65)               (N=23)   (N=12)                  
Rule of law system                  42                       14                  7                          
                          64.6 %                    60.9%                     58.3 %   
                 
Social change                            32                     16                            11 
             49.2%                     69.5%                     91.6%                 
    
Political development               27                    11                               6                                 
                                              41.5%                     47.8%                     50.0%                
  
 The three core themes are substantial for achieving a successful transition towards 
democracy. The majority of political elites believe that Jordan still lacks for the rule of 
law system, while the social and economic elites believe that the democratization process 
is deficient because it lacks for a real social reform. The absence of the core themes 
represents the void in the democratization process in Jordan. In order to overcome this 
hindrance the Jordanian government must account for the implementation of rule of law, 
allowing social change to flourish, and encourage political participation and political 
development. 
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The quantitative results for this section are summarized in the following table: 
 
Table 4.2 Summary of Quantitative Data Analysis Results: Elites’ Political  
   Culture towards the Efficiency of the Political System 
 
 Evaluating 
Political 
Systems 
Rule of 
Law 
System 
Democratic 
Governance 
Pluralism             
 
King’s 
Prerogatives/ 
P.M. Election 
vs. 
Appointment 
H1: 
Significant 
Difference  
Not 
Supported 
Not 
Supported 
Not 
Supported 
Not  
Supported 
Not  
Supported 
 
H2:  
Congruence: 
Regime with 
Elites’ 
Political 
Culture 
 
Not 
Supported 
 
 
Supported 
 
 
Supported 
 
 
Supported 
 
 
Su   Supported 
 
 
Elites’ Political Culture towards Freedoms & Civil Rights   
 The question (101) measures elites’ self-determination. Of those who believe in 
having self-determination, 90.9% said that they are able to impact policymaking, while 
only 9.1% said they do not.  Chi-square results indicate significant differences: χ2 (2, 
N=99) = .008, p < .05. For more details see Appendix D, Tables 22 and 23. 
 
 
  
 
  
104 
 
Figure 4.1  Marginal means for elites’ self-determination and liberty 
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 According to cross tabulation table, there is a significant difference between the 
social and political elites. Thus, the results support H1.  
 Elites’ beliefs in their self-determination and abilities to participate directly or 
indirectly in policymaking are not unexpected under Jordan’s authoritarian regime and 
government.  
 Therefore, the regime is congruent with elites’ political culture and the results support 
H2. 
  Question (103.1) assesses the importance of the civil rights and freedom value in 
the making of reform policies on a 5-point scale (1= extremely unimportant to 
5=extremely important). The two highest ratings on the scale of 15% “extremely 
important,” and 43% “important,” sums up to 58% of elites, and gives weight for this 
value in the making of policies.  
 All elites’ values are similar according to one-way ANOVA indicating, F (2, 97) 
= .194, p=ns. This result does not support H1. For more details, see Appendix D, Figure 
10, and Tables 25 and 26. 
 Thus, the value of freedom and civil rights is considered “important” by the 
majority of elites. These results of elites’ political culture suit the nature of the Jordanian 
regime that is congruent with elites’ value of freedoms and civil rights; thus the result 
supports H2.    
 The implementation of reform policies that allow having free access to 
information is assessed in question (104.3) on a 6-point scale (1= very poor to 6= 
excellent). The results indicate that 72% of the ratings were distributed among the highest 
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three ratings: 28% “good,” 35% “very good,” and 9% “excellent.” Further, one-way 
ANOVA indicates: F (2, 97) = .056, p=ns, with no significant difference between elites, 
rejecting H1. See Appendix D, Figure 11, and Tables 27 and 28 for further details.  
 There is no blocking of certain cites or social media in Jordan. The majority of 
elites believe that Jordan is relatively is a free country, and believe in the freedom of 
information; therefore, the results support H2.  
 The ideological affiliations are evaluated in question (105) on a scale of three 
ideologies: “liberal,” “independent,” and “conservative.” The majority of elites, 61% 
described themselves as “liberal,” 20% “independents,” and 19% “conservatives.” For 
the distribution of values, see Appendix D, Tables 29 and 30. Elites’ responses reflect 
their liberal values ideologies. 
 Chi-square result: χ2 (4, N=100) = .032, p < .05. The results support H1. For more 
details and descriptive statistics see Appendix D, Tables 32 and 33. The significance was 
found between the political and social elites, as shown in the mean plot figure below. 
 Furthermore, the results indicate the importance of ideological freedom to elites. 
There is no coercion under Jordanian political system. Despite the endeavors of some 
influential elites to impose the ideology of “Jordan First,” Jordanians remain free to 
affiliate themselves with other ideologies. This explains how the results indicated the 
high percentage of liberals among the respondents. The results support H2, as the regime 
is congruent with Jordanian elites’ values.   
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Figure 4.2  Marginal means for liberal, independent, & conservative elites’ 
ideological    backgrounds with liberals being the highest 
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The results of the findings of this section are summarized in the following table: 
 
 
Table 4.3 Summary of Quantitative Data Analysis Results: Elite’s Political 
Culture    towards Freedoms & Civil Rights under the Jordanian 
Political Systems  
 
 Elites’ Self- 
Determination 
Civil 
Rights & 
Freedoms 
Value 
Free 
Access to 
Information 
Freedom of 
Opinion:  
Ideological 
Affiliation 
 
H1: 
Significant 
Difference  
 
H2:  
Congruence:  
Regime with 
Elites’ 
Political 
Culture 
 
 
Supported 
 
 
 
 
Supported 
 
Not 
Supported 
 
 
 
 
Supported 
 
Not 
Supported 
 
 
 
 
Supported 
 
 
Supported 
 
 
 
 
Supported 
 
 
      
 
 
Elites’ Political Culture towards Public Sector Administrative Reform 
 The following group of questions measure elites’ attitudes towards the policies of 
public sector reform, by rating the government on its implementation of a series of 
reforms on a 4-point scale of (1= very unfavorable to 4= favorable). The first question 
(106.1) measures the implementation of reform policies that ensure transparency and 
accountability, and the second question (106.2) measures reforms of corruption control.  
 Cross tabulation results for transparency and accountability indicate a majority of 
49% of attitudes that are “unfavorable” of this reform.  
 Besides, there is a majority of 52% of “unfavorable” attitudes towards the policy 
of corruption control. 
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 The one-way ANOVA results indicate a significant difference: F (2, 97) = 5.21, p 
< .05. Hence, a Chi-square was run to confirm this significant difference: χ2 (6, N=100) 
=13.74, p = .033. There is a significant difference between the attitudes of political and 
social elites towards transparency and accountability. Thus, H1 is supported. 
 Also, one-way ANOVA indicates a statistical significant difference between the 
attitudes of the political and economic elites towards the policy of corruption control in 
question (106.2): F (2, 97) = 4.52, p < .05. By running Chi-square test the significance is 
confirmed: χ2 (6, N=100) = 15.55, p= .016.  
 Therefore, H1 is supported. For more details on these two significant results see 
Appendix D, Tables 34 to 41. 
 The implementation of transparency and accountability and corruption control 
was not taken seriously by the government; thus the absence of laws that regulate them 
impaired the administrative and political development. The majority of elites demanded 
the government to be more decisive in corruption control. Although elites’ criticism 
expresses reformist attitudes, it confirms the negligence of those who occupy the high 
incumbents in the Jordanian government. Therefore, the regime’s negligence is congruent 
with elites’ attitudes towards transparency, accountability, and corruption control. The 
results of all three questions support H2.  
 The following two figures of mean plots (Figure 4.3) and (Figure 4.4) display the 
differences between the means of elites’ attitudes towards these two reform policies: 
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Figure 4.3 Transparency and Accountability 
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Figure 4.4 Corruption Control 
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 The result of question (106.5) indicates a majority of 43% of elites’ attitudes that 
are “unfavorable” towards fighting nepotism. Besides, question (106.6) indicates a 
majority of 58% of “neutral” attitudes towards implementing a merit system. For more 
details see Appendix D, Figures 15 and 16, and Tables 42 to 45.  
 According to one-way ANOVA the result of fighting nepotism indicates: F (2, 97) 
=.442, p=ns. And for enforcing a merit system: F (2, 97) =.229, p=ns. Both results from 
both questions (106.5) and (106.6) do not support H1. 
 The nepotism in Jordanian public sector needs to be curtailed by enforcing a merit 
system, but the government’s lack of seriousness in implementing reforms triggered elites 
to criticize their government for letting this problem prevail. The results indicate 
congruence between the regime and elites’ attitudes; thus, the results support H2.   
 According to question (108) results, the majority of elites do not value the 
effectiveness of the “Financial Disclosure” corruption control law, as 45.2% rated this 
value “ineffective” and 19.4% said it is “extremely ineffective.” This claimed 
ineffectiveness exemplifies that elites’ possess more progressive values that would lead 
to a real reform.   
 The one-way ANOVA result indicating no significant difference between the 
means of elites’ values is: F (2, 90) = .113, p=.ns. This result does not support H1; for 
more details see Appendix D Figure 17, and Tables 46 and 47. 
 These results are another confirmation on the government’s lack of seriousness in 
imposing laws to end corruption. Most elites did not value this lack of seriousness, yet 
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they remain responsible for it; therefore their values were found congruent with the 
regime. The result supports H2. 
 Furthermore, results from the qualitative question (109) on administrative 
development indicate that the most frequent theme across the three groups is “Improving 
the individual’s performance,” “Applying the hiring codes and conducts,” and “Enforcing 
transparency and accountability.” All elites agreed on these themes without any 
significant differences. Elites’ elaborations are focused on improving the performance, 
efficiency, and effectiveness of administrators and other public and private sector 
employees by exposing them to new techniques and modernizing all procedures. 
Therefore, this result indicates that most elites have reformist values. See Appendix D, 
Tables 48 to 50, for more details on the qualitative thematic analysis. 
  The dichotomous question (110) of institution-building provides responses 
indicating that it is either absent or incomplete. An equal percentage of 42.9% “no” and 
42.9% “incomplete” is displayed in Appendix D, Tables 52 and 53.   
 Chi-square result: χ2 (4, N=100) = 10.93, p < .05confirms the significant 
difference; 34.9% political verses 83.3% economic elites believe that institution-building 
is incomplete. Thus, these results accept H1, as displayed in Figure 4.5. 
 The equal percentages of the “yes” and “no” answers, and the responses that were 
in between, reduced the percentage of those who do not agree; hence this means that 
there is congruence between the regime and elites’ political culture. The results support 
H2. 
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Figure 4.5 Institution-building 
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 In the qualitative question (111), asking elites what should be done in terms of 
institution-building; the most frequent three themes are “seriousness in implementing 
reforms,” “decreasing Royal Court authority,” and “enforcing democratic values.” For 
more details, see Appendix D, Tables 54 and 55 for qualitative thematic analysis. The 
lack of seriousness in implementing reforms can be the main reason behind the Royal 
Court’s encroachment on other institutions in the political structure, which reflects the 
dominance of non-democratic values and attitudes. These results confirmed that 
institution-building is incomplete.  
 The results of the findings of this section are summarized in the following table: 
 
Table 4.4 Summary of Quantitative Data Analysis Results: Elites’ Political  
   Culture towards Public Sector Administrative Reform 
 
 Transparency & 
Accountability 
Corruption 
Control 
Nepotism Merit             
System 
Institutional- 
Building 
H1: 
Significant 
Difference  
 
H2:  
Congruence 
Regime 
with Elites’ 
Political 
Culture 
 
 
Supported 
 
 
 
Supported 
 
 
Supported 
 
 
 
Supported 
 
Not 
Supported 
 
 
 
Supported 
 
Not  
Supported 
 
 
 
Supported 
 
 
Supported 
 
 
 
Supported 
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Elites’ Political Culture towards Political Participation: Political Parties, 
Elections, and Lobbying  
 The effect of the previous political culture that banned political party activities is 
assessed in the belief question (104.6) on a 6-point scale (1= very poor to 6= excellent). 
The result indicates that there is still no change in encouraging political party affiliations 
or activities by elites. The majority of elites are still holding on to the old culture; 52% of 
their responses rated this reform “very poor” in addition to 35% “poor,” adding up to 
87%; the total of elites who believe that the government’s reform policy of political party 
activities is not constructive. 
 The one-way ANOVA indicates: F (2, 97) = .095, p=ns. There is no significant 
difference between the means of elites’ beliefs. This result does not support H1; see 
Appendix D, Figure 19, and Tables 55 to 57. 
 The majority of elites expressed a state of stagnation in regard to political parties 
without expressing any interest in modernizing and reforming the institution of political 
party. This political culture goes in harmony with the regimes’ policies that restrict the 
activities of political parties. The regimen in this case is congruent with elites’ political 
culture. Thus, the result supports H2. 
 The affiliation with the political party dichotomous question (119) indicated that 
majority of elites do not value the political party affiliation. The cross tabulation test 
indicates the following results: 89% “no” and 11% “yes.” See Appendix D, Figure 20 and 
Tables 58 to 59.  
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 There are no significant differences between elites’ means according to Chi-
square results confirmed this insignificance, indicating: χ2 (2, N=100) = 3.8 p=ns. Thus, 
the results of elites’ attitudes do not support H1.  
 However, these attitudes agree with keeping the institution of political party in 
stagnation. The regime policy and elites’ attitudes are in congruence; thus, these results 
support H2. 
 The campaigning culture of political party and Parliament elections is assessed in 
the value semi-structured question (121). The results indicate that 39.4% believe that the 
used rhetoric during election times, which consist of slogans, mission and vision 
statements are only “accepted by some people” and another 39.4% believe that this 
rhetoric is a mere “propaganda.” Most elites were critical; they expressed disapproval of 
the campaigning culture. 
 There is no significant difference between elites’ means. The one-way ANOVA 
result indicates: F (2, 96) = .159, p =ns. This result does not support H1; see Appendix D, 
Figure 21, and Tables 60 to 62.  
 The majority of elites criticized the campaigning culture and did not believe in its 
effect or seriousness, claiming it as “mere propaganda” and “deceptive.”  The result 
confirms the lack of congruence between the regime and the majority of elites’ political 
culture; thus, does not support H2. 
 The open-ended question (122) measures the reasons behind the weaknesses of 
political parties. The most frequent three themes are “authoritarianism,” “absence of 
programs,” and “past failures.” In their elaborations on these core themes, most elites 
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expressed subordinate themes that explained their forward-looking perspectives, by 
denouncing authoritarianism and its consequences, and representing a ‘reformist’ 
outlook. The political culture reflected in this question sounded progressive and liberal. 
See Appendix D, Tables 63 and 64 for further details on the thematic analysis on the 
weakness of political parties.  
 Likewise, the open-ended question (123) asked what attitudes should be taken 
towards empowering and activating the institution of political party. Elites’ most frequent 
core themes are: “reforming political parties,” “legislative amendment,” and “raising 
awareness levels.” Most responses included liberal and democratic changes that were 
never translated into real programs. See Appendix D, Tables 65 and 66 for further details 
on the thematic analysis on strengthening political parties. 
 The one-man, one-vote law is an unprogressive law used by the government as 
one of the tools to prevent the majority of the population from gaining political power in 
proportion to their numbers. Elites’ beliefs in this traditionalistic law are measured in 
question (124), on a 4-point scale of (1=strongly disagree to 4=strongly agree). The 
majority of elites; 78.8%, strongly agreed that this law is traditionalistic. For more details 
see Appendix D, Figure 22 and Table 67 to 69. 
 However, the one-way ANOVA indicates an insignificant difference: F (2, 96) = 
.787 p=ns, which does not support H1. 
 The one-man, one-vote law empowered tribalism, and those who agreed with this 
notion were the majority of the respondents, as 79% of elites consider this policy a 
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reactionary one imposed by the regime. Hence, the regime is not in congruence with most 
elites’ political culture. The result does not support H2.  
 Elites’ attitudes are assessed towards lobbying in the dichotomous question (116). 
The results proved that most elites practice lobbying, despite the authoritative nature of 
the political system, and indicate that 82% of elites practice what they called 
“unorganized” lobbying, which reflects elites’ democratic ideas. 
 Moreover, Chi-square result confirms a significant difference, indicating χ2 (2, 
N=100) = 9.45, p < .05. These significant test results are proved between political and 
economic elites. Accordingly, these results support H1. See Appendix D, Table 70 for 
more details.  
 The political system of Jordan lacks some of the main elements of democratic 
practices; thus elites’ responses were found part of the pervasive democratic rhetoric. 
This rhetoric liberal political culture is congruent with the regime. The result supports 
H2.  
 The following mean plot displays the difference between the means of elites’ 
attitudes: 
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Figure 4.6  The practice of lobbying  
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 In a coupled semi-structured question (117), the respondents are provided five 
democratic purposes: “to implement important changes;” “to pursue my democratic 
values;” “to affirm pluralism;” “to participate in policymaking;” and “all the above.” The 
total number of respondents for this question is 82; (N=82). The results indicate that 
64.6% of the 82% of elites specified their reason by “all the above.”  
 There is no significant difference between elites’ means according to the one-way 
ANOVA, indicating: F (2, 79) = .738, p=ns. The results do not support H1. For more 
information see Appendix D, Figure 24 and Tables 71 and 72. 
 Elites’ responses confirmed their rhetoric liberalism that is congruent with the 
regime. The result supports H2. 
The results of the findings of this section are summarized in the following table: 
 
 
Table 4.5 Summary of Quantitative Data Analysis Results: Elites’ Political  
   Culture towards Political Participation 
 
 Political  
Party 
Affiliation 
Campaign 
Culture 
One-man 
One-Vote 
Legislation 
Lobbying Lobbying 
Reasons 
H1: 
Significant 
Difference  
 
H2:  
Congruence: 
Regime with 
Elites’ 
Political 
Culture 
 
 
Not 
Supported 
 
 
 
 
Supported 
 
Not 
Supported 
 
 
 
Not 
Supported 
 
Not 
Supported 
 
 
 
Not 
Supported 
 
 
Supported 
 
 
 
 
Supported 
 
Not  
Supported 
 
 
 
  
Supported 
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Social Development 
 
Elites’ Political Culture towards Tribalism 
 The respondents used a 5-point scale of (1= extremely unimportant to 
5=extremely important) to answer question (103.5). The results indicate that 64% of 
respondents ranked the importance of tribal values in the making of policies “extremely 
important.” Also, there are 17% of respondents who ranked this value as “important,” 
which means that this traditional value undermines modernity, and is substantial for 
policymakers. 
 The one-way ANOVA results indicates: F (2, 97) = 2.16, p=ns. The insignificant 
difference between the means does not support H1. See Appendix D, Figure 26, Tables 
76 to 78. 
 Tribalism has been used by the regime as a tool to pursue political agendas; 
hence, policymakers that consider tribalism as a significant factor does not reflect a 
progressive stance. The results support H2, as the regime in this case is congruent with 
elites’ values.    
 The impact of tribalism on development is measured in question (126) on a 3-
point scale (positive; negative; and positive at times, negative at others). The majority of 
elites believe that tribalism has a negative impact on political and social developments by 
46% and 41% believe its impact is positive at times and negative at others.  
 The difference between elites’ beliefs is insignificant; as indicated by Chi-square 
result: 
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 χ2 (4, N=100) =.659, p <ns. Thus, the results do not support H1. For more information 
see Appendix D, Figure 27, and Tables 79 to 81. 
 Elites’ beliefs were not in favor of tribalism in this question. There were more 
believers among elites in the negative impact of tribalism than the ones who believed in 
its positive impact. The regime is not congruent with elites’ beliefs; thus the results do 
not support H2.  
 Also, see Appendix D, Tables 82 to 84 for information on the open-ended 
question (127). The tables display the thematic analysis of elites’ beliefs explaining why 
tribalism impacts development in a certain way, and their responses revealed an 
unprogressive political culture.  
 The influence of tribalism on elites’ political culture is evaluated in question 
(128). Elites ranked their agreements on this influence on a 4-point scale: (1=strongly 
disagree, 4=strongly agree). The results implied that 39.4% of the respondents answered 
by “agree,” and 39.4% by “strongly agree,” to the statement of the question. Thus elites’ 
political culture is influenced by traditionalistic affiliations, which emphasizes their 
cautious liberalism.  
 There is no statistical significant difference between the means of elites’ beliefs in 
the tribal affiliation influence, as indicated by the one-way ANOVA: F (2, 96) = .436, 
p=ns, which rejects H1. See Appendix D, Figure 28, and Tables 85 to 87. 
 Agreeing that tribalism influences the political culture of elites means that the 
fluctuation in elites’ responses from previous questions can be explained on the basis of 
their responses to this question. According to most respondents, tribalism impacts the 
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making of policies, and elites agree that it does not have a positive impact on 
development. Tribalism influences elites’ political culture; thus, the results from previous 
questions as well as this question suggest that the regime is congruent with elites’ 
political culture, and supports H2.  
 
   Elites’ Political Culture towards Women Empowerment 
 Elites’ support verses opposition to women’s participation is measured in  
question (115.a) on a 4-point scale (1=strongly oppose to 4=strongly support). The 
strongly supportive are 78% for women’s political participation, 84% for women’s social 
participation, and 81% for women’s economic participation. The empowerment of 
women in Jordan is considered advanced, according to UNDP studies. For details on 
these values see Appendix D, Figures 30 to 32 and Tables 91 to 94.  
 The one-way ANOVA results indicating; political participation F (2, 97) = .100, 
p=ns; social participation, F (2, 97) = 1.24, p=ns, and economic participation (F (2, 97) = 
.309, p=ns. None of the three results are significant; therefore, the results do not support 
H1.  
 Elites’ responses about women empowerment and how women can be empowered 
under the authoritative system and a Patriarchic society are not different from the 
government’s policies. Therefore, the discrepancies in elites’ responses about women’s 
participation in the three fields of development agree with the regime’s policies of 
empowering women. The results show congruence between the regime and elites’ values; 
thus the results support H2.   
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 More details are illustrated in the open-ended question (115.b). There are three 
frequent themes that can negatively impact women’s empowerment: traditionalism, social 
underdevelopment, and unconstructive media. There are no reformers among elites who 
suggested a development plan to push the social development wheel and implement 
changes to achieve higher levels of women empowerment and participation. See 
Appendix D, Tables from 95 to 98 for further details on the thematic analysis on 
women’s empowerment. 
Elites’ Political Culture towards Participation in Voluntary 
Organizations  
 Volunteerism is tested in question (104.5) on a 6-point scale of (1= very poor to 
6= excellent). Government’s reform policy in the field of civic engagement and 
volunteerism is ranked “poor” by 36% and “very poor” by 9% of elites. See Appendix D, 
Figure 33.  
 The one-way ANOVA indicates: F (2, 97) =.041, p=ns. The insignificant results 
confirm elites’ cautious liberalism, which in this case does not support H1. For more 
information see Appendix D, Tables 99 to 101.  
 The majority of elites’ believe that the government hinders civic engagement and 
issue laws that restrict all NGO activities, 45% of elites condemn this restriction and they 
want their government to allow civic engagement, yet no actions were taken by elites to 
minimize the interference of the security apparatus in the affairs and activities of NGOs. 
These responses are in congruence with the regime; thus elites’ beliefs support H2.  
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 The following dichotomous question (129) assesses civic engagement by asking 
elites’ about their involvement in nine different types of voluntary organizations: 
(philanthropic organizations; syndicates; youth clubs; cultural institutions; sports clubs; 
religious organizations; family associations; cooperative groups; and national or 
international foundations). Involvement with cultural institutions registered the highest 
percentage of 67%, followed by national and international foundations reaching 63%, 
then the philanthropic organizations reaching 62%.  
 Thus, over 50% of elites are involved with some kind of nonprofit organization, 
whether passively or actively as donors or participants. Jordan has a developing civil 
society and the involvement degree and civic engagement is considered above average, 
which represents a good level of “activeness” in the Jordanian society in spite of the 
authoritarian political system. See Appendix D, Figures 34 and 35. 
 Only two affiliations tested statistically significant: the cultural institutions and 
the national and international foundations, as Chi-square result: χ2 (2, N=100) = 11.091, 
p < .05 for the cultural organizations, and Chi-square result: χ2 (2, N=100) = 9.809,   p < 
.05. Chi-square  
for the national and international foundations, which support H1. See Appendix D, Table 
103. 
 Elites’ affiliation with cultural, and national and international organizations was 
expected to be high due to their positions. Elites’ affiliation with the cultural and national 
and international organizations did not trigger any changes in laws that restrict civic 
engagement in Jordan. The regime is congruent with elites’ political culture, and support 
H2. 
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Figure 4.7  Elites’ Involvements with Cultural Institutions 
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Figure 4.8  Elites’ Involvement with National and International Foundations 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 There is no serious reform implementation to liberate civic engagement due to 
authoritarianism and interference by the security apparatus. However, the results from 
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question (130) specify more “no” responses to interference, than “yes” responses. Yet, 
the 37% of “yes” responses added to 23% of “sometimes” responses equate to 60% of 
elites approving of some kind of government interference in the affairs of the voluntary 
organizations. Chi-square result: χ2 (4, N=100) = 4.883,   p < ns, thus the results do not 
support H1, but they support H2. See Appendix D, Figure 36, and Tables 104 and 105.  
 In addition, this interference is confirmed by results from the open-ended question 
(131) demonstrating a one and only core theme of “authoritarianism and security 
apparatus interference” by 56% of elites. In their responses, most elites asserted that 
NGOs are not sovereign organizations due to several restrictive laws to their activities 
and the interference of the security apparatus in the type of activities they do. 
 The results of the findings of this section are summarized in the following table: 
 
 
Table 4.6 Summary of Quantitative Data Analysis Results: Elites’ Political  
   Culture towards Social Development 
 
 Importance  
of 
Tribalism 
Tribalism 
Influence 
Women 
Empower- 
ment 
Civic 
Affiliation 
NGOs 
Sovereignty 
H1: 
Significant 
Difference  
 
H2:  
Congruence: 
Regime with 
Elites’ 
Political 
Culture 
 
Not 
Supported 
 
 
 
Supported 
 
Not 
Supported 
 
 
 
Supported 
 
Not 
Supported 
 
 
 
Supported 
 
 
Supported 
 
 
 
Supported 
 
Not  
Supported 
 
 
 
Supported 
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Economic Development 
 
Elites’ Political Culture towards Economic Liberalization and Prosperity 
 Elites’ beliefs in prosperity are assessed in question (103.6) on a 5-point scale 
(1=extremely unimportant, 5= extremely important). Elites’ responses imply that the 
value of prosperity is 42% “important” and 25% “very important” for policymakers; a 
total of 67% of importance. This value is expressed in the enthusiasm towards economic 
liberalization in Jordan. 
 The one-way ANOVA confirms the insignificant difference indicating F (2, 97) 
=.812, p=ns. The result does not support H1.  See Appendix D, Figure 37 and Tables 106 
and 107.   
 The Jordanian government encourages economic liberalization policies, but the 
majority of elites elaborated on the economic liberalization question by emphasizing 
Jordan’s high poverty and unemployment rates; particularly, in the suburbs. In their 
responses most elites criticized their government on its economic liberalization policies 
that did lead to ameliorating the standards of living in Jordan, which indicate that there is 
lack of congruence between the regime and elites’ political culture. Thus, the results do 
not support H2.   
 The economic liberalization is measured in question (104.4) on a 6-point scale of 
(1= very poor to 6= excellent), through elites’ beliefs in the seriousness of the 
implementation of economic reforms that lead to economic liberalization. The highest 
percentage of responses is 42% “very good,” but 17% believe it is “excellent” and 23% 
believe it is “good.” This implies that a total of 82% of elites believe that economic 
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reform policy and economic liberalization are on the right track. See Appendix D, Figure 
38. 
 There is no significant difference in the results of the one-way ANOVA indicating 
F (2, 97) =.823, p=ns; thus, the result rejects H1. See Appendix D, Tables 108 to 109. 
 Most elites believe that the policies of economic liberalization and privatization 
have led Jordan to economic development, which agree with what the Jordanian 
government claims about the success of the economic liberalization policies. 
Accordingly, the regime is congruent with elites’ political culture; therefore, the results 
support H2. 
 
Elites’ Political Culture towards Economic Development vs. Political 
Development 
Elites’ political culture towards the precedence of economic 
development verses political development is tested in the semi-structured 
question (132).  The majority of Jordanian elites’ showed advanced attitudes 
towards some of the government’s economic reforms that give economic 
development precedence over political development. These attitudes are 
demonstrated in the 67% of elite’s that are in favor of the “both developments 
should occur simultaneously” option. See Appendix D, Figure 39 and Table 112. 
 The result of one-way ANOVA indicating no significance; F (2, 97) =.939, p=ns, 
thus the result undermines H1 and H2; see Appendix D, Tables 113 and 114. 
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 Elites’ political culture towards economic liberalization and development is 
enhanced in the open-ended question (133) that inquires about the chosen development 
plan and gave the respondents a chance to elaborate on Jordan’s economic development 
in general. Elites’ most frequent three core themes are (political and economic stability; 
reinstatement of freedoms, and economic development). See Appendix D, Table 115 for 
themes’ frequencies.  
 Accordingly, 64% of elites believed that when both developments occur 
simultaneously they enhance each other and ensure growth and the achievement of higher 
productivity, as some elites added in their elaborations. This enhancement will lead the 
country to political and economic stability. Elites’ core and subsequent themes reflect a 
reformist view. See Appendix D, Table 116 for the thematic analysis of core and 
subordinate themes, and Table 117 for the frequency of the core themes distributed in 
percentage.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
133 
 
The results of the findings of this section are summarized in the following table: 
 
 
Table 4.7 Summary of Quantitative Data Analysis Results: Elites’ Political  
   Culture towards Economic Development  
 
 Prosperity 
Value 
Economic 
Liberalization 
Economic 
Development 
Policy    
  
H1:  
Significant 
Difference 
 
Not 
Supported 
 
Not 
Supported 
 
Not 
Supported 
  
H2:  
Congruence: 
Regime with 
Elites’ 
Political 
Culture 
 
 
Not 
Supported 
 
Not 
Supported 
 
Not  
Supported 
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Discussion 
 
 This section addresses the issue of whether research findings add to or change the 
understanding of Jordanian elites’ political culture by discussing findings from the 
analyses of the four research questions: 1) The description of Jordanian elites’ political 
culture; 2) The significant differences among the three groups of elites; 3) The centers of 
influence among Jordanian elites; 4) The congruence level between the regime and elites’ 
political culture.   
 Elaborated data was gathered in response to the open-ended questions; 
particularly for the neutral, standard, or uncertain responses to some closed-ended 
questions. During the interviews, the abundance of data that was registered was taken 
under the researcher’s consideration to be used in the analyses, which helped in making 
the studied inferences that guided the discussion of the results.   
 The findings in the first section of political development portray elites’ values, 
beliefs, and attitudes towards a number of political development issues: The type of 
political system; the supremacy of rule of law; democratic governance; pluralism; and the 
election of the Prime Minister.  
 In their evaluations for the different political systems, the majority of elites 
expressed their inspirations and enthusiasm towards constitutional monarchy. They 
claimed to value the parliamentary democratic political system rather than their 
authoritative system that is ruled by an ultimate power. They also emphasized their 
beliefs in the supremacy of rule of law, real pluralism, and democratic governance. 
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Despite the claims made by most elites about their incompatibility with their government, 
elites’ political culture was found congruent with the regime.   
 Elites’ denunciation and criticism of the regime and their government’s policies 
were expressed throughout the interviews, particularly while answering the open-ended 
questions.   
 Thus, in their elaborations on the open-ended question (135) elites comments and 
elaborated explanations benefitted both the data gathering and data analysis processes. 
Most elites, particularly the ones who participated in the National Charter Convention 
(1990) condemned the government for paralyzing the National Charter, which had it been 
applied, Jordan would have witnessed serious implementation of reforms and a great 
enhancement to all developmental activities.  
 The Arab Barometer study (2006) indicated that there is a high percentage of 
73.5% of respondents who agreed to the following statement: "The democratic system 
has its problems, but it is better than any other." Also, in the Arab Barometer study, only 
12.3% disagreed to the same statement.  
 In addition, most elites elaborated on the government’s deficiency in achieving 
democratic governance and for lagging behind in achieving successful coordination 
processes that delay the delivery of social service in the country.  
 Similarly, the results confirm the absence of real pluralism, as most elites said that 
they did not believe that forces like the political parties, entrepreneurships & businesses, 
NGOs, unions, decision making groups, pressure groups, and powerful personalities can 
participate in governance. Jordan is a regime led state, as described by Lucas (2004). 
Thus, the regime maintains the exclusive right to define pluralism and decides which 
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forces should be restricted and deemed outside the boundaries of its accepted pluralism. 
The government’s pluralism is coherent with Linz’s theory of authoritarianism (1964), 
which suggests pluralism under authoritarian regimes is only social pluralism. 
 Nevertheless, the results from the question that inquired about the King’s 
prerogatives indicated that the pattern that took place at the very beginning of data 
gathering was contradicted with elite’s responses on this particular question. Most elites 
justified their positions of not sounding liberal in answering this question by emphasizing 
that democracy in Jordan has not matured for implementing this particular reform. Thus, 
their expressed beliefs that the King must practice all his prerogatives including the 
appointment of the Prime Minister underline Wiktorowicz’s argument of the façade of 
democracy (1999). More importantly, these beliefs were found to go in coherence with 
John Locke’s theory of “Cautious Liberalism” stating that revolutionary and progressive 
values, beliefs, and attitudes that lead to major changes in the political structure can cause 
political degeneration and major changes in the status quo of the holders of power under 
that political system. 
 The result of the qualitative questions confirmed the values, beliefs, and attitudes 
of elites which they expressed about the type of political system and its characteristics 
which they mainly criticized and considered non-democratic. 
 In summary, most of the quantitative and qualitative results in the first section 
indicate that Jordanian elites’ values, beliefs, and attitudes towards the type of political 
system, rule of law, democratic governance, and pluralism suggest that they have a liberal 
political culture. Yet, in order for them not to jeopardize their tenures or security, they 
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stayed guarded in regards to the implementation of one of the most important issues that 
cause political underdevelopment.  
 The analyses of the second group of political development responses indicate that 
elites’ political culture has appreciation for freedoms and civil rights. The results indicate 
that Jordanian elites appreciate having self-determination that enable them to make or 
impact policies, freedoms and civil rights; access to information; and freedom of opinion 
and ideological affiliation. In addition, the results support the fact that they highly value 
civil rights and the liberal ideologies. They were also hopeful in having more freedom 
and access to information. Jordanian elites showed interest in expressing their ideological 
backgrounds that were different from the regime’s ideology of “Jordan First,” which was 
adopted by very few elites.  
 Democracy exists if citizens are free and their rights are not restricted or violated, 
and vise versa; although on one hand, some of these results do not agree with the 
Freedom House rating that considers Jordan “Not free.” On the other hand, Jordanian 
elites took liberal stances by showing their eagerness to accomplish more advances in the 
realm of freedoms and civil rights, in order to keep Jordan ahead of its neighboring 
countries. More importantly, elites expressed a liberal political culture that is coherent 
with the democratic rhetoric of the regime. By the same token, the Arab Barometer study 
(2006) shows that 38.8% of Jordanians believe that disrespecting human rights for the 
sake of security is "not ever justified" and rejected the encroachment by the security 
apparatus, whereas 12% said it is "justified to a large degree." These results emphasize 
the government’s encroachment on human rights; for the sake of security.  
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 The third section discusses the results of elites’ political culture towards public 
sector reform. This section measures the quantitative and qualitative results of elites’ 
political culture towards transparency and accountability, corruption control, nepotism, 
merit system, administrative development, and institution-building. According to 
Transparency International Index, the overall perception of corruption in Jordanian public 
sector has worsened; it rated 46/177 and fell to 66/177 in 2013. These results are also 
confirmed by Jreisat (as cited in Jabbra, 1989) explaining the obstacles that hinder 
administrative development in Jordan. Elites’ attitudes towards enforcing transparency 
and accountability, as well as corruption control were “unfavorable” towards the 
government’s implementation of this reform. Elites expressed criticisms of the 
government’s enforcement of the Financial Disclosure law. There is value in the expected 
consequences of this law, as it was ratified to hold administrative officials accountable 
and maintain transparency, yet the lack of seriousness in its enforcement rendered this 
law an ineffective tool in the combat of corruption. Likewise, most elites’ attitudes were 
“unfavorable” towards the implementation of reforms that end nepotism. The majority of 
elites denounced the rampant phenomenon that is known as “Wasta,” which means 
nepotism, cronyism, favoritism, and patronage.  
 Institution-building is another reform that was assessed through the political 
culture of elites who expressed reformist values, beliefs, and attitudes in what ought to be 
done to accomplish a complete and successful institution-building process in Jordan. 
Most elites’ comments on the open-ended question regarding institution-building 
elaborated on the empowerment of institutions that takes place by enhancing their system 
of equilibrium of rules, norms, and beliefs and improving their capacity in the 
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implementation of reforms. Furthermore, they emphasized the need for a public 
administration strategy to strengthen the Jordanian institutions and to increase efficiency 
levels in order to meet the requirements of Jordan’s transitional period which is still 
deficient in Jordan. Wiktorowicz (1999) blamed authoritarianism for the deficiency of 
institution-building. Similarly, the majority of elites referred this underdeveloped 
situation of institution-building to the nature of the monarchical regime and the different 
roles which the institution of the Palace and the Royal Court play, as they believed that 
these institutions infringe on all other institutions in the country and interfere with their 
equilibrium that affects their development. The process of institution-building in Jordan 
is struggling to develop.  
 The qualitative results and elites’ elaborations emphasized the significance of 
several enterprising values, which notes that their absence lowers the efficiency levels of 
all workers. They showed eagerness in fighting corrupt norms in all their organizations, 
such as “Wasta.” The low efficiency levels in the public and private Jordanian 
organizations can be treated by the following reform plan: the assignment of training 
programs for improving the performance of individuals; strict enforcement of a merit 
system to hire on the basis of KSAs, codes, conducts, and by-laws; and for transparency 
and accountability to hold officials accountable to the public. In the open-ended question 
on institution-building, the result indicated that most elites have shared the following 
themes: seriousness in implementing reforms, decreasing Royal Court authority, and 
enforcing democratic values. Again, the seriousness in implementing reforms remains 
critical to the development process.  
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 The fourth section is concerned with political participation and Jordanian political 
parties. The Jordanian parties have been undeveloped institutions since their 
establishment. The parties have been unacceptable political institutions in Jordan and 
were never supported by the regime that claims parties as obstacles to democratic 
development. The Jordanian political parties are conflicted with alleged tendencies and 
they are centered on personalities rather than programs. Most elites and the Jordanian 
public are still averted with this reputation. The results display a high percentage of elites 
who avoid having any affiliation with political parties. Elites’ beliefs in having 
affiliations with political parties are considered illiberal, submissive, and reactionary, 
since the party affiliation among elites has remained extremely low. Further, the party 
institution is considered incapable of forming effective parliamentary blocs, which has 
negatively reflected on the parliamentary elections and their campaigning culture. Most 
elites refused the campaigning rhetoric; as it is considered propaganda, or used to serve 
the interests of some individuals. The campaigning culture is discouraging to the 
Jordanian intelligentsia and to the younger generation; therefore, responding by selecting 
the abovementioned two options is considered progressive due to the importance of these 
options to the reformation process. 
 The legislations of organizing political parties and parliamentary elections are 
another important factor for controlling and restricting these institutions. The one-man, 
one-vote law is a traditional and conservative law imposed by the regime to empower 
tribalism and to keep the institutions of political party and the Parliament weak and 
incapable. The Arab Barometer (2006) study results revealed that there are differing 
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levels of confidence among Jordanians in their public institutions. The results indicated 
that 56% of the people are "confident to a large degree" in the General Security forces, 
followed by the courts at 40%, then the Prime Minister at 27%, and the Parliament at 
19%, and finally political parties with only 10 percent. Similarly, this study’s results did 
not show high levels of confidence among elites in the Parliament and political parties.  
 Lobbying is a democratic practice that is informally performed by Jordanian elites 
who believe in its effect, although they operate under an authoritarian political system. 
The majority of elites said that they practice lobbying to participate in policymaking, 
influence the policymakers, and to pursue democracy.  
 The qualitative results defined elites’ beliefs in the reasons that contribute to the 
weakness of political parties and their attitudes towards reforming and activating the 
party institution in Jordan. According to elites’ beliefs, the weaknesses of the party 
institution are: authoritarianism, absence of programs, and political parties past failures 
that led to their destructive reputation. Political parties remain the best way to deliver 
democracy; therefore, elites were asked to elaborate on a reform plan. However, most 
respondents were focused on the deficiencies of the available political parties and did not 
have a reform plan that can activate the dysfunctional party institution due to the 
authoritarian regime that restricts freedoms, and the absence of the royal decree that 
allows the reformation process. The core themes of reform, as mentioned by elites are: 
reforming the party institution, empowering democratic values to allow political 
participation and guarantees freedoms and rights, amending legislations to negate the 
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flawed party legislations, raising the public awareness levels about the party institution, 
and allowing parties to have programs, recruit efficient leaders, and build popular bases.  
 Collectively, the political parties and the Parliament in Jordan remain weak 
institutions. This policy is described by Brynen as a step toward liberalization without 
real political development. Keeping the institutions of Parliament and political parties 
under the control of the state hinders democratization and political development (1998). 
Jordanian elites have expressed very liberal values and their responses were focused on 
criticizing the government, yet they are part of the government and part of the regime that 
they were criticizing. It can be inferred that Jordanian elites’ political culture could not 
help them to get rid of their fears. Thus, they were described as cautious liberals.  
 The results of social development are discussed in three sections. First, the 
importance and consideration of tribal values in the making of policies; tribalism is 
another sensitive issue that generates inconsistencies in elites’ responses. As displayed in 
the one-man, one-vote legislation, tribal values are very important not only to the regime, 
but also to the most influential elites. Oudat and Alshboul (2010) state that tribalism has 
been used by the regime as a tool to serve some Jordanians and their political interests; 
thus, those elites who emphasized the negative impact of tribalism express a progressive 
political culture. Using tribalism to serve a certain political agenda is an undemocratic 
practice that leads the society to conflicts.   
 The most frequent core themes on tribalism’s effect on development are: causing 
degeneration and regression, causing confusion in loyalties, and enhancing development 
by playing a role in protecting the national security. Two themes underlined the negative 
effect of tribalism, while the third theme was positive. However, the positive theme was 
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the less frequent theme, which confirms that using tribalism as a tool to pursue certain 
political agendas by the regime has a negative impact on development.  
 The second section under social development is women empowerment. There was 
no opposition to women’s participation in the political, social, and economic fields 
among Jordanian elites. However, most elites supported women’s social and economic 
participation more than their political participation. The level of women’s political 
participation in Jordan was 7 percent to 16.9 around the world. Therefore, Jordan depends 
on the quota system to raise women’s representation in the Parliament. Women’s quota 
has been recently raised to 12 percent. Nevertheless, the UNDP studies on Jordan 
consider the participation of Jordanian women in the three fields is restricted by 
numerous obstacles and challenges. The qualitative results from elites’ elaborations on 
this issue confirm the impact of tribalism and traditional social norms on women’s 
participation. In addition, the Jordanian society, particularly in the suburbs, is 
Patriarchical and hierarchical. This impacted the social identities of women who tend to 
be more dependent on male figures in their family relations. These challenges affect the 
policymaking under Jordan’s political system that is described by Hudson as a patriarchic 
and traditional political system (1977). The status of women is taken under the 
consideration of different international studies on Jordan. Several elites referred to these 
studies and disagreed with their findings. They do not consider women in Jordan to be 
less liberated than other women in the world. One of their core themes referred to the role 
of destructive media as a reason for any alleged deficit in women’s participation.  
 Although volunteering is carried out through nonprofit organizations, it is also 
valuable for governments. Volunteerism supplements several services that governments 
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provide. It is necessary for several communities in Jordan, but the lower incomes and 
standard of living makes volunteers look for paid jobs instead of seeking volunteer 
opportunities. The result that assessed elites’ value of volunteerism points out their 
inflexible outlook towards this value. Particularly, the lack of governmental subsidies 
illuminates any urgency in taking steps to promote volunteerism or to allocate budgets to 
fund volunteer programs. Financial hardship is present among both the government and 
the population in general, which limits peoples’ will to volunteer. These results were not 
expected from the majority of elites who were responding as liberal activists through the 
survey because through voluntary organizations activists can mobilize the grassroots of 
the society (Wiktorowicz, 1999). 
 In their assessment for the sovereignty of their nonprofit organizations, most elites 
condemned their government for its interference in the affairs of the governmental 
organizations.  As a matter of fact, in accordance with Kamrava’s theory, the 
authoritarian government of Jordan and its security apparatus politicize the activities of 
most NGOs in Jordan in order to put restrictions on most of their activities (1998). 
Hence, Jordanian elites realize that the nonprofit sector in Jordan is not considered free. 
As they also know that the only permissible activities are the charitable ones. Yet, 
Jordanian elites’ political culture does not indicate their willingness to amend the policy 
that restricts NGOs’ activities, or to activate civic engagement that creates social 
harmony and builds social trust. 
 Elites’ values, beliefs, and attitudes towards economic development confirmed 
their appreciation for economic growth to achieve prosperity and higher living standards. 
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Therefore, the results indicated their enthusiasm to liberate their economy and achieving 
economic liberalization. Although Jordan has taken bigger steps than other countries in 
the region towards economic liberalization, the government’s economic reform policies 
have lagged behind.  According to the Human Development Index (HDI) Jordan’s 
current economic status has not achieved better poverty and unemployment rates and 
most Jordanians do not have a prosperous living.    
 Therefore, most elites condemn their government on its economic policies. They 
criticized the privatization policies that led to privatizing Jordan’s most important 
national resources. Most elites critiqued the government’s policies of economic 
liberalization that lack for regulations and laws that should be promulgated to protect the 
national economy, as most elites consider the absence of government surveillance in the 
government’s economic liberalization policies led did not lead the country to economic 
liberalization, but widened the gap between the haves and have-nots and increased the 
levels of poverty and unemployment.  
 The third issue is the policy of economic development. This assessment 
essentially measures elites’ beliefs in the interconnected relationship between economic 
and political reform. The majority of elites believe in the interconnectedness between 
these two developments. They emphasized that neither form of development should be 
separate of the other. This is because underdeveloped economic issues impact political 
development, and political underdevelopment can in turn hinder any economic growth. 
Although Jordan has grown economically, due to a lack of democracy and political 
participation in decision-making, economic development remains threatened. Freedoms 
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remain to be a vital factor for both forms of development to succeed to their full 
potential. If freedoms and rights are guaranteed under the Jordanian political system, the 
poverty and unemployment levels would drop and the economic growth rate would in 
turn rise.  
 Accordingly, most elites denounced the precedence of economic liberalization 
over the political liberalization. In response to the first research question, the results of 
elites’ political culture on economic development contrast with the regimes economic 
liberalization policies, as they ruthlessly criticized their government for the privatization 
of several public sector entities. However, elites’ criticisms of the government’s 
economic policies have remained rhetoric.  
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Chapter 5: Main Conclusions 
 
 In response to the four research questions and their two hypotheses, this chapter 
offers valuable insights into Jordanian elites’ political culture. It provides illustrations on 
elites’ most crucial challenge, imposed by the centers of influence that impacts their 
values, beliefs, and attitudes and their pursuits of achieving liberalization, 
democratization, and development. It displays the main conclusions and inferences from 
the analyses by describing the political culture of Jordanian elites; explaining the scarce 
significant differences among elites’ three groups; elucidating the centers of power 
concerned with elites’ political culture; and defining the regimes’ congruence with 
Jordanian elites’ political culture.  
 In consummation, the limitations of this study will be discussed, and the 
following three areas will be addressed in the implication section: to decide whether 
theory, research, and practice of the findings are consistent with selected theoretical 
framework or not; if the study helps in advancing the research methodology, issues of 
measurement, and research design; and finally, on the practical level, how the findings 
are anticipated to add to this field and to lead for changes in interviewing elites in 
authoritarian political systems. 
 
1) Description of elites’ political culture 
 In response to the first research question, the results indicated a certain pattern in 
elites’ political culture. In the first section of questions on political development, most 
elites expressed democratic, progressive, and advanced values, beliefs, and attitudes 
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towards a type of political system, supremacy of rule of law, democratic governance, and 
pluralism. All the results that were inferred from the analysis of this group of questions 
indicated that elites’ political culture contrasted with the reform policies of the regime or 
the approaches which the regime adopted in the implementation of reform policies. For 
example, continuously criticizing the government on its lack of seriousness in reform 
policy implementation and explaining with much elaboration the reasons behind their 
criticisms showed the difference in the way they think versus the reality of the stagnant 
political development in Jordan. Many aspects of political development such as the 
supremacy of rule of law can be superseded by tribal laws, which defeats one of the main 
pillars of a modern state. The analysis of the last quantitative question in this section that 
inquired about the King’s prerogatives confirmed that the majority of Jordanian elites’ 
liberalism on which they elaborated appeared to be more timid than progressive in certain 
areas. Unfortunately, this particular reform remains vital for the transitional movement 
towards liberalization, democratization, and development. This is because the transition 
from an authoritative monarchical political system to a constitutional monarchical 
political system contradicts with the notion of the ultimate power that accompanies 
authoritarianism. However, Jordanian elites’ beliefs revealed a sentiment of fear of real 
change and they showed inability and weakness in achieving a constitutional monarchy 
that is anti-royalist and anti-ultimate power. Therefore, on the basis of these results, 
Jordanian elites can be described as cautious liberals whose political culture does not 
really vary from the pervasive democratic rhetoric of Jordan. 
 In the second section of the analysis, Jordanian elites responded by evaluating a 
number of freedoms and rights such as the freedom of self-determination, civil rights, 
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freedom of access to information, freedom of choice, and freedom of affiliation with 
certain ideologies. The analyses show that elites’ values, beliefs, and attitudes were 
inconsistent with liberalism. They expressed a dynamic ability in affecting policy-making 
in Jordan, in considering the value of civil rights and freedoms in the policy-making, 
maintaining Jordan’s leading position in the freedom of accessing information, and more 
importantly in their ability to express their ideological affiliations despite the regime’s 
endeavors to emphasize its ideology “Jordan First.” The results of the ideological 
background question indicated that the majority of Jordanian elites described themselves 
as liberals.  
 In the third section of the analysis, the Jordanian elites’ political culture towards 
public sector reform followed a reformist pattern on all questions in this section. All of 
the results indicated that Jordanian elites were capable of diagnosing one of the most 
important deficiencies that can cause underdevelopment on the political, administrative, 
economic, and social levels which is corruption. Elites showed a progressive political 
culture in fighting this developmental ailment as well as fighting nepotism and the 
absence of transparency, accountability, and a merit system. This reformist stance most 
elites took accentuates their liberal values, beliefs, and attitudes and their eagerness to 
have serious implementation of reforms on the political, administrative, and social levels. 
This inference stems from the analysis of their responses to all the questions in this 
section.  
 Moreover, elites’ attitudes towards institution-building reform reflected their 
understanding of the requirements necessary to achieve serious reforms that would lead 
to development. Most authoritarian regimes take bits and pieces of the reform plans and 
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avoid the institutionalization of these reforms in order to delay any possibility of a change 
in their status quo. Nevertheless, the majority of Jordanian elites’ political culture 
towards institution-building emphasized the presence of a progressive political culture.  
 The fourth section assesses elites’ political party affiliation, evaluates the 
weakness of political party institution, political party reform, the one-man one-vote 
election law, the practice of lobbying, and elites’ reasons for lobbying. The analysis of 
this section on political development puts more emphasis on Jordanian elites’ liberal 
political culture that can be better described as rhetorical liberal culture. It is known that 
political parties and parliament institutions are the vehicles for political participation 
under the democratic political systems. However, the political party institution under the 
authoritative political system of Jordan was paralyzed and put under austerity measures 
that banned all their activities for decades. As mentioned in the literature review chapter 
of this study, Jordan represents a mixed system of representation that uses pluralism to 
stabilize authoritarianism as pluralism eases the pressure in society by allowing the 
masses to vent. The austerity measures of the ruling regime buttress an invisible form of 
authoritarianism. Therefore, the institutions of political parties and parliament are to 
remain weak institutions through the promulgation of laws that restrict their activities or 
hinder democracy such as the one-man one-vote law. Furthermore, such laws promote the 
campaigning culture that enhances the democratic rhetoric and façade.  
 By the same token, the practice of lobbying under the authoritarian regime of 
Jordan is another example of superficial democratic practices in an atmosphere that lacks 
political parties, parliament majorities, and fair and free elections. Therefore, Jordanian 
elites’ political culture towards political development highlighted many symptoms that 
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hinder liberalization, democratization, and development due to the fact that this political 
culture is deficient and incapable of implementing real reforms. 
 Likewise, Jordanian elites’ political culture towards the importance of tribalism as 
a value for policy-makers and tribalism influence on political and social development, 
women empowerment, civic affiliation, and NGO sovereignty also indicated a similar 
cautious political culture that underlined the problems of underdeveloped social situations 
without presenting any solution. For instance, Jordanian elites’ values, beliefs, and 
attitudes condemned the regime’s use of tribalism as a tool to pursue certain political 
agendas, yet they would consider filling the gap that the regime created by curtailing the 
activities of political parties by tribes and tribal affiliations. In addition, some elites 
consider tribalism to be a substantial phenomenon for political and social stability. The 
analysis shows that Jordanian elites expressed their political culture with modern and 
liberal language, yet they simultaneously reveal traditionalistic and conventional 
thinking. 
 In the field of women empowerment, liberalism and modernity followed the 
conventional mentality that is proportionate to the regime’s policies of women 
empowerment. Their ideas are suitable for the regime’s policies; however both men and 
women after all, are Jordanian citizens ruled by the same authoritarian political system. If 
men are not empowered, then women are not empowered. Under an authoritarian 
political system, all citizens are not empowered because political participation remains 
restricted. Therefore, Jordanian women will remain only empowered to a certain extent 
under the current authoritarian regime. 
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 Civic engagement and the affiliation with cultural national and international 
organizations are subject to several restrictive rules enforced by the government to curtail 
and restrict all the activities of the nonprofit organizations and keep them under the 
control of its security apparatus. The abundance of nonprofit organizations in Jordanian 
society can be confusing to some because to have over 6,000 nonprofit organizations in a 
lightly populated country is alarming. However due to the lack of democracy and strict 
supervision of the regime and security forces, these nonprofit organizations will remain 
toothless; particularly with cautious liberal elites. 
 The analysis of the economic development field underlined a political culture that 
sounds radical, yet incapable of enforcing and implementing real economic liberalization 
that would tighten the gap between the haves and have-nots in the society and help 
ameliorate the economic situation in Jordan. Elites’ political culture sounded extremely 
enterprising and reformist, but the majority of elites expressed that unless change comes 
from the institution of the palace, there will be no real implementation of reforms. 
2) Significant Differences  
 The purpose of this analysis and the hypothesis testing was to look for different 
patterns among elites’ values, beliefs, and attitudes to assess whether the three groups of 
elites are different in their political culture or not. The analysis of results concluded that 
there are very few significant differences between the means of the three groups of elites. 
The first section of the analysis on political development indicated no significant 
differences between the means of the three groups. However, the second and third 
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sections contained some significant differences between the political culture of one group 
and the political culture of the other two groups.  
 The absence of significant difference stresses the similarity among the values, 
beliefs, and attitudes of the three groups of Jordanian elites, which implies that there is a 
strong consensus among the values, beliefs, and attitudes of the political, social, and 
economic Jordanian elites towards liberalization, democratization, and political, social, 
and economic development. 
3) Jordanian Elites Political Culture Concerning the Centers of Power in 
Jordan 
 Most of elites’ responses to the open-ended questions consisted of a repeated term 
of the “Old Guards.”  There is a strong belief among Jordanian elites that the main culprit 
for the country’s stagnant state of development is the influence and power of the Old 
Guards whose grip on the country and all its institutions has been tightened and supported 
by the institution of the Palace. Most elites believe that the monarchical system 
guarantees the political and social stability in the Jordanian society that has a greater 
majority of Palestinians. Thus, most elites believe monarchy balances both components 
of the society believe it should be sustained.   
 Some East Bank elites expressed their beliefs very loudly by criticizing the most 
influential elites who are in the center of power and considered them the most responsible 
for the deterioration of the liberalization and development movement. 
 The Old Guards are mainly the army generals, highly ranked security apparatus 
officers, some of the ex- Prime Ministers, and other influential tribal members who 
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occupy high incumbents in the government and the Royal Court.  These influential 
figures are in the center of the Jordanian elites’ strata; they were criticized and 
condemned throughout the interviews for all the deterioration and stagnation in Jordan.  
 The Old Guards hinder the progress of development through their positions in the 
security forces. According to the majority of elites, they are the ones to be blamed as they 
thwart any endeavor of serious reforms that might weaken their influence and powerful 
grip.   
 Some of the literature that studied the Jordanian case explained who the Old 
Guards are and how they have become since the establishment of the state in the center of 
power. The patron-client relationship has taken place between the Old Guards and the 
King through a series of bargains and mutual interests that resulted in a similar situation 
for both sides. Each side depends on the other, and each side defends the existence, 
strength, and legitimacy of the other.  Using tribalism as a tool for the pursuit of certain 
political agendas, the empowerment of the East Bank Jordanians, the discrimination 
against the West Bank Jordanians, emphasizing the political culture of “Jordan First,” and 
the creation of social factions are methods used by the regime for enhancing the power 
and influence of the Old Guards over the rest of the society. This political culture is 
justified by the Palace and is considered the backbone of Jordan’s social and political 
stability.  
4) The Congruence between the Regime and Elites’ Political Culture 
 The analysis of these results indicated that most Jordanian elites have expressed 
criticism of the government’s reform policies and lack of seriousness in the 
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implementation of reforms which led to the deterioration of the liberalization, 
democratization, and development. Most of the elites, who condemned the regime and 
the Old Guards for the stagnant situation in Jordan, are themselves responsible for this 
deterioration, as they occupy the highest incumbents in the government and army. 
Additionally, some of them were Ex-Prime Ministers or Ex-security apparatus highly 
ranked officers.  
 The criticism did not provide alternatives or agendas for correcting 
underdevelopment, but rather illuminated all the flaws without a plan or mechanism for 
improvement. This criticism was destructive and did not offer any solutions for how the 
country can aim to get on the right track for liberalization and democratization. Whether 
these figures who made critiques of the situation where legislators, ministers, political 
party leaders, or CEOs in the private sector, they are all actually the participants who play 
the main role in Jordanian governance. At the beginning of each interview, each of these 
figures expressed that they enjoy their self-determination and ability to make policies or 
impact policy-making; hence their criticism suggests that they themselves are the culprit.  
 Conclusively, this is the reason why the analysis suggests that the regime is 
congruent with the political culture of Jordanian elites and in most cases, H2 was 
supported. This confirms that Jordanian elites are weak legislators, explaining why they 
are cautious liberals and reformers. The passivity of their stances implied great fear in 
any change to the political system which would jeopardize their positions in the 
government or negatively affect their rankings. 
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Limitations 
One of the potential limitations of this study is in its methodological premise. In 
accordance with Putnam’s (1971) study on elite political culture and ideology, this study 
underlines the sophisticated and complex political belief systems of political leaders that 
cannot be justified by crude techniques of survey research design. The cruder techniques 
of a survey design, for instance, cannot do justice in perceiving the subtleties and nuances 
in elites’ responses to various political issues. This becomes critical when analyzing and 
understanding their philosophies. Everything they say adds weight to the precision of 
critiquing their values, beliefs, and attitudes. This is the reason why elite theorists who 
studied elites’ political culture reflected on the consequent methodological difficulties 
and provided a solution for overcoming this difficulty by linking the problem to 
psychoanalytic techniques. So the “true” insights and what demonstrably “feels true” can 
create a validity dilemma. This necessitates a method of inquiry that is cable of drawing 
these conclusions without doing any injustice to the validity of data. However, this 
dilemma remained without a perfect solution. 
            Accordingly, the researcher’s fundamental methodological premise of this study 
on Jordanian elites’ values, beliefs, and attitudes was to communicate with them 
systematically by listening carefully to their responses and additional elaborations, which 
they tended to make even while responding to the closed-ended questions. As explained 
in Chapter 3 of this study, in an attempt to avoid any possible injustice to the validity of 
the gathered data, the researcher used paraphrasing as a method to confirm respondents’ 
answers and additional comments by repeating their words back to them. This allowed 
the researcher to receive feedback to confirm the internal validity of the gathered data.  
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 Furthermore, the nature of the Jordanian political environment that is subject to 
the authoritarian government and political system is another potential limitation of this 
study. The limitations that are a consequence of this nature made it difficult for elites to 
criticize the regime and its policies. This resulted in having to design the questionnaire 
according to this political environment. The consequences of designing the questionnaire 
this way presented themselves in both the closed- and open-ended versions of the 
question. This is because operating under an authoritarian regime comes with 
implications that high governmental officials approve of the regime’s approach to 
governance. Thus, elites were hesitant at first when voicing true thoughts and beliefs 
about the government. They persistently required confirmation that their identities were 
to remain anonymous for this study and that their names would not be published in any 
work. 
 The very first question in the survey asked elites if they personally have any 
impact on policymaking. The purpose of designing the survey so that this question was 
asked first was to measure their self-determination in making and implementing policies. 
The goal was also for them to define their own responsibilities. Formulating the questions 
and translating them from English to Arabic as suggested by Jordan University’s Center 
for Strategic Studies (CSS) aided in ensuring the reliability and internal validity of the 
research. The accuracy and precision of the data were heavily taken under consideration 
of the researcher through the coding process of qualitative data. 
  When the following questions asked about the administration or the government, 
it was implied that the questions asked the elites about themselves personally, as they are 
the policymakers who are representing the government. Designing some of the survey 
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questions indirectly aimed to prevent elites from responding with “I don’t know” or 
rejecting the question altogether.  
 The imbalance among the three groups of elites, as explained in Chapter 3, is not 
a limitation, but it is due to an imbalance in the population. The numbers of elites who 
belong to the three groups were 65/23/12. This imbalance was uncontrollable and had its 
reasons, as the governmental incumbencies were granted by the King to certain 
intelligentsia members or to prominent economic elites. In this case, the prominent 
economic elites who have become members of the Senate would classify themselves as 
political elites rather than economic elites. Therefore, the disproportionate sample of this 
study represents the disproportionate distribution in the population.   
 Another limitation is that when elites were asked dichotomous questions that 
could be answered with “yes” or “no,” many strayed away from these two options and 
instead would answer with “sometimes.” Similarly, when they were asked to describe a 
situation as “positive” or “negative,” many would respond with “sometimes negative and 
sometimes positive.” Because of the high frequency of receiving this middle-point 
response, this option was added to all surveys and considered in the scale during the 
analysis.  
 In terms of the external validity of this research, this case study of political culture 
of Jordanian elites who operate under the monarchical authoritarian political system can 
be generalized to other elites’ political cultures operating under presidential or sheikhdom 
political systems in the Arab region. Whether the country is under a presidential system 
or a sheikhdom, they operate similarly to a monarchical regime. The other common 
factor is authoritarianism which prevails in the Arab region. This is in addition to the 
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similarity of the culture in general among all Arab nations which impacts the values, 
beliefs, and attitudes of their policymakers. This creates a similar political culture for 
Arab elites. Thus, this study does not lack for generalizability.  
 It can be argued that these limitations did not override the findings, including the 
unexpected and insignificant ones. The sensitive issues and subjects under the 
authoritarian monarchical regime highlighted the importance of activating the 
liberalization and democratization transition by triggering the policymakers and people 
who have the most influence on the progression of development in Jordan to take a more 
assertive role. 
 
Implications 
The available literature on elites’ political culture provides minimal insight into 
the values, beliefs, and attitudes of Jordanian elites. This study fills this gap by the 
existing consistency between the selected theoretical framework and its results. It 
provides answers for the research questions on the bases of its theoretical foundation. The 
response of the first research question that is concerned with political elites describing 
their political culture consists of their values, beliefs, and attitudes, and confirms all 
inferences that strongly support Locke’s “cautious liberalism” theory. 
            First, on the basis of the theoretical foundation of this study, the instability of 
political order in Jordan remains precarious; especially when considering the slow 
process of liberalization, democratization, and development. Therefore, the regime, 
particularly the “Old Guards,” or the East Bank elites who benefit from this stagnation 
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are responsible for causing constant anxiety about the possibility of political degeneration 
caused by change.  
            The lack of harmony in John Locke’s political theory echoes Jordanian elites’ 
values, beliefs, and attitudes which they expressed when responding to the survey 
questionnaire. They answered with ambivalence due to their duel tendencies towards 
change. In all of their responses to questions that presented a more developed political 
system, elites were pro change and seemed extremely liberal; yet in response to questions 
that discussed implementing prime changes, they expressed conservatism by showing 
their reluctance to change. These types of passive-aggressive leaders who are more 
inclined to preserve the political order are largely responsible for the delayed journey 
towards liberalism and development. 
 For instance, the initial expectation that interviewing a group of conservative 
elites would yield conservative responses was not met, as elites responded quite liberally. 
The questionnaire consisted of certain sensitive questions which led elites to be critical of 
the regime and the government of which they are affiliated. However, the successful 
survey design enabled the researcher to overcome this limitation. As a result, the 
researcher collected an abundance of data expressing a progressive and reformist political 
culture, which did not meet the initial expectation. Nevertheless, the responses that 
articulated liberal values, beliefs, and attitudes were altered when the questions asked 
about changes in the King’s prerogatives or the issues that would lead to changes in the 
political system. This alteration in the expressed political culture did not meet the second 
expectation.  
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 Some of the elites were more liberal than others, while the conservative “Old 
Guards” among them were the reluctant ones to any change in the political system. Those 
elites from the Old Guards are the promoters of authoritarianism, tribalism, patriarchy, 
the notion of “Jordan First” that deepens the social faction in the society, and intolerance. 
Thus, they fight against any change in the regime or the political system because it will 
lead to changes or put limitations in their privileges. They thwart reforms such as 
corruption control and consider the endeavors of activating civil society organizations or 
the institution of a political party an external or foreign interference that is threatening to 
their national security. Therefore, these institutions get deactivated by the use of the 
security apparatus suppression. As a consequence, the existence of the “Old Guards” 
lowers the activists’ ceiling of liberalization and makes their mission more challenging.  
 In addition, the weakness of the state and its institutions remain the main reasons 
behind elites’ apprehensions, feelings of insecurity, and ambivalence, as they fear what 
change will bring them; including the more liberal elites. As a matter of fact, most liberal 
elites in Jordan have been calling for a constitutional monarchy. There is a demand 
among the Jordanian intelligentsia for ending authoritarianism. However, most liberals in 
Jordan are not advocating for change in the monarchical system. On the contrary, they are 
calling for altering the rule from an authoritarian monarchy, where the power is 
ultimately in the hands of the King, into a constitutional monarchy ruled by rule of law. 
Hence by valuing a political system that contradicts with their existing political system, 
and ranking it “very suitable” was surprising, particularly after they expressed 
conservative beliefs towards other reforms that would make such a change in their 
political system possible.  
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 The conclusion can be drawn that Jordanian elites are cautious liberals, fitting 
with Locke’s theory of ‘cautious liberalism.’ They opt for liberalism and democratization 
and for changing the status of authoritarianism in their political system, but remained 
fearful of the consequences of promoting changes in the political system, or expressing a 
political culture that is anti-Royalist.  
 Further, the interpretation of the findings implies, on one hand, the type of 
relationship between the authority patterns of the monarchical authoritarian political 
system and its regime that is materialized in its elites. On the other hand, the authority 
pattern of the various social units is incorporated in the general public and their different 
institutions and organizations. This relationship reflects the level of congruence between 
the two patterns of authority (Eckstein, 1998). The congruence theory contributes to 
understanding the political culture of Jordanian elites by understanding their performance 
level and their capability to be in agreement with their constituents from the general 
public and their different institutions that require governance.  
 The elites are part of the executive organizations of the state; thus they participate 
in making and implementing policies and are responsible for the achievement of good 
governance. This, according to Cheema, entails the coordination of “complex 
mechanisms, processes, relationships, and institutions through which citizens and groups 
articulate their interests, exercise their rights and obligations, and mediate their 
differences by allocating and managing all resources to respond to collective problems.” 
If the authority patterns of the government are congruent with the authority patterns of all 
other units in the society, the government performs well.  
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 Accordingly, achieving good governance would improve the congruence in the 
relationship between two authority powers of the Jordanian state and society. The ability 
of elites to defeat the obstinate and underdeveloped political culture will help Jordan in 
this struggle and push the development wheel forward. This happens when all forces 
coordinate and collaborate to achieve stability of the political system through balanced 
interactions and relationships among all conflicting and consensual parties, or active and 
passive ones. This conductive environment, according to the theory, enhances the 
stability of the political system; while the authoritative or totalitarian authority patterns 
hinder the transition towards democracy and the stability of the political system. 
 However, the findings from elites’ attitudes towards the lagging situation of 
democratic governance and their criticism of the implementation of reforms that lead to 
this accomplishment confirms the government’s low performance level. In other words, 
the relationship between authority patterns of the state, government, regime, and their 
Jordanian elites and the authority patterns of the society forces and institutions is lacking 
congruence.  
 In capsulation, the state in Jordan, which is built on its regime, stabilized itself by 
allocating privileges for East Jordanians and depriving the rest of the society from the 
same privileges, creating disparities and factions. This contradicts with the second 
hypothesis of the congruence theory that suggests that the government can achieve high 
performance if its authority patterns are capable to make a balance among its disparities. 
As mentioned earlier, the Old Guards are the most influential elites whose interests are 
served by creating factions and disparities and by putting the spikes in the liberalization 
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and democratization wheel. They are the conservative elites who carry reactionary 
values, beliefs, and attitudes.  
  
Conclusion 
 
 
 On the basis of these results and the theoretical foundation of this study, the 
Jordanian elites’ cautious liberal political culture does not place enough urgency on 
implementing serious reforms and changes to enable Jordan to achieve liberalization, 
democratization, and development. In addition, the requirements for achieving good 
governance are compound and multifaceted. The achievement of coordinated complex 
processes remains the chief challenge that all Jordanian authority patterns of both the 
state and society can face during the transitional period towards liberalization, 
democratization, and development. The findings signified that Jordanian elites’ cautious 
liberal political culture; the consensus among the three groups of elites due to the scarcity 
of significant differences among them; the rhetorical liberalism of elites’ political culture 
concerning the centers of power; and the congruence between the regime and Jordanian 
elites’ political culture are all factors that contribute to the continuation of this stagnant 
state, which Jordan has been struggling to end.  
 Further, these findings provide a new perspective that emphasizes on the mutual 
relationship that exists between the most influential centers of power under Jordan’s 
political system being, the King and the East Bank internal elites, and describes the 
political culture of Jordanian elites, illustrating the discrepancies between their claimed 
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values, beliefs, and attitudes and their real political culture that remains congruent with 
the regime’s policies of liberalization, democratization, and development.    
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Appendix A 
Geographical Location & Map of Jordan 
 
Map 1.1  The Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan 
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Appendix B 
Demographics: Social and economic statistic of a human 
development 
 
  
 
Figure 2.1 Population Growths in Jordan 2012-2013 
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Transjordanian Tribes 
 
Map 2.1  Origins of East Bank Elites 
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Table 2.1 GNI per capita / PPP from 1989 to 2012 
 
Country 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 
Jordan  2,260 2,270 2,060 2,420 2,510 
Egypt 2,180 2,310 2,410 2,540 2,620 
Morocco 1,740 1,890 2,040 1,980 1,950 
Syria 1,890 2,070 2,240 2,540 2,660 
Country 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 
Jordan  2,600 2,750 2,770 2,870 2,930 
Egypt 2,760 2,920 3,090 3,280 3,400 
Morocco 2,180 2,040 2,310 2,270 2,460 
Syria 2,970 3,120 3,160 3,040 3,230 
Country 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 
Jordan  3,010 3,230 3,420 3,550 3,690 
Egypt 3,590 3,810 3,970 4,020 4,160 
Morocco 2,470 2,530 2,760 2,870 3,090 
Syria 3,060 3,120 3,320 3,480 3,530 
Country 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 
Jordan  4,070 4,450 4,860 5,330 5,660 
Egypt 4,370 4,630 5,210 5,540 5,940 
Morocco 3,310 3,500 3,840 4,020 4,270 
Syria 3,830 4,080 4,270 4,510 4,600 
Country 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 
Jordan  5,820 5,750 5,870 5,980 
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Egypt 6,130 6,300 6,290 6,450 
 Morocco 4,410 4,580 4,840 5,060 
 Syria 4,760 4,800 
 
5,120 
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Figure 2.2                   GNP Growth Rate 
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Services: Tourism and Health Sectors 
 
 Tourism is one of the Kingdom’s largest export sectors. It enhances the national 
economy and GDP rates. Tourism is Jordan’s second largest private sector employer and 
the second highest producer of foreign exchange contributing more than $800 million to 
Jordan’s economy and accounts for approximately 10% of the country’s GDP. Further, 
the health industry is one of the most important in Jordan’s economy. According to 
Jordan’s Private Hospital Association site, due to Jordan’s rapidly developing 
international reputation for high quality, affordability and internationally competitive 
healthcare costs, its medical tourism is on the rise. There are nine Joint Commission 
International (JCI) accredited hospitals. Over 250,000 patients travelled to Jordan in 2012 
and the number is growing each year.  
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UNDP: Human Development Index (HDI) 
 
 United Nations Development Program (UNDP) tracks the economic health of a 
country from a human development perspective using the human development index 
(HDI); a composite of statistics of life expectancy, education, and income indices, and 
introduces these indices to view the potential human development level by ranking 
countries into different tiers. According to the UNDP report (2013), Jordan’s HDI level is 
0.700, which comparatively ranks Jordan’s human development level as medium on a 
global scale. However, in comparison to other Arab countries in the regions, Jordan’s rates 
of education, literacy, and measures of social well-being are relatively high. The 
macroeconomic stability that has been achieved since the 1990s is one of the most 
important factors in the government’s efforts that contribute to the improvement of 
Jordanian citizens’ well-being.  
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Figure 2.3  Economic Liberalization and Freedom  
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Appendix C 
Human Subjects, Informed Consent, & Survey questionnaire 
 
 
The Positions of the Survey Participants  
 The table below provides the list of positions held by the Jordanian elites, who 
participated in the survey. 
Table 1 Political, social, & economic elites’ positions 
_______________________________________________________________________ 
Elites’ Positions                                       N 
________________________________________________________________________ 
I. Political        65 
I.1 High-level Governmental Positions       
 I.1. a) Present & ex-prime ministers & ministers   11  
 I.1. b) Present & ex-Parliament members   16 
 
I.2. Political Parties  
 1.2) Leaders & Secretaries General     08 
 
  I.3)  Administrations & Bureaus of Ministries & Divisions   
              I.3.a) Trustees & under secretaries                  07 
              I.3.b) Administrative & Bureau Executives & G.Ms  11                     
   
I.4. Unions & Syndicates 
               I.4) Unions & Syndicate Secretary General                12 
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________________________________________________________________________                 
   
II. Social        23 
II. Intelligentsia 
                      II.1) University Professors                   10 
                II.2) Writers         10                                                                         
  II.3) NGO Leaders                                        03       
________________________________________________________________________ 
III. Economic                  12 
III   Business  
                        III. 1) CEOs                      08 
                     III.2) Business Chairs                    04  
 
Total                        100 
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Informed Consent 
 
 You are invited to participate in a research study conducted by Laila Huneidi from 
Portland State University, Public Administration and Policy. The researcher hopes to learn 
about the centers of influence and elites’ political culture towards liberalization, 
democratization, and development in Jordan. This study is being conducted in partial 
fulfillment of the requirements for a doctoral degree, and it is under the supervision of a 
specific faculty member at PSU. You were selected as a possible participant in this study 
because you belong to the top officials in the Jordanian government. 
 If you decide to participate, you will be asked to sign an informed consent form, 
answer oral interview questions, and answer a short closed-ended questionnaire. All the 
activities can be done in one appointment if your time allows, or I can come back for the 
interview. Your answers are extremely valuable to my study, which its result will benefit 
the country in its transition toward democratization and will benefit all decision makers 
in the country and the rest of the Jordanian public. I can come to your office when your 
time allows for the interview and I will not take much of your time. I will take notes of 
your answers and there will be no audio- or videotaping through the whole meeting. 
While participating there will be no risks. All the activities will be anonymous and your 
identity will be kept confidential through the whole study. There will be no obligation to 
answer any of the questions if you chose not to answer.   
 Any information that is obtained in connection with this study and that can be 
linked to you or identify you will be kept confidential, or otherwise in a paper, thesis, 
dissertation, journal or newspaper article, on the web or in a presentation, a statement 
must be added to that effect. If information will be released, it will be released for 
educational purposes in a class lecture or for completion of a dissertation that will be 
presented for a committee from Portland State University professors. There will be no 
disclosure of names or identities and this information will be kept confidential during the 
data collection and data analysis stages by using a special coding system that I have 
created particularly for data storage procedures. 
 Your participation is voluntary. You do not have to take part in this study, and it 
will not affect my PhD or my relationship with Portland State University. You may also 
withdraw from this study at any time without affecting my PhD or my relationship with 
Portland State University. 
 If you have concerns or problems about your participation in this study or your 
rights as a research subject, please contact the Human Subjects Research Review 
Committee, Office of Research and Sponsored Projects, 111 Cramer Hall, Portland State 
University, (503) 725-4288 / 1-877-480-4400. If you have questions about the study 
itself, contact Laila Huneidi at 0779930099. 
 Your signature indicates that you have read and understand the above information 
and agree to take part in this study. Please understand that you may withdraw your 
consent at anytime without penalty, and that, by signing, you are not waiving any legal 
claims, rights or remedies. The researcher will provide you with a copy of this form for 
your own records.  
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Signature         Date 
Survey Questionnaire 
 
A Survey on the Values, Beliefs, &Attitudes of Jordanian Elites towards liberalization, Democratization 
& Development  
Application Number:    
 
Interviewees Information 
I. Interviewees  
I.1. High-level Governmental Positions 
I.1. a)  Present & Ex-Ministers  
I.1. b)  Present & Ex-Parliament members 
I.2. Political Party Leaders & Secretaries General 
    I.2.a)  Arab Land Party 
    I.2.b)  Al-Ahed Party 
    I.2.c)  Jordan Communist Party 
    I.2.d)  Jordan Green Party 
    I. 2.e)  Mission Party 
    I.2.f)  Islamic Center Party 
    I.2.g)  The Islamic Action Front 
    I.2.h)  National Action Party (Haq) 
I.3. Ministries, Bureaus and Administration Divisions 
                     I. 3.a)  Under Secretaries & Trustees 
                     I.3.b)  Administrative Executives  
                     I. 3.c)  Bureau & Division General Managers 
II.1. Syndicates 
              II.1.a)  Syndicate Secretary General  
                     II.2.b)   Union  Secretary Generals  
                     II.3.c)   NGOs Leaders  
II.2. Intelligentsia 
                     II.2.a)   University Professors 
             II.2.b)  Writers                                                                                                                         
III.   Business  
                           III.a)  CEOs  
                     III.b)  Business Chairs  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
l___l l___l 
II. Interview Date  
 
Research Procedures 
 
Researcher Name  :    Laila Huneidi                               Date : 
Coding Date          : 
Data Entry Date    :                           
 
Interview Results: 
 
1. Completed Interviews    :                         l___l 
2. Rejected Interviews        :                     l__l  l__l 
                              __________________        
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101. Do you think you currently have or have had any impact on policymaking in Jordan? 
 
0. No (go to Q. 103) 
1. Yes 
5.   Don’t know (go to Q. 103) 
                    6.   No response (go to Q. 103) 
 
l__l 
 
 
 
 102. As a policymaker, or as someone who has/had an impact on policymaking, to what extent do you 
believe that your political goals are/were accomplished?  
1. Not at all 
2. To a little extent 
3. To a moderate extent 
4. To a large extent 
                      5. Don’t know 
                      6. No response 
 
 
 
l__l 
 
 
103. As a policymaker how do you rank the importance of the following values in the making of reform 
policies? 
 (1 = Extremely unimportant,  2= Unimportant,  3 = Somehow important,  4= Important ,  5 =  Extremely 
Important)  
Values Significance Other Concerns  
1. Civil rights & freedoms 
          1          2          3          4          5           
            ________________________________ 
 
 
98. Don’t know 
  99. No Response 
 
l__l 
 
   2. Social reform through schools curricula               
                         1          2          3          4          5           
             _________________________________ 
 
 
98. Don’t know 
  99. No Response 
 
l__l 
        
3. Economic independence of women 
                         1          2          3          4          5          
             _________________________________ 
 
 
98. Don’t know 
  99. No Response 
 
l__l 
 
4. Religious values      
                         1          2          3          4          5          
             _________________________________ 
 
 
98. Don’t know 
  99. No Response 
 
l__l 
 
5. Tribal values      
         1          2          3          4          5          
             _________________________________ 
 
 
98. Don’t know 
  99. No Response 
 
l__l 
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6. Prosperity values 
                         1          2          3          4          5           
            _________________________________ 
 
 
 
98. Don’t know 
  99. No Response 
 
l__l 
 
 
104. How would you rate the quality of the reform implementation by the current administration? 
(1 = Very poor,  2 =  Poor,   3 =  Standard,   4  =  Good,   5= Very good, 6  =Excellent) 
 
Implementation Level Other Concerns  
1. Reforming bureaucratic procedures (through modernizing the 
administrative statutes)  
                           1          2          3          4          5          6 
                          _________________________________ 
 
 
98. Don’t know 
  99. No Response 
 
l__l 
2. Supremacy of rule of law/ level of implementation 
                           1          2          3          4          5          6 
                          _________________________________ 
 
 
98. Don’t know 
  99. No Response 
 
l__l 
3. Free access to information technology 
      1          2          3          4          5          6 
                          _________________________________ 
 
 
98. Don’t know 
  99. No Response 
 
l__l 
4. Economic liberalization 
                            1          2          3          4          5          6 
                          _________________________________ 
 
 
98. Don’t know 
  99. No Response 
 
l__l 
5.  Empowering volunteerism               
      1          2          3          4          5          6 
                          _________________________________ 
 
 
98. Don’t know 
  99. No Response 
 
l__l 
6. Unrestricted policies freeing political party activities 
                            1          2          3          4          5          6 
                          _________________________________ 
 
 
 
98. Don’t know 
  99. No Response 
 
l__l 
 
 
 
 
105. Describe yourself  ideologically 
 
     
1.  Liberal  
2.  Independent    
3.  Conservative 
  
 
 
l__l  
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106. On a scale of 1-6, how do you favor the implementation of the following reforms by the Jordanian 
government: 
 
 
                Reforms 
 
Very 
unfavorable  
1 
 
Unfavorable 
 
2 
 
 
Neutral 
3 
 
 
Favorable 
4 
 
I don’t 
know 
5 
 
 
NR 
6 
 
1. Transparency & 
accountability 
      
  
LI 
2. Corruption control       
 
LI 
3. Cooperation with 
the private sector  
      
 
LI 
4. Cooperation with 
the        Nonprofit 
sector 
      
 
LI 
5. Fighting nepotism        
 
LI 
6. Merit system        
 
 
LI 
 
 
 
107. In Jordan the relationship between the public and private sectors and civil society in the delivery of 
public services is lagging behind. 
1. Disapprove  
2. Uncertain 
3. Approve 
 
 
l__l l__l 
 
 
  
 
108. How do you value the effectiveness of the ‘Financial Disclosure Law’ to ensure accountability and 
transparency? 
1. Extremely ineffective 
2. Ineffective  
3. Moderately effective  
4. Effective 
5. I don’t know 
6. No Response 
 
 
 
l__l 
 
 
109. Can you mention the three most important administrative reforms that would lead to higher efficiency 
and productivity levels? 
   l__l l__l l__l 
l__l l__l l__l 
l__l l__l l__l 
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110. Institutionalization is a required stage in administrative development. Do you think the 
institutionalization process in Jordan has been successful? 
0. No  
1. Yes 
                     2.  Incomplete Process 
                     5. Don’t know  
                     6. No response  
 
 
l__l 
 
 
 
111. How does the institution-building lead to reform and development? 
  
l__l l__l l__l 
l__l l__l l__l 
l__l l__l l__l 
 
 
112. The following are models for political systems of some countries in the Middle East. Pick the most 
suitable for Jordan and rate its suitability on the below scale from 1-6:  
Political Structures 
Not 
Suitable  
1 
Somewhat 
Suitable  
2 
 
Suitable 
3 
Very  
Suitable 
4 
Don’t 
Know 
5 
No 
Response 
6 
 
1. Parliamentary system that allows 
the nationalist, Islamic, and left 
and right wing parties to compete 
in transparent and impartial 
parliamentary elections 
       
2. Parliamentary system that allows 
only the Islamic parties to 
compete in parliamentary 
elections 
       
3. Authoritarian system controlled 
and ruled by an ultimate power 
and authority without consent or 
consideration for opposing views  
       
4. A system ruled by Islamic 
Shari’ah without any type of 
elections or political parties  
       
 
 
113. In light of your response to question 112, can you expand on your views regarding the political system 
that will best solve the problem of administrative corruption in Jordan? 
 
 
 
 
l__l 
 
 
114. What is the type of economic system that suits Jordan the most and presents solutions for the high 
levels of unemployment and poverty? 
  
l__l 
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115.a  Rate your support or opposition to women’s participation in the political, social, and economic 
            development.   
 
Type of Contribution 
Strongly 
Oppose 
1 
Somewhat 
Oppose 
2 
Moderately 
Support 
3 
Strongly 
Support 
4 
Don’t 
Know 
5 
No response 
6 
 
 
1. Political   participation 
       
I___I 
 
2. Social participation 
       
I___I 
 
3. Economic participation 
       
I___I 
 
 
115.b  If you support women’s participation in the three fields, why do you think the participation of 
Jordanian 
            women is lagging behind? 
  
              
 
l_l l_ll_l 
 
 
 
116. Have/had you ever practiced formal or informal lobbying to influence members of Parliament? 
                     0. No (proceed to Q. 118) 
                     1. Yes 
                     5. Don’t know (proceed to Q. 118) 
                     6. No response (proceed to Q. 118) 
 
 
l__l 
 
 
 
117. What were your reasons for lobbying?  
1. To implement important changes      
2. To pursue my democratic values 
3. To support Pluralism 
4. To participate in policymaking  
        5.    All the above 
 
 
l__l 
 
 
 
118. ‘Pluralism’ is the participation of all political forces in governance. Does pluralism exist under Jordan’s 
authoritative monarchical political structure? 
                0. No  
                1. Yes 
                5. Don’t know  
                6. No response  
 
 
l__l 
  
 
 
119.  Are you affiliated with a political party? 
                0. No (proceed to Q. 121) 
                1. Yes 
                5. Don’t know  
 
 
l__l 
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                6. No response 
 
120.  Which political party, do you think, has the most dedicated leadership?  
____________________________________ 
 
 
l__l l__l 
 
 
 
121.  How do you describe the different mottos, missions, and vision statements as depicted in the 
campaigning culture of political parties and Parliament members? 
1. Appealing and engaging to most Jordanians 
2. Appealing and engaging to some Jordanians 
3. Neither appealing nor engaging  
4. Used as campaign propaganda 
5. I don’t know 
6. No response 
 
 
l__l 
 
 
 
122. What are the reasons behind the weakness of political parties in Jordan? 
 
1.   ____________________________________ 
               2.     _____________________________________ 
               3.     _____________________________________ 
l_l l_ll_l 
l_l l_ll_l 
l_l l_ll_l 
 
 
 
 
123. State three elements that would activate the party system and empower political parties 
 
1.  _____________________________________ 
                        2.  _____________________________________ 
                        3.  _____________________________________ 
 
l_l l_ll_l 
l_l l_ll_l 
l_l l_ll_l 
 
 
 
124. The one-man, one-vote law empowered tribalism at the expense of the partisan structure of the 
Parliament and weakened political party and Parliament institutions. Please indicate your level of 
agreement. 
1. Strongly disagree 
2. Disagree 
3. Agree  
4. Strongly agree 
                      5. Don’t know 
        6. No response 
 
 
 
l__l 
 
 
125. Is it true that Parliament members stay connected and follow through with their promises to their 
constituencies and communities after the elections?   
 
0. No 
1. Yes 
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 5. Don’t know 
                                    6. No response 
 
 
 126. In what way do you think tribalism impacts the political and social developments in Jordan?    
             1. Positive    
             2. Negative 
             3. Positive at times and negative at others 
             5. Don’t know 
             6. No response  
 
 
 
l__l 
 
 
 
127. Why?  
 
             1. ________________________________________ 
2. ________________________________________ 
3. ________________________________________ 
 
 
l__l l__l l__l 
l__l l__l l__l 
l__l l__l l__l 
 
 
 
128. Elites’ tribal affiliations have influence on their political culture. What is your agreement level with 
this 
         statement? 
1. Strongly disagree 
2. Disagree  
3. Agree  
4. Strongly agree  
                      5.  I don’t know 
         6.  No response 
 
 
 
l_l 
 
 
129. Have you participated, donated, or done any voluntary work, or become a member of any of the 
         following voluntary organizations? 
Type of NGO Yes No  
1. Philanthropic institutions    
2. Syndicates    
3. Youth clubs    
4. Cultural organizations     
5. Sports clubs    
6. Religious organizations    
7. Family associations    
8. Cooperative groups    
9. National or international foundations    
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130. Does the government interfere in the affairs of nonprofit organizations?  
0.  No (proceed to Q. 132) 
1. Yes 
2. Sometimes 
             5.   Don’t know (proceed to Q. 132) 
             6.   No response (proceed to Q. 132) 
 
 
l__l 
 
 
 
 
131. Tell me about the government’s interference in the affairs of nonprofit organizations? 
 
            
     ________________________________________ 
     ________________________________________ 
     ________________________________________ 
 
 
 
l__l l__l l__l 
 
 
132. Do you think economic and political developments should occur together, or one should take 
         precedence because it fosters the other? 
 
1. The economic development should take precedence  
2. The political development and civil liberties should take precedence  
3. Both developments should occur simultaneously  
4. Neither, both are imposed by external powers 
5. Don’t know 
6. No response 
 
 
 
l__l l__l 
 
 
133. Why do you think this is a better development plan for Jordan? 
 
            
  ________________________________________ 
  ________________________________________ 
             ________________________________________ 
 
 
 
l__l l__l l__l 
 
 
134.a  Do you believe the Prime Minister should be elected from a Parliament majority? 
 
             0. No  
             1. Yes 
             5. Don’t know  
             6. No response 
 
l__l 
 
134.b  Why or why not? 
             ________________________________________ 
  ________________________________________ 
             ________________________________________ 
 
 
 
l__l l__l l__l 
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135. Democracy is not merely a motto; it is a way of life that serves and empowers citizens under a rule of 
law system. It assures freedoms, protects citizenship rights, and guarantees the occurrence of regular, 
  competitive, transparent, and fair elections while practicing the two freedoms of choice and press. 
  According to the above definition of democracy, how do you view the transitional process to   
  democracy in Jordan?  
 
 
1.  ____________________________________ 
                      2.   _____________________________________ 
                      3.   _____________________________________ 
 
l_l l_ll_l 
l_l l_ll_l 
l_l l_ll_l 
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Appendix D 
Descriptive Statistics Tables and Figures 
 
(Q. 112)  Democratic Governance: Political Systems 
 Figure 1 The suitability of a pluralistic parliamentary democratic political 
   system
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Figure 2 The suitability of an authoritarian political system ruled by an   
  ultimate power  
 
 
 
 
 
(Q.112.1) One-way ANOVA results for pluralistic parliamentary democratic   
  political system  
Table 1 Pluralistic parliamentary democratic by three groups of elites 
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                    SS    df            Mean Square          F               P 
Between groups     .307                2          .153                   .224        .800 
Within groups  66.333    97          .684   
Total   66.640   99   
 F (2, 97) = .224, p=ns. 
 
(Q. 112.3)        Authoritarian with ultimate power    
Table 2 Authoritarian Political System by three groups of elites 
                   SS    df            Mean Square         F             P 
Between groups     .108                2           .54                  .549        .579 
Within groups    9.532    97           .98   
Total                9.640    99   
 F (2, 97) = .549, p=ns. 
  
(Q. 112.4)      Religious non-parliamentary  
Table 3 Religious non-parliamentary rules with Shari’ah by three groups of elites   
                   SS    df            Mean Square         F             P 
Between groups     .048                2          .024                 .265        .768 
Within groups    8.862    97          .091   
Total     8.910    99   
 F (2, 97), =.265, p =ns
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Table 4  Four political systems suitability:  Mean (SD) of by three groups of elites  
 
Four political systems by  
Three Elites Groups         Mean (SD)   N 
1. Parliamentary democratic  
 
  Political Elites    3.57 (.829)  65 
  Social Elites    3.61(.839)  23 
  Economic Elites  3.42 (.793)  12 
2. Parliamentary Islamic  
 
Political Elites     1.00 (0.00)  65 
Social Elites     1.00 (0.00)  23 
Economic Elite    1.00 (0.00)  12 
 
3. Authoritarian ruled by an  
ultimate power   
 
 Political Elites                1.08 (.367)  65 
 Social Elites    1.00 (.000)  23 
 Economic Elites  1.08 (.289)  12 
4. Religious non-parliamentary  
 
 Political Elites      1.05 (.372)              65 
 Social Elites     1.00 (.000)              23 
 Economic Elites   1.00 (.000)              12 
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Table 5    Suitability percentage of four political systems – Cross Tabulation 
Four Political Systems by 
Three Groups of Elites 
Not  
Suitable   
N (%) 
Somewhat 
Suitable  
N (%) 
 
Suitable             
N (%) 
 
  Very  
Suitable  
  N (%) 
 
1. Pluralistic Parliamentary 
    Democratic 
          Political Elites 4 (6.2%) 2 (03.1%) 12(18.5%) 47 (72.3%) 
      Social Elites 1 (4.3%) 2 (08.7%)  2 (08.7%) 18 (78.3%) 
      Economic Elites 0 (0.0%) 2 (16.7%)  3 (25.0%) 07 (58.3%) 
Total % 5 (5.0%) 6 (06.0%) 17(17.0%) 72 (72.0%) 
 
2. Parliamentary Islamic 
          Political Elites 65 (100%) 0 0 0 
      Social Elites 23 (100%) 0 0 0 
      Economic Elites 12 (100%) 0 0 0 
Total % 100(100%) 0 0 0 
     3. Authoritarian Ruled by  
      an ultimate Power 
          Political Elites 62(95.0 %) 1 (01.5%) 2 (3.1%) 0 
      Social Elites 23(100. %) 0 0 0 
      Economic Elites 11(91.0 %) 1 (08.3%) 0 0 
Total % 96(96.0%) 2 (02.0%) 2 (02.0%) 0 
 
4. Religious non 
    Parliamentary                                          
         Political Elites 64 (98.5%) 0 0 1 (1.5%) 
      Social Elites 23 (100%) 0 0 0 
      Economic Elites 12 (100%) 0 0 0 
Total % 99 (99.0%) 0 0 1 (1.0%) 
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(Q. 113)  In addition, the subsequent belief question, question (113) investigated 
the best political system type for solving Jordan’s political and administrative challenges. 
The theme with the highest frequency reported by the three groups of elites was the 
“Democratic Parliamentary Pluralistic” political system.   
(Q.104.2)  The Implementation of Rule of Law 
Figure 3 Beliefs in the Supremacy of Rule of Law System by Three Groups of 
Elites
  
202 
 
Table 6  Rule of Law by three groups of elites    
                                         SS    df      Mean Square         F             P      
Between groups    5.43                2                 2.716                1.935        .150 
Within groups  136.12    97        1.403   
Total   141.56    99   
 F (2, 97) = 1.94, p=ns. 
   
Table 7 Rule of Law Means (SD) 
Three Elites Groups      Mean (SD)    N       
Political Elites                   3.32 (1.566)  65     
Social Elites                             3.22 (1.087)       23            
Economic Elites      4.00 (1.091)      12 
Total                   3.38 (1 .196)          100           
 
 The following table displays the N and percentage values for elites’ beliefs and a 
detailed distribution for the six ratings  
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Table 8 Rule of Law Supremacy – Cross Tabulation 
Beliefs in Rule of Law Supremacy 
Three Elite Groups N % 
                              Political Elites 65 65% 
       Very poor 4 6.2 
       Poor 13 20 
       Standard 22 33.8 
       Good 12 18.5 
       Very good 12 18.5 
       Excellent 2 3.1 
                                  Social Elites 23 23% 
       Very poor 1 4.3 
       Poor 4 17.4 
       Standard 10 43.5 
       Good 5 21.7 
       Very good 3 13 
       Excellent 0 0 
                                  Economic Elites 12 12% 
       Very poor 0 0 
       Poor 0 0 
       Standard 5 41.7 
       Good 3 25 
       Very good 3 25 
       Excellent 1 8.3 
   Total 100 100% 
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(Q.106.3)  Democratic governance: the coordination between public & private  
  sectors  
 
Figure 4 Attitudes towards the public/private sectors  
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Table 9 Public/private coordination by three groups of elites 
                                          SS    df      Mean Square         F             P 
Between groups     .070                2                   .035              .089         .915 
Within groups  38.090    97          .393   
Total   38.160    99   
 F (2, 97) =.089, p=ns.  
 
 
Table 10 Attitudes towards Public/Private Coordination –Means (SD) 
Three Elites Groups      Mean (SD)  N        
Political Elites                   2.74 (.644)  65   
Social Elites                             2.70 (.635)              23              
Economic Elites      2.67 (.492)              12              
Total                   2.72 (.621)               100             
 
 
 
  
206 
 
(Q 106.4)  The Coordination between public & nonprofit sectors 
 
Figure 5 Attitudes towards the public/nonprofit sectors  
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Table 11 Public/nonprofit coordination by three groups of elites 
         SS    df      Mean Square         F             P 
Between groups     .860                2                   .430              .962         .386 
Within groups  43.380    97          .447   
Total   44.240    99   
 F (2, 97) =.962, p=ns 
 
 
Table 12 Attitudes towards public/nonprofit coordination – Means (SD) 
Three Elites Groups      Mean  N        
Political Elites                   2.22 (.673)    65        
Social Elites                             2.39 (.583)              23              
Economic Elites      2.08 (.793)              12              
Total                   2.24 (.668)             100             
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(Q. 107)  Coordination among the three sectors 
 
Figure 6 The three sectors effectiveness in delivering services 
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Table 13 Beliefs in democratic governance progress – Means (SD) 
Three Elites Groups      Mean (SD)  N   
Political Elites                   2.34 (.567)    65      
Social Elites                             3.35 (.487)              23            
Economic Elites                 2.50 (.522)           12             
Total                   2.36 (.542)             100           
 
 
 
Table 14        Attitudes towards democratic governance – N(%) – Chi-square 
Three Elite Groups          Disagree % Uncertain%  Agree %     χ2            
Total 
Political            3 (4.6%)           37 (63.8%)      25(64.1)           .654 
Social                                   0 (0.0%)           15 (25.9%)           8 (20.5) 
Economic                      0 (0.0%)             6 (10.3%)           6 (15.4) 
Total            3 (3%)           58 (58%)  39 (39%)  
 100 
  χ2 (4, N=100) = 2.44, p = .654. 
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Q. 134.a)  King’s Prerogative vs. Electing the Prime Minister 
   
Figure 7 Electing verses appointing the Prime Minister  
 
 
 
  
 
 
  
211 
 
 
 A one-way ANOVA test was used to check if there is any significant difference 
among the three means.   
Table 15 Electing verses appointing the Prime Minister Means (SD) 
Three Elites Groups    Mean (SD)   N        
Political Elites                   .46 (.502)  65    
Social Elites                             .61 (.502)               23            
Economic Elites                 .42 (.502)                12            
Total                   .49 (.502)               100          
 
Table 16        Electing verses appointing the Prime Minister – N(%) – Chi-square 
Three Elite Groups           No   %  Yes    %                     χ2              
Political             35 (53.8%)           28 (46.2%)      .414      
Social                                      9 (39.1%)           14 (60.9%) 
Economic                         7 (58.3%)             5 (41.7%) 
  χ2 (2, N=100) = 1.77, p = .414.
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(Q. 134.b)  Qualitative Analysis:  Thematic Analysis: Electing the Prime Minister  
 
 
Table 17 Electing vs. Appointing the Prime Minister – N (%) 
Core Themes Political Elites     Social Elites     Economic Elites     Total  
   (N=65)        (N=23)  (N=12)         (N=100) 
Guarantees a       28            14        5                    47                
Parliamentary     43 %                  60.9%                    41.7%                47% 
Majority                     
 
Inapt Change at     26                         8                              7                     41 
the Present   40.1%                   34.8%               58.3%                41% 
             
 
Encroachment  
on King’s              11             1                              0                    12 
prerogative        16.9%                   4.3%                         0%                12%                      
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(Q. 118)  Pluralism 
Figure 8 Jordanian pluralism  
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Table 18 Pluralism Means (SD) 
Three Elites Groups     Mean   (SD)            N   
Political Elites                   .31    (.467)            64    
Social Elites                             .17    (.388)            23              
Economic Elites                 .17    (.389)            12   
Total                   .26    (.422)            99              
 
 
Table 19 Pluralism– N (%) – Chi-square 
Three Elite Groups           No      (%)        Yes    (%)                       χ2       
Political             44    (68.8%)         20 (31.3%)       .312       
Social                                    19    (82.6%)           4 (17.4%) 
Economic                       10    (83.3%)         2 (16.7%) 
Within Three groups  73    (73.7%)       26 (26.3%)             
  χ2 (2, N=99) =2.33, p=.312
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(Q. 135)  Qualitative Analysis: Democracy in Jordan 
The beliefs of elites in the transition to democracy are assessed in this open-ended 
question that inquired about the necessary reforms for the success of the democratization 
process. The three most frequent core themes were enforcing a “rule of law system,”  
“social reforms,” and a serious implementation of “political reforms.” Several 
subordinate themes to these three core themes are displayed in the tables below: 
 
Table 20 Core and Subsequent Themes: Democracy in Jordan 
Core Themes                                                     Frequency  
Rule of Law System                 63 
Social Development/Democracy a Way of Life     59 
Political Development                              44 
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Table 21 Democracy in Jordan: Core and Subordinate Themes  
Theme 1 Theme 2 Theme 3 
Elites’ 
Quotations from 
the Survey 
Rule of law system 
  
Legislative 
amendments 
Reforming 
the 
Parliament 
Amending 
legislations and 
implementing 
reforms empowers 
all institutions, 
particularly the 
Parliament. 
    
Social 
development/democracy 
a way of life 
 
Curriculum 
change 
Empowering 
nationalism 
& Patriotism 
Infusing schools’ 
curricula with 
democratic values 
to teach new 
generations the 
meaning of 
nationalism and 
patriotism. 
    
Political development 
 
Political 
participation 
Activating 
political 
parties  
The political 
development 
enhances political 
participation and 
restores freedoms 
and political party 
activities. 
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(Q. 101)  Elites’ self-determination and impact on policymaking 
 
Figure 9 Estimated marginal means for elites' self determination and liberty 
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(Q. 101)  Elites’ self-determination and impact on policymaking 
Table 22 Elites’ impact on policymaking – Means (SD)  
Three Elites Groups      Mean  N           
Political Elites                    .94 (.242)  65             
Social Elites                              .95 (.213)  22                              
Economic Elites                  .67 (.492)  12                          
Total                    .91 (.289)  96                              
 
Table 23 Elites’ impact on policymaking – N (%) – Chi-square 
 
Three Elite Groups          No (%)  Yes (%)    χ2         Total 
Political            4 (44.4)    61 (67.8)         .008              65 
Soc                                       1 (11.1)               21 (23.3)             22 
Econ            4 (44.4)         8 (8.9)            12 
 The test indicates a significant difference at:  χ2 (2, N=99) = 9.76, p = .008  
 
(Q. 102)  Elites’ accomplishment of political goals is measured on a 4-point scale of  
Table 24 Accomplishment of Political Goals by Three Groups of Elites 
                    SS    df     Mean Square             F              P 
Between groups     .376     2                 .188                   .341         .712 
Within groups             47.422             86                 .551   
Total              47.798             88   
 F (2, 86) = .341, p=ns 
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(Q.103.1) Value of civil rights and freedoms  
 
Figure 10 Civil rights and freedom Value by the three groups of elites 
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Table 25  Civil Rights and Freedoms by Three Groups of Elites 
 
                                         SS    df      Mean Square         F             P 
Between groups    .384                2        .192    .194        .824 
Within groups  96.256    97        .992   
Total   96.640    99  
 F (2, 97) = .194, p=ns. 
 
Table 26 Civil Rights and Freedoms Value – Cross Tabulation 
Three Elites Groups   N   %  
Political Elites     65  
 Extremely unimportant 03  04.6%   
 Unimportant   06  09.2%       
 Somewhat important  19  29.2% 
 Important   23  35.4% 
 Extremely important   14  21.5%  
Social Elites    23 
 Extremely unimportant 00 00.0%   
 Unimportant   03 13.0%       
 Somewhat important  06 26.1% 
 Important   13 56.5% 
 Extremely important   01 04.3%        
Economic Elites   12   
 Extremely unimportant 01 08.3%   
 Unimportant   00 00.0%       
 Somewhat important  04 33.3% 
 Important   07 58.3% 
 Extremely important  00 00.0%
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 (Q.104.3)  Free Access to Information    
Figure 11 Free accesses to information by three groups of elites 
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Table 27 Free access to information- One way ANOVA 
                                         SS    df      Mean Square           F             P 
Between groups    .142                2         .071     .056           .945 
Within groups  121.968   97       1.255   
Total   122.110   99  
 F (2, 97) = .056, p=ns. 
 
Table 28 Beliefs in the free access to information – Cross Tabulation 
Three Elites Groups   N   %  
Political Elites   65 
 Very poor   01  01.5%   
 Poor    03  04.6%       
 Standard   17  26.2% 
 Good    14  21.5% 
 Very good    23  35.4% 
 Excellent   07 10.8% 
Social Elites    23      
 Very poor   00  00.0%   
 Poor    02  08.7%       
 Standard   03  13.0% 
 Good    08  34.8% 
 Very good    08  34.8% 
 Excellent   02  08.7% 
Economic Elites   12    
 Very poor   00  00.0%   
 Poor    01  08.3%       
 Standard   01  08.3% 
 Good    06  50.0% 
 Very good    04  33.3% 
 Excellent   00  00.0%
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 (Q. 105)  Freedom of Opinion: Ideological Backgrounds  
 The freedom of opinion and ideological affiliation is tested in question (105) that 
provides the respondents with three different ideologies to choose the one that applies 
ideologically to them. The three ideologies were identified to the interviewees during the 
interviews as follows: Liberal values include the appreciation for free and fair elections, 
civil rights, freedoms, the rejection of absolute monarchy and the rejection of state religion. 
Conservative ideological background is the appreciation for traditionalism, rejection of 
modernity, and supporting the continuation of the status quo, which may also express the 
appreciation for the regime’s notion of “Jordan First.” The independent ideological 
background is described as free of control, not influenced by a particular opinion, conduct, 
or thinking.  
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Table 29 Ideological backgrounds Means (SD)  
Three Elites Groups      Mean (SD)    N        
Political Elites                   1.75 (.867)    65        
Social Elites                             1.17 (.388)                 23              
Economic Elites      1.42 (.669)               12              
Total                   1.58 (.794)                         100             
  
 
 
 
 
 
 A Chi-square test was run to confirm this significance: 
Table 30 Elites’ ideological backgrounds – N(%) – Chi-square 
Three Elite Groups       Political        Social     Economic      χ2    Total 
       N (%)         N (%)        N (%) 
Liberal                34 (52.3%)       19 (82.6%)         8 (66.7%)    .032       65 
Independent                  13 (20.0%)         4 (17.4%)       3 (25.0%)                 23 
Conservative                 18 (27.7%)         0 (0.0%)        1 (8.3%)                 12 
  
 χ2 (4, N=100) =10.53, p < .05
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Public Sector Reform 
(Q. 104.1)  Administrative reforms 
Figure 12 Minimizing bureaucracy and reforming administrative statutes  
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Table 31 Administrative reforms by three groups of elites 
                    SS    df     Mean Square             F              P 
Between groups      .349     2                 .174                   .145          .865 
Within groups            116.891            97              1.205   
Total             117.240            99   
 F (2, 97) = .145, p =ns. 
 
Table 32 Beliefs in administrative reforms – Means (SD) 
Three Elites Groups      Mean (SD)  N        
Political Elites                   2.75 (1.199)     65        
Social Elites                             2.78   (.850)             23                
Economic Elites                 2.58   (.950)            12             
Total                   2.74 (1.088)          100             
 
 The table below indicates the frequencies of the six ratings provided in the 
question by the three groups of elites. 
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Table 33 Administrative reforms– Cross Tabulation 
Elites’ Beliefs                                                                                N           % 
Political Elites 65 65% 
       Very poor 12 18.5 
       Poor 14 21.5 
       Standard 22 33.8 
       Good 13 20 
       Very good 3 4.6 
       Excellent 1 1.5 
   Social Elites 23 23% 
       Very poor 1 4.3 
       Poor 8 34.8 
       Standard 9 39.1 
       Good 5 21.7 
       Very good 0 0 
       Excellent 0 0 
   Economic Elites 12 12% 
       Very poor 2 16.7 
       Poor 2 16.7 
       Standard 7 58.3 
       Good 1 8.3 
       Very good 0 0 
       Excellent 0 0 
   Total 100 100% 
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 (Q. 106.1)  Implementing transparency and accountability 
Figure 13 Transparency and accountability 
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Table 34 Transparency and Accountability by three groups of elites 
                    SS    df     Mean Square             F              P 
Between group                5 .277      2             2.639                  5.206        .007 
Within groups     49.163            97               .507   
Total      54.440            99   
 F (2, 97) = 5.206, p < .05  
 
Table 35 Transparency and accountability – Chi-square 
            Value     df  χ2 
Pearson Chi-Square  13.737   6          .033 
 χ2 (6, N=100) =13.74, p = .033. The Chi-square result confirms the statistic 
significance by .033. The probability of significance = (1-.033) = .967 = 96.7%.  
 
Table 36 Transparency and accountability –Means (SD)  
Three Elites Groups      Mean (SD)   N        
Political Elites                    2.51 (.753)     65       
Social Elites                              2.00 (.522)              23             
Economic Elites                  2.08 (.793)              12            
Total                    2.34 (.742)              100           
  
230 
 
Table 37 Transparency and accountability – Cross Tabulation 
Three Elite Groups                                                                   N              %   
Political 65 65% 
              Very unfavorable 5 7.7 
              Unfavorable 27 41.5 
               Neutral 28 43.1 
               Favorable 5 7.7 
 
    Social 23 23% 
              Very unfavorable 3 13 
              Unfavorable 17 73 
               Neutral 3 13 
               Favorable 0 0 
 
    Economic 12 12% 
              Very unfavorable 3 25 
              Unfavorable 5 41.7 
               Neutral 4 33.3 
               Favorable 0 0 
 
    Total 100 100 
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 (Q. 106.2)  Corruption Control 
Figure 14 Corruption control 
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Table 38 Corruption control by three groups of elites 
                    SS    df     Mean Square             F              P 
Between group                4.655      2             2.328                  4.522        .013 
Within groups     49.935            97               .515   
Total      54.590            99   
  F (2, 97) = 4.52, p < .05.  
 
Table 39 Corruption control –Means (SD)  
Three Elites Groups      Mean (SD)   N        
Political Elites                    2.45 (.771)     65       
Social Elites                              2.04 (.475)              23             
Economic Elites                  1.92 (.793)              12              
Total                    2.29 (.743)              100            
 
 
Table 40 Corruption control –Chi-square 
            Value     df  χ2   
Pearson Chi Square  15.545   6          .016 
 χ2 (6, N=100) = 15.55, p= .016. 
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Table 41 Corruption control – Cross Tabulations 
Elites’ Beliefs N % 
 Political 65 65% 
              Very unfavorable 6 9.2 
              Unfavorable 29 44.6 
               Neutral 25 38.5 
               Favorable 5 7.7 
 
    Social 23 23% 
              Very unfavorable 2 8.7 
              Unfavorable 18 78.3 
               Neutral 3 13 
               Favorable 0 0 
 
    Economic 12 12% 
              Very unfavorable 4 33.3 
              Unfavorable 5 41.7 
               Neutral 3 25 
               Favorable 0 0 
 
    Total 100 100 
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(Q .106.5)  Ending Nepotism 
 
Figure 15 Ending nepotism 
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Table 42   Ending nepotism by three groups of elites  
 
                                          SS    df      Mean Square         F             P 
Between groups     .520                2                   .260              .442         .644 
Within groups  57.040    97          .588   
Total   57.560    99   
 F (2, 97) = .442, p=ns 
 
 
Table 43 Ending nepotism –Means (SD) 
Three Elites Groups      Mean (SD)    N       
Political Elites                   2.43 (.770)               65        
Social Elites                             2.26 (.689)               23              
Economic Elites      2.33 (.888)               12           
Total                   2.38 (.763)             100             
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 (Q. 106.6)  Merit system  
Figure 16  Frequencies of attitudes towards a merit system by three groups of   
  elites 
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Table 44 Merit system by three groups of elites 
 
                                          SS    df      Mean Square         F             P 
 
Between groups     .249                2                   .125              .229         .795 
Within groups  52.751    97          .544  
Total   53.000    99   
 F (2, 97) =.229, p=ns.  
 
Table 45  Merit system – Means (SD) 
Three Elites Groups      Mean (SD)    N        
Political Elites                   2.91 (.785)               65        
Social Elites                             2.83 (.717)               23              
Economic Elites      3.00 (.426)               12               
Total                   2.90 (.732)              100             
  
 
  
  
238 
 
 (Q. 108)  Financial Disclosure Law 
 Elites were asked another question about corruption control in terms of a recent 
law that was issued enforcing transparency and holding Parliament members and those 
who occupy high incumbencies in the government accountable. This value question 
inquired about the effectiveness of “Financial Disclosure Law” and if it controls 
corruption and ensures accountability and transparency in the political system. The 
respondents were asked to rate the value or effectiveness of the law using a 4-point scale 
(1=extremely ineffective to 4=effective).  The provisions of this law shall apply to the 
following positions: prime minister and cabinet; senate president; speaker of the house 
and members of both houses; judges; heads of official public institutions; military and 
civilian managers; senior level staff; officials in public institutions and ambassadors; 
mayors, heads, and members of the large municipalities; heads and members of bidding 
and procurement of civil and military committees; officials of government, public 
institutions, and municipalities; incumbents of cabinets; heads of the Boards of Directors 
of companies that contribute 50% more than the government.   
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Figure 17  Financial disclosure law 
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Table 46   Financial disclosure law by three groups of elites 
                                         SS    df      Mean Square         F             P 
Between groups     .192                2        .096    .113        .893 
Within groups  76.539    90        .850   
Total   76.731    92  
 F (2, 90) = .113, p=.ns 
 
Table 47 Financial disclosure law – Means (SD) 
Three Elites Groups      Mean (SD)   N        
Political Elites                   2.31 (.969)              59        
Social Elites                             2.27 (.883)              22              
Economic Elites      2.17 (.718)              12              
Total                   2.28 (.913)               93             
 
 (Q. 109)  Qualitative Analysis:  Efficiency and productivity Levels  
 The following reforms were categorized as core themes and classified under 
(Theme 1):  improving individuals’ performance, applying the hiring codes and conducts, 
enforcing transparency and accountability, reinforcing the democratic values into the 
organizational culture, reforming managements, organizational development, and policy 
coordination. But, the core themes that registered high frequencies in this analysis were 
these three following themes: 1) improving the individual’s performance, 2) applying the 
hiring codes and conducts, 3) enforcing transparency and accountability. See below 
tables for core and subordinate themes: 
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Table 48 Core themes of improving efficiency 
Core Themes                                                   Frequency  
Improving the individual’s performance                    128 
Applying the hiring codes and conducts           44 
Enforcing transparency and accountability                                    28 
 
   
 In addition, in their explanations and elaborations, the respondents underlined 
several subordinate and secondary themes that were categorized as (Theme 2) and 
(Theme 3). For example, training, education, incentives, assigning retreats, or improving 
the work environment were all subordinate themes to the most frequent core theme of 
improving the individual’s performance. The vocational training theme and the 
enforcement of the national allegiance through schools’ curricula and including the 
educational level of candidates as a criterion for certain job positions were classified 
secondary themes (Theme 3). 
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The following is a demonstration of core and subordinate themes: 
 
 
Table 49  Core & subordinate themes of efficiency and productivity levels 
Theme 1  Theme 2 Theme 3 Elites’ Quotations  
       from the Survey 
Improving 
individuals' 
performances Training 
Vocational 
Training 
Managers and all employees 
should be assigned training 
and vocational training 
sessions to stay efficient and 
productive. 
    
Abiding by the 
organizational codes 
& conducts  
Merit 
system KSAs 
Applicants should be 
selected lawfully & hired 
based on their qualifications, 
or their knowledge, skills, 
and abilities; not on their 
personal relations with a 
parliament member or a 
minister 
    
Enforcing 
transparency and 
accountability   
Improving the levels of 
proficiency and efficiency by 
holding officers accountable 
and enforce transparency. 
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The distribution of frequencies:  
 
Table 50 Identification of core themes 
Core Themes  Political Elites  Social Elites   Economic Elites     
  
      (N=65)     (N=23)       (N=12)                  
Improving performances       7                               33                    17     
            120.0 %     143.2%     141.6% 
                     
Hiring codes & conducts       31                              9           4      
         47.7%                          39.1%                        33.3% 
                 
Transparency           20                                 5                              3                      
& Accountability       30.8%                           21.7%                  25.0%                
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(Q. 110) Institution-building 
Table 51 Beliefs in Institution-building – N(%) – Chi-square 
Elite Groups         No (%)       Yes (%)      Incomplete        χ2               
Political                  29   (46) 12 (19)       22 (34.9)         .027           
Soc                                             11   (47)  2 (8.7)       10 (43.5)  
Econ                    2 (16.7) 00 (00)       10 (83.3) 
 Chi square result indicates significance: χ2 (4, N=100) = 10.93, p < .05. 
 
Table 52 Institution-building – Means (SD) 
Three Elites Groups          Mean                   N        
Political Elites                    .89 (.900)               63        
Social Elites                              .96 (.976)                23             
Economic Elites                1.67 (.778)                12            
Total                  1.00 (.931)                98  
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(Q. 111)    Qualitative Analysis:  Attitudes towards institution-building 
 Table 53 Institution-building frequency of core themes  
Core Themes                                        Frequency  
Seriousness in Implementing Reforms               57 
Decreasing the Authority of the Royal Court                    33 
Enforcing Democratic Values          22      
 
 
 The below table demonstrates the frequency distribution of core and subordinate 
themes: 
Table 54 Identification of core themes by three groups of elites 
Core Themes  Political Elites  Social Elites   Economic Elites      
      (N=65)     (N=23)       (N=12)                  
Serious implementation       31           17             7                          
of reforms                    47.7 %                        73.9%                         58.3 %        
       
Reducing Royal               30            9                        3                           
Court’s power                    46.2%                          39.1%                         25.0%       
              
Enforcing democratic         13                       4                                   5                                 
values                               20.0%                           17.4%                          41.6%                                
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Political Participation 
(Q. 104.6)  Political Party Reform Policy 
 
Figure 19 Political party affiliation by three groups of elites 
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Table 55 Political party reform policy- One way ANOVA       
                                         SS    df      Mean Square         F             P      
Between groups     .119                2                  .060               .095        .910 
Within groups  60.921    97         .628   
Total   61.040    99   
  F (2, 97) = .095, p=ns 
 
 
 
Table 56  Political party reform policy –Means (SD)  
Three Elites Groups      Mean (SD)    N        
Political Elites                   1.62 (.722)               65        
Social Elites                             1.70 (.926)               23              
Economic Elites      1.67 (.888)               12            
Total                   1.64 (.785)             100             
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Table 57 Political party reform policy – Cross Tabulation 
Three Elites Groups   N   %  
Political Elites   65  
 Very poor   34  52.3%   
 Poor    22  22.8%       
 Standard   9  13.8% 
 Good    00     00    
 Very good    00     00    
 Excellent   00     00    
Social Elites    23      
 Very poor   12  52.2%   
 Poor    08  34.8%       
 Standard   01  04.3% 
 Good    02  08.7% 
 Very good    00     00    
 Excellent   00     00        
Economic Elites   12    
 Very poor   06  50.0%   
 Poor    05  41.7%       
 Standard   00    00 
 Good    01  08.3% 
 Very good    00     00    
 Excellent   00     00    
Total               100 
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 (Q. 119)  Elites’ affiliation with political party  
Figure 20 Elites’ affiliations with political parties 
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Table 58 Elites’ affiliation with political party –Means (SD) 
Three Elites Groups      Mean (SD)            N        
Political Elites                   2.74 (.644)             65        
Social Elites                             2.70 (.635)             23              
Economic Elites      2.67 (.492)             12             
Total                   2.72 (.621)            100             
 
Table 59 Elites’ affiliation with political party –N(%) –Chi-square  
Three Elite Groups       No        Yes  χ2  Total 
Political            55 (61.8)            10 (90.0%)             .150      
Social                        22 (24.7%)          1 (9.1%) 
Economic           12 (100%)     0   (0%) 
Total                     89 (89%)    11 (11%)              100 
 χ2 (2, N=100) = 3.8 p=ns
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(Q. 121) Campaigning culture: mottos, missions, and vision statements  
 
Figure 21    Value distribution of elites’ campaigning culture  
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Table 60 Campaigning culture by three groups of elites 
                                       SS             df        Mean Square       F            P 
Between groups     .396                2               .198           .159         .854 
Within groups           119.786    96             1.248   
Total                      120.182               98   
 F (2, 96) = .159, p =ns 
 
 
Table 61  Campaigning culture –Mean (SD)  
Three Elites Groups       Mean (SD)  N 
Political Elites                    2.75 (1.141) 64 
Social Elites                    2.70 (1.105) 23 
Economic Elites                   2.92 (0 .996) 12 
Total                     2.76 (1.107) 99 
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Table 62 Campaigning culture – Cross Tabulation 
 
Three Elites Groups       N   %  
Political Elites                    64  
 Appealing and engaging to most Jordanians  09 14.1%  
 Appealing and engaging to some Jordanians  24 37.5% 
  Neither Appealing nor engaging          05 07.8%  
  
 Used as campaign propaganda   26 40.6% 
 
Social Elites                   23         
 Appealing and engaging to most Jordanians  03 13.0% 
 Appealing and engaging to some Jordanians  09 39.1% 
  Neither Appealing nor engaging   03 13.0% 
 Used as campaign propaganda   08 34.8% 
 
 
 Economic Elites                  12 
 Appealing and engaging to most Jordanians   0 00.0% 
 Appealing and engaging to some Jordanians  06 50.0% 
  Neither Appealing nor engaging   01 08.3% 
 Used as campaign propaganda   05 41.7% 
 
Total          99 
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 (Q. 122) Qualitative Thematic Analysis: Political Party Weakness 
 
In the open-ended question (122), elites expressed their beliefs of the weakness of 
political parties. The below table displays the core themes that registered the highest 
frequencies: 
 
Table 63 Frequencies of core themes: Political party weakness 
Core Themes                      Frequency 
Authoritarianism               52 
Absence of Programs                51 
Past Failures                                    34                
 
   
 The frequency distribution of core and subordinate themes in percentages: 
 
Table 64 Core themes for political party weakness 
Core Themes      Political Elites   Social Elites   Economic Elites      Total           
   (N=65)          (N=23)            (N=12)               (N=100)     
 
Authoritarianism   31              15              6     52 
                47.7 %           65.2%           50%                    52% 
 
Absence of Programs  30                   15              6     51 
           46.2%              65.2%              50%               51%  
 
Past Failures             21                    9                 4               34                          
           32.3%             39.1%             33.3%                  34% 
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 (Q. 123) Qualitative Analysis Activating and Empowering Political Parties 
 
A variation of reforms was illustrated by the respondents and sorted in the 
following most frequent core themes as demonstrated in the below table: 
 
Table 65 Core themes for activating and empowering political parties  
     
Core Themes                                                        Frequency  
Reforming Political Parties                  86 
Legislative Amendment                          44     
Raising Awareness Levels                                  40 
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Elites’ elaborations on core and subordinate themes: 
Table 66 Activating Political Parties: Core and Subordinate Themes  
Theme 1 Theme 2 Theme 3 
Elites’ Quotations from 
the Survey 
Reforming political 
parties 
 
  
Activating 
political party 
programs 
 
 
Emphasizing 
the national 
roles of 
political parties 
 
The absence of programs 
weakens the national 
roles of political party 
institutions; therefore, 
they must be allowed to 
pursue the political, 
social, and economic 
goals on their agendas. 
    
Legislative 
amendment 
 
Amending 
political party 
law 
Voiding out 
the One Man 
One Vote Law 
 
The one-man, one-vote 
rule leads to 
disproportionate results; 
election laws must be 
based on the population 
in each district not on 
who populates the 
district. 
    
Raising awareness 
levels 
 
 
 
 
Understanding 
the negative 
effect of 
tribalism on 
political parties 
 
 The tribal affiliation 
should never replace the 
political party affiliation. 
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(Q. 124)  Electoral laws: One-man, One-vote 
  
Figure 22 One-man, One-vote Laws 
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A One-way ANOVA testing differences between elites’ beliefs:   
Table 67 One-man, one-vote by three groups of elites 
                                     SS       df      Mean Square        F           P 
Between groups 1.187         2          .594              .787       .458 
Within groups            72.449        96          .755   
Total                        73.636        98   
 F (2, 96) = .787 p=ns. 
 
 
Table 68  One-man, One-vote law –Mean (SD)  
Three Elites Groups       Mean (SD)  N 
Political Elites                    3.55 (.952)     65  
Social Elites                    3.61(.783)  23     
Economic Elites                   3.91(.302)  12  
Total                     3.61(.867)            100    
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Table 69 One-man, One-vote – Cross Tabulation 
Elites’ beliefs in the One-man, One-vote Law          N                % 
Political 65 65% 
              Strongly disagree  6 9.2 
              Disagree  3 4.6 
              Agree  5 7.7 
              Strongly agree 51 78.5 
 
    Social 23 23% 
              Strongly disagree  1 4.3 
              Disagree 17 73 
              Agree  4 17.4 
              Strongly agree 17 73.9 
 
    Economic 12 12% 
              Strongly disagree 0 0 
              Disagree 0 0 
              Agree  1 9.1 
              Strongly agree 10 90.9 
 
    Total 100 100 
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 (Q. 116)  Lobbying 
 
Figure 23 Practicing lobbying distribution  
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Table 70 Practicing lobbying – N (%) – Chi-square 
Three Elite Groups         No (%)     Yes (%)    χ2 Total    
           
Political              9 (13.8)     56 (86.2)       .009 
Social                                3 (13.0)                    20 (87.0) 
Economic                   6 (50.0)             6 (50.0) 
Total                      18 (18)                   82 (82.0)                100 
  χ2 (2, N=100) =9.45, p < .05 
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(Q. 117)  Lobbying Reasons 
Figure 24 Elites’ reasons for lobbying? 
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Table 71 Lobbying reasons by three groups of elites 
 
                    SS    df    Mean Square        F              P 
Between groups    3.608   2                1.804           .738         .481 
Within groups   193.078           79               2.444   
Total   1 96.695           81   
 F (2, 79) = .738, p=ns 
 
Table 72 Lobbying reasons Cross-Tabulation 
Three Elites Groups     N     %  
Political Elites      56 68.3% 
 To implement important changes   10 18.0% 
            To pursue my democratic values  00  00 
 To support pluralism     00   00 
 To participate in policy making   11  20.0% 
            All the above                                                   35       63.0% 
Social Elites      20        24.4% 
 To implement important changes  06   30.0%  
 To pursue my democratic values  00    00 
 To support pluralism     00    00   
 To participate in policy making             00         00 
 All the above     14  70.0% 
 Economic Elites     06  07.3% 
 To implement important changes   00 00 
 To pursue my democratic values  00 00 
 To support pluralism     00 00 
 To participate in policy making       02 33.0% 
 All the above        04 67.0% 
Total        82 100
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Social Development 
(Q.103.2)  Social change through modernizing schools’ curricula 
Figure 25 School curricula reform
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A one-way ANOVA test result was not significant: 
Table 73 School curricula reform- One way ANOVA 
             SS  df    Mean Square        F              P 
Between groups     1.765   2                .882             .541           .584 
Within groups     158.19         97              1.631   
Total      159.96         99   
 F (2, 97) =.541, p=ns 
 
Table 74 School curricula reform –Means (SD) 
Three Elites Groups      Mean (SD)      N       
Political Elites                   3.08 (1.315)    65   
Social Elites                             2.78 (1.126)                23              
Economic Elites                 3.17 (1.337)                12             
Total                   3.02 (1.271)                       100             
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Table 75 Importance of education policy reform & school curricula   
 values – Cross Tabulation 
Modernizing School Curricula Value                     N                   % 
Political Elites   65 65% 
       Extremely unimportant 6  6.0 
       Unimportant 20 20 
       Somewhat important 17 17. 
       Important 7 7.0 
       Extremely important 15 15. 
   Social Elites 23 23% 
       Extremely unimportant 3 3.0 
       Unimportant 7 7.0 
       Somewhat important 6 6.0 
       Important 6 6.0 
       Extremely important 1 1.0 
   Economic Elites 12 12% 
       Extremely unimportant 2 2.0 
       Unimportant 1 1.0 
       Somewhat important 4 4.0 
       Important 3 3.0 
       Extremely important 2 2.0 
   Total 100 100% 
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 (Q. 103.5)  Importance of tribal values to policymakers 
Figure 26 Tribal values by three groups of elites 
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Table 76 Tribal values- One way ANOVA  
                    SS    df     Mean Square             F              P 
Between groups     4.786   2                 2.393               2.156         .121 
Within groups  107.654            97                1.110  
Total   112.440            99   
  F (2, 97) = 2.16, p=ns. 
 
Table 77 Importance of tribal values to policymakers – Means (SD) 
Three Elites Groups      Mean   N       
Political Elites                   4.18 (1.171)    65        
Social Elites                             4.70  (.765)            23                
Economic Elites                 4.50   (.798)            12           
Total                   4.34 (1.066)           100             1.066 
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Table 78 The tribal values by three elite groups                                     
  Elites’ Tribal Values   N % 
Political Elites    65 
 Extremely unimportant 04  06.2%   
 Unimportant   02  03.1%       
 Somewhat important  09  13.8% 
 Important   13  20.0% 
 Extremely important   37  56.9%   
Social Elites    23      
 Extremely unimportant 00 00.0%   
 Unimportant   01 04.3%       
 Somewhat important  01 04.3% 
 Important   02 08.7% 
 Extremely important   19 82.6%        
Economic Elites   12    
 Extremely unimportant 00 00.0%   
 Unimportant   00 00.0%       
 Somewhat important  02 16.7% 
 Important   02 16.7% 
 Extremely important  08 66.7% 
Total               100 100% 
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 (Q. 126)  Tribal impact on development  
Figure 27 Beliefs distribution of tribal impact on development
  
 
Table 79 Tribal impact on development – Means (SD) 
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Three Elites Groups      Mean (SD)    N  
Political Elites                   2.23 (.702)       65       
Social Elites                             2.43 (.662)               23               
Economic Elites                 2.25 (.622)              12                
Total                   2.28 (.638)                          100              
 
 
Table 80 Beliefs in tribalism impact on development – Cross     
  Tabulation  
 
Tribalism Impact                                          N            % 
 
Political 65   65% 
              Positive 10 15.4% 
              Negative 30 46.2% 
              Positive/Negati                                 25      38.5% 
Social 23   23% 
              Positive 02 08.7% 
              Negative 09 39.1% 
              Positive/Negative                                                                                     12 52.2%
 Economic 12   12% 
 
             Positive  01 
                             
08.3% 
              Negative  07 58.3% 
              Positive/Negati                                 04    33.3% 
 Total 100 100% 
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Table 81 Tribalism impact on development– N (%) – Chi-square 
Elite Groups       Positive (%)   Negative (%)     Pos/Neg (%)    χ2 Total    
           
Political             10 (15)              30 (86.2)             25(39)    .009 
Social                  2 (9.0)               9 (87.0)  12 (52) 
Economic           1 (8.0)     7 (50.0)    4 (33) 
 
Total             13 (13%)            46 (82%)           41 (41%)   100 
  
  χ2 (4, N=100) =.659, p <ns 
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(Q. 127)  Qualitative analysis:  Reasons behind tribalism impact on development 
Table 82 Frequencies of core themes: tribalism impact 
Core Themes                                            Frequency  
Sociopolitical imbalances & disloyalty           49 
Compound impact            37 
Smooth developments           14        
 
 
Elites’ elaborations on core and subordinate themes: 
 
 Table 83  Tribalism impact on development: core and subordinate themes  
Theme 1 Theme 2 Theme 3 
Elites’ Quotations 
from the Survey 
Hindrance &  
regression 
Tribalism 
delays 
democratic 
governance 
 Loyalty for the tribe 
overcomes the 
national loyalty, and 
tribal rules 
overcome the rule 
of law; it creates 
fanaticism, 
extremism, and 
spreads corruption. 
    
Confuses  
Loyalty 
Substitutes for 
political parties 
and 
Nationalism 
Weakens  
Modernity 
Fills the gap that the 
absent political 
parties could not 
fill, but it weakens 
the modern state 
and generates non-
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democratic 
measures. 
    
Enhancing 
development 
Tribalism 
strengthens the 
social cohesion 
 Tribalism enhances 
its members’ 
stability, solidarity, 
unity, economic 
situations; it 
controls crime. 
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Table 84 Tribalism impact on development – N (%)  
Core Themes  Political Elites  Social Elites   Economic Elites     
  
      (N=65)     (N=23)       (N=12)                  
Hindrance and       30       11           8                                          
regression             46.2 %                         47.8%                            66.6  
 
Confused                  25                                9                                     3                           
Loyalty                38.5%                           39.1%                  25.0 
 
Enhancing                        10         3                                      1                          
Development                  5.4%                          13.0%                               8.3%                            
 
 
 
(Q. 128)  Tribalism influence on elites’ political culture 
 
Table 85 Tribal influence on elites’ political culture by three groups of elites 
 
                    SS    df     Mean Square             F              P 
Between groups      .747    2                 .374                 .436         .648 
Within groups     82.243            96                .857   
Total      82.990            98   
 F (2, 96) = .436, p=ns 
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Figure 28 Tribal influence on elites’ political culture 
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Table 86 Tribal influence on elites’ political culture: Means (SD) 
Three Elites Groups      Mean (SD)    N  
Political Elites                   3.06 (.924)      64         
Social Elites                             3.09 (1.041)              23            
Economic Elites                 3.33 (.651)               12               
Total                   3.10 (.920)               99                
  
 
Table 87 Tribal influence on elites’ political culture –Cross Tabulation 
Elites’ Values on Tribal Influence                             N           % 
Political 64 64% 
              Strongly disagree   5   5.1 
              Disagree 10 10.1 
              Agree 25 25.3 
              Strongly agree 24 24.2 
 
    Social 23  23% 
              Strongly disagree   3   3.0 
              Disagree   2   2.0 
              Agree   8   8.1 
              Strongly agree 10 10.1 
 
    Economic 12 12% 
              Strongly disagree   0    0 
              Disagree   1 1.0 
              Agree   6 6.1 
              Strongly agree   5 5.1 
 
    Total 99 100% 
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(Q. 103.4)  Importance of religious values in social development 
Figure 29 Religious values by three groups of elites 
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Table 88 Religious values- One way ANOVA  
                    SS    df    Mean Square             F                P 
Between groups    4.976   2                2.488                 3.040         .052 
Within groups    79.384            97                 .818  
Total      84.360           99   
 F (2, 97) = 3.04, p=ns 
  
Table 89 Importance of Religious Values – Means (SD)  
Three Elites Groups      Mean (SD)   N       
Political Elites                   4.26 (1.004)    65        
Social Elites                             4.78 (.600)              23                
Economic Elites                 4.58 (.793)              12             
Total                   4.42 (.923)             100               
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Table 90 Importance of religious values – Cross Tabulation 
Elites’ Religious Values                                                                 N             % 
Political Elites 65 65% 
       Extremely unimportant 2 2.0 
       Unimportant 2 2.0 
       Somewhat important 8 8.0 
       Important 18 18. 
       Extremely important 35 35. 
   Social Elites 23 23% 
       Extremely unimportant 0 0 
       Unimportant 0 0 
       Somewhat important 2 2.0 
       Important 1 1.0 
       Extremely important 20 20. 
   Economic Elites 12 12% 
       Extremely unimportant 0 0 
       Unimportant 0 0 
       Somewhat important 2 2.0 
       Important 1 1.0 
       Extremely important 9 9.0 
   Total 100 100% 
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 (Q.115.a)  Women’s political, social, and economic participation  
Figure 30 Women’s Political Participation by Three Groups of Elites 
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Table 91 Women’s political participation by three groups of elites 
          SS             df      Mean Square             F              P 
Between groups       .041   2                   .020                .100          .905 
Within groups    19.669            97                  .203   
Total       19.710            99   
 F (2, 97) = .100, p=ns 
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Figure 31 Women’s social participation by three groups of elites  
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Figure 32 Women’s social participation by three groups of elites  
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Table 92 Women’s social participation-One way ANOVA                    
          SS    df     Mean Square             F              P 
Between groups       .335   2                   .167               1.239        .294 
Within groups    13.105            97                  .135   
Total       13.440            99   
 F (2, 97) = 1.24, p=ns 
 
 
Table 93 Women’s economic participation by three groups of elites 
           SS   df     Mean Square             F              P 
Between groups       .114   2                   .057                 .309        .735 
Within groups    17.886            97                  .184   
Total       18.000            99   
 F (2, 97) = .309, p=ns  
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Table 94 Women’s Political, Social, and Economic Participation Means (SD)  
The Participation of Women Mean  (SD) N 
Political Participation       
                  Political elites 3.78  (.056) 65 
                  Social elites 3.74  (.094) 23 
                  Economic elites 3.75  (.131) 12 
Total 3.77  (.045) 100 
 
Social Participation 
                    Political elites 3.86  (.348) 65 
                  Social elites 3.74  (.449) 23 
                  Economic elites 3.92  (.289) 12 
Total 3.84  (.368) 100 
 
Economic Participation 
                    Political elites 3.82  (.429) 65 
                  Social elites 3.74  (.449) 23 
                  Economic elites 3.83  (.389) 12 
 
Total 3.80  (.429) 100 
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 Table 95 Women’s Political, Social, and Economic Participation – Cross Tabulation 
  
 
Women’s Participation by 
Three Groups of Elites 
Strongly Oppose 
Moderately 
Oppose 
Moderately 
Support 
Strongly 
Support 
 
  N          % N           % N            % N           % 
1. Political Participation 
    
      Political Elites   0           0%   1          1.5%    12        18.3% 52      80.0% 
      Social Elites   0           0%   0            0%   6        26.1% 17      73.9% 
      Economic Elites   0           0%   0            0%   3        25.0 %  9       75.0 % 
      Total %   0           0%   1         1.5% 21       21.0 % 78      78.0 % 
2. Social Participation 
    
      Political Elites   0           0% 0           0%   9       13.8% 56       86.2% 
      Social Elites   0           0% 0           0%   6       26.1% 17       73.9% 
      Economic Elites   0           0% 0           0%   1       0 8.3% 11       91.7% 
      Total %   0           0% 0           0% 16      16.0% 84       84.0 % 
 3. Economic participation 
    
      Political Elites   0           0% 1         1.5% 10        15.4% 54        83.1% 
      Social Elites   0           0% 0           0%   6        26.1% 17        73.9% 
      Economic Elites   0           0% 0           0%   2        16.7% 10        83.3% 
     Total %   0           0% 1        1.5% 18        18.0 % 81        81. % 
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(Q. 115.b)  Qualitative Thematic Analysis: Women’s participation  
Table 96 Frequencies of core themes: Women’s participation 
Core Themes                                                    Frequency 
Traditionalism                    47 
Social Underdevelopment           27 
Propaganda             27                    
 
 
Table 97 Women’s participation: core and subordinate themes  
Theme 1 Theme 2 Theme 3 Elites’ Quotations 
from the Survey 
Traditionalism Obsolete traditions 
& beliefs 
 
 
 Both men and women 
believe in obsolete 
beliefs, which slow 
down the response for 
social development. 
Social 
underdevelopment 
 
 
Gender inequality/ 
patriarchy 
Female sub-
ordinance 
Women in the suburbs 
are not empowered 
due to high levels of 
patriarchy. 
Propaganda 
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Table 98 Women’s participation by three groups of elites 
Core Themes  Political Elites  Social Elites   Economic Elites      
      (N=65)     (N=23)       (N=12)                  
Traditionalism           31        9           7                                        
      47.7 %                       39.1%                            58.3%       
 
Social Under-                  12                             12                                     3                         
Development                 18.5%               52.2%       25.0% 
 
Propaganda      20        5                                      2                                                    
     30.8%                          21.7%                              16.7% 
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(Q. 104.5)  Volunteerism 
 
Figure 33 Volunteerism 
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Table 99 Volunteerism- One way ANOVA 
                    SS    df     Mean Square             F              P 
Between groups      .113    2                 .056                   .041         .960 
Within groups            133.997            97               1.381  
Total             134.110            99   
  F (2, 97) =.041, p=ns 
 
Table 100 Volunteerism - Mean (SD)  
Three Elites Groups      Mean    (SD)  N       
Political Elites                   2.83   (1.180)    65        
Social Elites                             2.87   (1.140)            23              
Economic Elites                 2.75   (1.215)            12            
Total                   2.83   (1.164)                     100             
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Table 101 Volunteerism Beliefs – Cross Tabulation 
Three Elites Groups   N   %  
Political Elites    65 
 Very poor   07  10.8%   
 Poor    21  32.3%       
 Standard   21  32.3% 
 Good    09  13.8% 
 Very good    06  09.2% 
 Excellent   01  01.5% 
Social Elites    23 
 Very poor   01  04.3%   
 Poor    10  43.5%      
 Standard   06  26.1% 
 Good    03  13.0% 
 Very good    03  13.0% 
 Excellent   00  00.0%  
Economic Elites   12  
 Very poor   01  08.3%   
 Poor    05  41.7%       
 Standard   04  33.3% 
 Good    00  00.0% 
 Very good    02  16.7% 
 Excellent   00  00.0% 
Total               100 
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(Q. 129)  Civic engagement:  involvement with voluntary organizations  
Figure 34 Cultural organizations by three groups of elites 
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Figure 35 Involvement with national and international foundations by three   
  groups of elites 
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Table 102  Affiliation with cultural and national/international –Means (SD)  
Affiliations with NGOs   Mean   (SD)  N 
Cultural Institutions 
 Political elites    1.42   (.497)  65 
 Social elites    1.04   (.209)  23 
 Economic elites               1.41   (.515)          12 
Total      1.33   (.473)            100 
 
National and International Foundations   
 Political elites    1.46    (.502)  65 
 Social elites    1.30    (.470)  23 
 Economic elites   1.00    (.000)  12 
 
Total      1.37    (.485)           100  
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 Chi-square test results confirmed the significance of the two affiliations:  
Table 103     Affiliations with cultural and national/international NGOs  
 
 NGO Type          No (%) Yes   (%)   χ2 ƞ2 
Cultural Institutions 
 Political              27 (41.5) 38   (58.5)             .004      .333 
 Social                            1 (04.3) 22   (95.7)    
 Economic               5 (41.7)    7   (58.3) 
 
National/International  
 Political  30 (46.2)   35    (53.8)  .007 .313 
 Social     7 (30.4)  16    (69.6)  
 Economic    0   (0.0)          12    (100)  
 
 Chi-square result: χ2 (2, N=100) = 11.091, p < .05 
 Chi-square result: χ2 (2, N=100) = 9.809,   p < .05  
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 (Q. 130)  Government interference in NGO affairs 
Figure 36 Government interference in NGO affairs by three groups of elites 
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Table 104 Government interference in NGO affairs – Means (SD) 
Three Elites Groups      Mean (SD)    N       
Political Elites                     .72 (.761)        65        
Social Elites                             1.13 (.751)               23         
Economic Elites                   .83 (.853)               12   
         
Total                    .83 (.779)                          100              
  
Table 105 Government interference in NGO affairs – N (%) – Chi-square 
Elite Groups       Never (%) Always (%) Sometimes (%)     χ2    Total    
           
Political            30 (47)    5 (21)               5 (41)           .300       40  
Social                    23 (35)       10 (44)               4 (33)               37 
Economic       12 (19)         8 (35)         3 (25)                         23                           
Total              100      
  χ2 (4, N=100) =4.88, p < .05 
 
(Q. 131)  Qualitative Thematic Analysis: Government Interference in  
 NGO Affairs 
 Most elites consider that “authoritarianism/national security,” is the core reason 
behind interfering in the affairs of voluntary organizations. This core theme occurred by 
56% across the sample.  
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Economic Development 
 (Q. 103.6)  Prosperity and work value  
Figure 37 Prosperity and work value by three groups of elites
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A one-way ANOVA test results are displayed below: 
Table 106 Prosperity by three groups of elites 
                    SS  df  Mean Square         F          P 
Between groups    1.471    2              .071               .812     .447 
Within groups              87.919            97           1.257  
Total               89.390            99   
 F (2, 97) =.812, p=ns 
 
 
Table 107 Prosperity – Means (SD) 
Three Elites Groups      Mean (SD)   N        
Political Elites                   3.82   (.967)   65        
Social Elites                             3.65 (1.027)              23              
Economic Elites                 4.08   (.669)                12              
Total                   3.81   (.950)                       100              
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 (Q.104.4)  Economic liberalization 
Figure 38 Economic liberalization by three groups of elites 
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Table 108 Economic Liberalization by Three Groups of Elites 
                    SS  df    Mean Square        F              P 
Between groups     1.985     2               .071               .823         .442 
Within groups               116.925         97             1.257   
Total                 118.910       99   
  F (2, 97) =.823, p=ns 
 
 
Table 109 Economic Liberalization – Means (SD) 
Three Elites Groups      Mean (SD)    N        
Political Elites                   4.63 (1.098)       65        
Social Elites                             4.30 (1.222)                  23              
Economic Elites                 4.42 (.793)                  12                
Total                   4.53 (1.096)                       100             
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Table 110 Economic Liberalization: Cross Tabulation  
Three Elite Groups N % 
Political Elites 65 
        Very poor 02 03.1 
       Poor 00  00. 
       Standard 08 12.3 
       Good 11 16.9 
       Very good 33 50.8 
       Excellent 11 16.9 
Social Elites 23 
        Very poor 00 00. 
       Poor 01 4.3 
       Standard 06 26.1 
       Good 06 26.1 
       Very good 05 21.7 
       Excellent 05 21.7 
Economic Elites 12 
        Very poor 00 00. 
       Poor 00 00. 
       Standard 01 08.3 
       Good 06 50.0 
       Very good 04 00. 
       Excellent 01 08.3 
   Total 100 
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 (Q.132)  Development precedence Economic verses Political  
Figure 39 Economic development precedence 
  
  
305 
 
Table 112 Economic Development Precedence by Three Groups of Elites 
                    SS    df     Mean Square             F              P 
Between groups        .672    2              .336                    .939         .395 
Within groups     34.718            97             .358 
Total      35.390            99   
  F (2, 97) =.939, p=ns 
 
 
Table 113 Economic Development Precedence – Means (SD) 
Three Elites Groups      Mean (SD)   N       
Political Elites                  2.63 (.651)  65        
Social Elites                            2.78 (.518)               23              
Economic Elites                2.83 (.389)               12              
Total                  2.69 (.598)             100             
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Table 114 Economic development precedence by three groups of elites 
 
Three Elite Groups N % 
 Political 65 65% 
                  1. The economic development 
                     should take precedence  4 4% 
 2. The political development and civil 
                     liberties should take precedence  18 18% 
                 3. Both developments should occur 
                    simultaneously Neutral 41 41% 
 
4. Neither, both are imposed by  
                    external powers 
2 
 
2% 
 
 Social 23 23% 
                  1. The economic development 
                     should take precedence  0 0% 
 2. The political development and civil 
                     liberties should take precedence  6 6% 
                 3. Both developments should occur 
                    simultaneously Neutral 16 16% 
 4. Neither, both are imposed by  
                    external powers 1 1% 
 Economic 12 12% 
                  1. The economic development 
                     should take precedence  0 0% 
 2. The political development and civil 
                     liberties should take precedence  2 2% 
                 3. Both developments should occur 
                    simultaneously Neutral 10 10% 
 4. Neither, both are imposed by  
                    external powers 0 0% 
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(Q.133)   Qualitative Thematic Analysis: The relationship between the economic &  
    political developments 
  
Table 115 Political and economic development plan choice by elites    
Core Themes                                                    Frequency  
Political and economic Stability                64 
Reinstatement of Freedoms                      29 
Economic Development            4        
  
 The following table illustrates elites’ core and subordinate themes and their 
elaborations on their responses on the development plan that they chose in (Q. 132). 
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Table 116 Political and economic development plan choice: core and subordinate  
  themes  
Theme 1 Theme 2 Theme 3 Elites’ Quotations from 
the Survey 
 
Political & 
Economic Stability 
  
Ensures higher 
growth & 
productivity at 
all levels 
 The achievement of 
higher levels of growth 
and productivity 
enhances the government 
credibility and improves 
its relative political 
capacity. 
    
Reinstatement of 
freedoms 
 
Establishment 
of Free 
Enterprising 
Economy 
Protection 
from 
globalization 
 
The Globalization led 
Jordanians to discontents 
because it did not lead to 
economic development. 
    
Economic 
development 
 
 
Open economy 
& globalization 
 
Free markets 
 
 
Liberalization & 
globalization open the 
door for modernity, 
encourage the world 
investments, and 
accentuate freedoms. 
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 The below table demonstrates the distribution of elites’ beliefs in the effectiveness 
of their chosen development plan: 
  
Table117 Political and economic development plan choice (N %) 
Core Themes  Political Elites  Social Elites   Economic Elites      
      (N=65)     (N=23)       (N=12)                  
Political & Economic        38        16           10                         
Stability                     58.5 %       69.6%                             83.3 %                  
 
Reinstatement of        21                     6                                  2                          
Freedoms                  32.3%                       26.0%                              16.6 %                    
 
Economic                            4          0                                     0                                
Development                     6.2%                         00.0%                             00.0 %    
 
                               
   
 
 
